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Letter from the Executive Board

S

ince President Barack Obama was sworn into office a little
over a year ago, “change” is one of many words to describe the
current political climate. Is America more divided after the tortuous healthcare wrangle? Or is America more effusively expressing
its diverse political views? Whether it is the conspicuous rise of the
Birther Movement or outraged citizens storming the Capitol armed
with epithets, it is nearly impossible to tell which conditions make up
today’s political landscape other than just plain mad. Change is hard,
and apparently, change is angry.
That is not to say that Americans do not have good reason to be
angry. Congress seems to be unable to solve urgent problems as individuals, communities, and other levels of government suffer from
joblessness, rising costs, and fewer resources. Anger is only at the
surface of America’s deep fear and anxiety over an uncertain future.
But this is change in its rawest form—the good, the bad, and the
ugly. This spring volume features contributions on healthcare reform’s underbelly and potential homeownership opportunity rollbacks; however, it also features essays on LGBT advocates’ success
in joining the Supreme Court bar, preparation of a new generation
of problem-solving lawyers, and creative solutions that bring attention to the broken criminal justice system. If the current political
landscape demonstrates any lesson, it is that change does not equate
progress. Sometimes even, as Bridgette Baldwin convincingly argues
about welfare stigmatization, things can be more of the same. It depends from which vantage point one looks.
The Modern American is “modernizing” during our sixth year, yet our
commitment to offering robust dialogue on diverse issues remains
as firm as ever. Evocative dialogue can contain a lot of value—it
can be more than irate slurs hurled at elected officials. Real decisions
affect real people in real ways which is essential to acknowledge in a
discussion about political change. Still, we must be fair-minded as we
engage with one another.
The Modern American continues to bring incisiveness out from political
storms on pressing issues within this volume and those to come. We
encourage The Modern American readers to help us in our mission to
provide a constructive platform for these conversations by offering
us feedback during our Strategic Plan comment period (open until
May 31). More information about the Strategic Plan can be found on
the publication back cover. Here, at The Modern American, we believe,
“Yes, we still can.”

Sincerely Yours,
The Executive Board
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STRATIFICATION OF THE WELFARE POOR:
INTERSECTIONS OF GENDER, RACE, & “WORTHINESS”
IN POVERTY DISCOURSE AND POLICY
By: Bridgette Baldwin 1
On average, we black women have bigger, better problems
than any other women alive. We bear the burden of being
seen as pretenders to the thrones of both femininity and
masculinity, endlessly mocked by the ambiguously gendered
crown-of-thorns imagery of ‘queen’ Madame Queen, snap
queen, welfare queen, quota queen, Queenie Queen, Queen
Queen Queen. We black women are ﬁgured more as stand-ins
for men, sort of like reverse drag queens: women pretending
to be women but more male than men—bare-breasted, sweatglistened, plow-pulling, sole supporters of their families.
- Patricia Williams 2
INTRODUCTION
Welfare policy in theory aims to compensate those in
need, usually those existing at or below a ﬂuctuating poverty
line. The policy behind welfare has always been devised.
However, who is designated as poor and when that poverty is
deserving of compensation has never been fully determined
by economic conditions, but most crucially by subjective
interpretation of “worthiness.” As a perfect example, in the
1980s, black women across the country were exposed, uplifted
and appreciated as the “queens” of American poverty. At the
behest of this black “queen’s” inauguration was the future 40th
President and then Governor of California, Ronald Reagan.3
In his highlighting of welfare programs, Reagan hailed black
women as the ultimate “welfare queens.”4 You have heard the
story, with minute details which differ from region to region: the
Black “welfare queen”5 had a generally lavish lifestyle driving
around in her nice new Cadillac never really going anywhere in
particular, unless off to pick up her welfare checks (which by
the way she had gotten rich on) or to dine on steak and lobster.
However, she usually stayed at home watching soap operas like
“Days of our Lives,” generating more income by producing
baby after baby. She was cunning yet shiftless, clever in her
manipulation of the system yet uneducated, and active in her
endeavor to con the system yet lazy in her work ethic. All hail
the “welfare queen.”
This representation of black women permeated the
discourse of welfare reform in the 1980s and later served as
an important propaganda image in the social policy switch
from welfare to workfare.6 We needed a reason to reduce
resources to the poor and what better way than to use the
notoriously lazy black woman as a scapegoat. She was the
personal manifestation of a lazy well-fed government that
had produced no proﬁts and was the reason for the country’s
economic decline. Despite the containment of many black
women within the economic status of the working poor, black
women were painted as the picture of the “welfare queen,”
4

designated as undeserving and unworthy of any social welfare
beneﬁts and as the poster child for the neo-conservative small
government, big business movement.
If we move backward to the 1880s at the start of
welfare policies in the post Reconstruction Era, we see a
completely different standard of compensatory worthiness,
but one with almost the exact same policy outcome. Again
black women’s identity was not purely deﬁned by a standard
of economic poverty but predicated on notions of moral
ﬁtness and even conceptions of employability. In this era, for
almost the opposite reason, black women were central to the
discussion and marginalized from the help of social welfare.7
However, instead of being heralded as the lazy “welfare
queen,” they were marked as despicable, employable workers
because of their consistent labor during slavery.8 Unlike
white women, who were part of a rising white middle-class
that fostered female respectability by relegating women to
the domestic sphere and protecting them from public labor,
black women were seen as perfect for work and for this reason
not eligible for compensation for the very real poverty they
faced while working.9 Under the patriarchal domestic code,
“proper” women stayed home and took care of their husbands
and children, and if the husband died the state would step in to
ﬁll “his” void.10 Hard-working husbands could earn sufﬁcient
money to support their families.11 Fittingly, this allowed society
to deny black mothers the same protection as “proper” mothers
who worked in their own homes. Because black women were
required to work outside the home, they were excluded from
poverty compensation. Moreover, because black women
usually worked in white women’s homes they provided the
labor to ensure white female respectability.
This history of economic “worthiness,” this revelation,
is signiﬁcant for welfare policy discourse. When black people
were stolen from Africa and sold into slavery, the plantation
system rarely discriminated between man, woman, old, young,
weak or poor.12 So in that sense the post-slavery argument
is consistent; working-class black women have continually
been “working mothers” without the protected status of
respectable motherhood. Black women have been expected to
work. Yet the image of black women has been distorted over
the 100 years since the Reconstruction to reinforce normative
conclusions that they are unworthy of welfare. During the
formative stages of welfare policy-making in the 1880s, black
women were thought undeserving of welfare because they
were considered inherently employable. By the 1980s, black
women were uniformly deemed unworthy of welfare because
they were “welfare queens,” lazy by nature and unwilling
participants in the labor force. What we rarely think about
is the permanent centrality of black female images to welfare
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discourse. “She” is consistently deemed to be the negation, of the discussion in this era, the Progressive Movement’s image
the opposite of compensatory worthiness within the poor of “mother,” which relegated her to the domestic sphere, was
for contradictory reasons. Importantly, charting the changes solely dependent on the labor of black women in the homes
in the meaning of black women’s relationship to worthiness of white “mothers.” The construction of social welfare policy
and poverty compensation is not a history of their poverty that required women to work in their own home excluded
but diagrams the evolution of the rapid transformation and black women and exposed the foundations of public welfare
decline of social welfare programs in the United States through policy as inherently racialized and white.17 The advocates for
Mother’s Pension constructed the family along white middle
a misrepresentation of the black female image.
A social and historical examination of black women’s class standards and norms. Entitlement to certain social
representation within welfare policy and discourse reveals beneﬁts was predicated on losing a male provider and offered
that social constructions of race and gender have consistently protections only to women who labored in the home. These
informed welfare reform policies that rationalize inequitable constructions ran counter to the reality of black family life
and the labor demands placed on black
distributions and unrealistic visions of
women in particular.
the social world. This paper analyzes the
. . . welfare was rarely meant
The
political,
economic
historical, cultural and legal treatments
to remedy the structural
and social opportunities provided
and representations of poor black women
by industrial capitalism during the
from Progressive Era philanthropic aid to
crunch of poverty.
Progressive Era were stratiﬁed along
early “work-to-welfare” reform protocol.
racial lines. The clarion call for progress
When black women serve as the case
during this period seemed ironic at best
study for a larger examination of social
policy issues we see that welfare was rarely meant to remedy when considering that this period was also the ostensible
the structural crunch of poverty. Working class black women nadir of race relations. Black men and women suffered due
have been at the center of the construction of the poor and to persistent acts of racial violence and discrimination at the
serve as the designation to determine which people deserve hands of poor whites, particularly in the South.18 Further,
to be compensated for being poor.13 This paper discusses social welfare reform efforts subjected private relationships
both the ramiﬁcations and rationale of why the government within black families to public scrutiny as a pre-condition for
never designated black women as “deserving” poor and the alleviating poverty conditions.19 This is not to suggest that
implications of constructed images in the post-reconstruction sexual and racial equalities were not part of the Progressive
period, the New Deal Era, the 1960s AFDC agenda, and 1980s agenda; they just were just secondary concerns. Structural
dynamics and changes to the meanings of gender identity
welfare to work reform.
made it difﬁcult for black women to meet ideas of what it
PROGRESSIVE ERA
meant to be a respectable or a decent mother.20 White women
tried to improve their lives and the lives of their families
The Progressive Era historically has been popularly but created and endorsed policies that ignored the particular
understood as a movement of positive social reform and the role black women played as the matriarch of their particular
rise of the feminist movement.14 However, the changing socio- familial experiences. As historian Eileen Boris argues, “though
economic landscape of turn of the century depression, post- reformers deﬁned motherhood as a positively valued nurturing
slave economy, and rapid urban-industrialization left many activity…women of color... had to labor for others and could
people exposed to the underside of capitalist progress.15 From not fulﬁll the dictates of ‘true womanhood.’”21
this reality emerged a collection of middle class reformers
A woman’s eligibility for Mother’s Pensions was
concerned with conceptualizing a more humane relationship determined by her moral standing in the community.22
between industry and the increasingly poor and largely Progressive reformers were dedicated to serving those who
(im)migrant communities.
they deemed to have proper morals and worthy character and
The rise of Progressive Era women reformers stood who deserved assistance due to temporary hardship.23 Poor
at the center of this formation. These reformers concentrated working mothers were deemed undeserving poor. While many
on improving the conditions of women who were being pushed European immigrants could also be excluded by these general
into the industrial labor force because of poverty resulting guidelines, black women were haunted by images of their slave
from death, divorce or insufﬁcient employment of their male past. Black women had always been part of the labor market
providers. The major thrust of politics and policy urged by and never protected by the laws of marriage and hence were
these reformers was the protection of women from the travails branded as inherently undeserving and suspected of vice,
of a rapidly changing world and the brutal labor market. immorality and intemperance in ways that working class white
Progressive Era women reformers stressed reorganization ethical women were not.24 Mothers had to be ﬁt and proper
of the family and were instrumental in the establishment of and this deﬁnition was left to the discretion of local overseers
the ﬁrst social welfare program for women: the “Mothers’ of the relief. Initial Mother’s Pensions regulations required in
Pensions.”16 However, if we place black women at the center many states that a woman be a widow and enforced strict yet
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ambiguous behavioral standards.25 What really came out of families. Most black family members worked as agricultural
the Mothers’ Pensions was that those white women deemed wage laborers and sharecroppers in the south and low skilled
deserving were helped. Black women were encouraged to craft workers or domestics in the north. In addition, black
organize for their pensions separately, but this was an unrealistic men who were hired out into positions which were considered
request considering the lack of political and economic power more professional, were not hired for long and therefore black
in the hands of the black community.26 Nonetheless, the women had to make consistent and substantial contributions
National Association of Colored Women (NACW) organized to their families.32 Here, the “undeserving” angle showed its
to create better social conditions for black women. Unlike the face quite often in the domestic work performed by black
platforms that endorsed Mothers’ Pensions for white women, women. With the strong expectation of female domesticity,
this organization encouraged women to work to improve black women were summarily excluded from the beneﬁts
of the Mothers’ Pensions because
the economic conditions of the family
they had always worked and were seen
and the national reputation of black
The new American welfare state
womanhood.27
as able to work.33 As an example, the
Lack of economic and political intentionally excluded black families, Sheppard-Towner Act,34 also known
strength was not the only shortcoming particularly black women, from access as the maternity bill, provided federal
black women faced; they also had to deal
funds to states for health and welfare of
to social welfare beneﬁts
with the legalized conditions of racism.
mothers and infants during maternity.35
The highly celebrated achievements
States were given unfettered discretion
of the Progressive Movement co-existed with the Jim Crow as to how they distributed funds.36 Since racialized notions
Era in the South and its more covert operation in northern of motherhood heavily informed this discretion, black women
cities. In fact, Jim Crow Laws were on the books as early as the did not receive the same funds as their white counterparts.37
1890s and the policies ran the gamut from more benign legal Hence, the umbrella protections afforded to white women
sanctions on public housing, employment and recreation to the were not afforded to black women. So-called “progress” in
more pernicious forms of racial violence including rapes and this era was stratiﬁed along racial lines. While the ensuing
lynchings. 28 The Plessy v. Ferguson29 doctrine of “separate but Great Depression could have instigated an egalitarian level of
equal” became the formalized manifestation of longstanding compensation because everyone was poor, we ﬁnd that the
white anxieties about black progress. Even in the more liberal distribution of federal money still continued along racial lines.
North, the segregation of settlement houses and social
programs along the lines of race denied that white supremacy
NEW DEAL OR RAW DEAL
was the “peculiar institution” of the South. The most public
and spectacular exhibitions of how former slaves were not
With the worst stock market crash in history and the
treated as citizens were the charred bodies and punctured souls Great Depression descending upon the states, thousands of
that lynching parties left on display. According to historian people ﬂooded soup kitchens in urban and rural communities
Jacqueline A. Rouse, the legalized sanctioning of lynching across the nation. Black people, who were already living
during the Jim Crow Era promoted white supremacy and in poverty, suffered even greater losses from the economic
maintained subordination and intimidation of black people.30 depression. The agricultural collapse in the southern states
Under the specter of Jim Crow, most turn of the century led to the near destruction of the tenant farming system and
social reform was born. This is not to deny the sympathetic severe unemployment for many black families that still toiled
supporters and charitable settlement houses set up to assist on southern land as others had made decisions to leave the
poor black families in the North, but in the larger scheme of South a few years prior. At the same time, black women in
things these supporters were far and few between, speciﬁcally the North also began to lose their jobs in exorbitant numbers
in southern communities. Most of the policy-makers were, and were replaced by white women domestics as they were left
after all, faithful to a racist ideology that supported racial unshielded by the plight of the Great Depression.38 In 1932,
violence, unequal political and legal systems, and inferior social President Franklin D. Roosevelt promised to provide economic
services. Out of the bondage of slavery most black families security for all Americans with the “New Deal.”39
The
were relegated to agricultural and, for women, domestic labor unprecedented economic policy decisions during Roosevelt’s
to survive. Racism further hindered the advancement of black “Frst 100 Days” brought about new agencies and programs.
people and kept them working in menial jobs.31 Social welfare President Roosevelt’s New Deal projected to implement
policies in particular ignored the role of the black mother and ideas from the Progressive Era and consolidate them into a
the stratiﬁcation of labor in the black family.
federally sponsored program. Still, the new American welfare
Black families lived in a world with considerably state intentionally excluded black families, particularly black
restricted opportunities and blatant discrimination. During this women, from access to social welfare beneﬁts under New Deal
time period black women were not protected by the Mothers’ legislation.40
Pensions and the social welfare beneﬁts because they were
With the rise in the immigrant population, the political
considered employable women and they had to support their controllers were all too delighted to bypass the economic and
6
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racial problems of black families. According to historian black families from earning wages at any signiﬁcant rate above
Michael Brown, there was no need to deal with the “Negro poverty.61
State-subsidized
machinery
beneﬁted
white
problem” because it was presumed that the New Deal politics
would lessen racism by raising the standard of living for all landowners by increasing productivity while eliminating the
people through social reform.41 However, under the New Deal need for black tenant farmers.62 Thus, agricultural innovations
administration, social welfare organizations did little to change caused the displacement of more black families. Even where
the quality of life for black people.42 Although Roosevelt black workers remained on white farms, lax enforcement of
is credited with changing the economic prosperity of the AAA policies requiring landowners to channel a portion of
country with various acts and disbursements of money to state government crop reduction pay to tenants guaranteed that
polities, it comes at no surprise that there was an increasing black tenants were deprived of their share.
and detrimental pattern of inequitable distribution of funds
The Social Security Act (SSA), which included both
43
to the black poor. Roosevelt extended social beneﬁts to old age insurance and public relief, was another example
whites, while discriminatory practices implemented by state of race-based policy implementation.63 Seemingly coloragents constructively denied those same benﬁts to blacks.44 blind policies continued to intentionally deny black families
Unfortunately, black families continued to suffer and were not access to beneﬁts.64 The SSA speciﬁcally excluded domestic
equally included in Roosevelt’s New Deal for all Americans.45
and agricultural workers from receiving beneﬁts upon the
Ironically, programs under New Deal legislation loss of a breadwinner.65 As mentioned previously, these
began to systematically push black men into unemployment.46 areas of employment were predominately occupied by black
For example, the National Recovery Administration (NRA)47 workers.66 The Works Progress Administration (WPA), which
and the Agricultural Adjustment Act (AAA) of 193348 were concentrated on employment rather than relief, also instituted
considered to be pivotal in the early stages of “New Deal” color-blind policies. However, without the enforcement by
policy making.49 One of the NRA’s major “color-blind” policies the federal government of non-discriminatory practices, black
was to implement equitable wage standards across all races.50 workers were intentionally excluded from access to public jobs
However, there was a signiﬁcant disparity in racialized wage in everyday practices.67 Between 1936 and 1942, black workers
earnings for black workers especially in southern regions.51 were hired for roughly only 15 % of the jobs offered under
The NRA and the federal government endorsed longstanding the WPA.68 Due to the intentional exclusion of black men
regional practices by refusing to enforce national standards of from the labor market, black families began to lose their male
industry and labor. There was little done to control state-to- breadwinners. Most black women were in the labor market,
state disparities and deviations of salaries to black workers. but women who had never worked were also being forced to
In addition, some southern employers refused to pay black earn the family wage or apply for public relief. Although New
workers as much as white workers on the view that black labor Deal policies endorsed giving welfare beneﬁts to women who
was signiﬁcantly less efﬁcient than white labor.52 Further, headed households, most public relief, which was controlled
when employers in southern states were forced to pay whites by local governments, was also predicated on the former
and blacks equally, they threatened to ﬁre all black employees domesticity of the women. Because of the legacy of racism
and replace them with more efﬁcient white employees.53 and the concentration of black families below the poverty
Obviously still offended by the government appropriation of line, many black women had always been in the labor market
well before the New Deal. Therefore,
their commodiﬁed labor,54 southerners
were determined to keep black labor
black women continued to be excluded
Access
to
the
program
was
still
55
from public relief, social beneﬁts, social
cheap.
determined by an ambiguous
Black women fared no better.
security and other forms of welfare
Although many black women already “suitable home” standard which because their status as “employable”
labored in the market, an increasing
excluded most needy black families. made them again, undeserving of
number of black women became the sole
government help.
breadwinners for their families. Because
The program that could have had
of the scarcity of jobs during the Great Depression, black the most impact on public relief for black women was the
women were exploited by their domestic employers and were Aid to Dependent Children Act (ADC). ADC was merely an
paid very little per week to support their families.56 In many extension of Mother’s Pensions69 and similarly guided by ideas
states, black women were paid the lowest salaries outside of of the so-called deserving poor. Access to the program was still
and below NRA’s federal standards.57 In addition, the NRA determined by an ambiguous “suitable home” standard which
refused to include domestic work, agricultural work or common excluded most needy black families.70 Further, federal agencies
laborers among those who should receive the minimum wage.58 under political pressure from southern states allowed local
In the South in particular, black women represented 60 % governments to determine the speciﬁc criteria for eligibility.
59
of the domestic workers corps, and roughly 40 %60 of the Most southern states were dependent on cheap black labor and
agricultural labor was Black. Refusal to include occupations very reluctant to create policies that gave black workers access
that were dominated by black labor under NRA precluded to federal relief.71 Although later ruled unconstitutional,72
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minimum residency requirements mandated by local assisted programs under-served the black community and
governments also excluded most black migrant workers.73 solidiﬁed the place of black families at the bottom of a racist
Further, many southern states conditioned access to public regime. Black families continued to be moved to substandard
relief to mothers who had never worked in the labor market, housing complexes and were relegated to the worst health care
which would exclude most black mothers. Southern states facilities in the country. The result of the end of World War
reasoned that black mothers had always worked and asked II led to immense poverty due in large part to displacement
why anything should change because
of women and black workers when
of this new program.74 Such restrictive
white soldiers returned. Changes in the
Because black women were
measures left families, and particularly
structure of the so-called nuclear family
black mothers, in a state of signiﬁcant deemed inherently undeserving, they became evident particularly in poorer
were subjected to benign neglect by state communities. For example, in 1950
poverty and despair.75
Access to beneﬁts under
approximately a quarter of the population
and national governments.
new nationalized welfare policies was
of black mothers were separated,
structurally distinguished by race and
divorced or widowed.83 Children living
gender, attaching welfare beneﬁts to socially constructed notions in one-parent households in the black community rose from
of what qualiﬁes as a traditional family organization. Family roughly 22 % to 32 % in ten years.84 Although the rise in single
(dis)organization determined what relationship, if any, a family parent income could represent the increase in the number of
could have to the American welfare state.76 Because of various black mothers on AFDC, this rationalization ignores the reality
acts that caused displacement among black families during the of the social, economic and political plight of black families.
Great Depression, there was a high proportion of female- Several presidential administrations have tampered with the
headed households.77 In the North, a reported 30 % of black American welfare state. Unfortunately, the impact of this
families were headed by single, divorced or widowed women.78 haphazard effort at reform has been very detrimental to singleThe ease with which New Deal policies excluded much of the parent households headed by black women. In particular, the
black male labor force from social insurance created a legal expansion of the American welfare state to include single black
barrier that was greater for black women than for similarly- mothers created a cultural backlash motivated by racism and
situated white women. For instance, rising out of poverty was sexism and opened the door to what President Clinton called
more difﬁcult for black women than their white counterparts “the end of welfare as we know it.”85
because New Deal policies extended to similarly-situated white
The previously mentioned Aid to Dependent Children
women where the husband was unemployed or dead. This is Act (ADC)86 originated in the Social Security Act of 1935 but
especially true where black men suffered from unemployability. has its historic foundation in the Progressive Era as a remnant
Welfare policies distinguished among households based on of Mothers’ Pensions.87 Similar to Mothers’ Pensions, ADC
how they became female-headed—whether by death, divorce, was originally intended to continue to allow deserving mothers
abandonment, or single motherhood, for example—so black to stay at home with their children while receiving public
families and images of black womanhood became the focus assistance. Most ADC programs provided beneﬁts to families
of public scrutiny and outcry.79 New Deal programs therefore who lost a male breadwinner due to death, abandonment or
failed to protect black women in two ways: as capable mothers unemployment. Conceptually, the structural problem with the
and as capable workers.80
early foundations for this program was the continual role of
As black communities were further consolidated an ambiguously deﬁned notion of worthiness. Because black
into urban ghettos after World War II, black female-headed women were deemed inherently undeserving, they were subjected
households would ﬁnally come under the umbrella of state to benign neglect by state and national governments.88
aid. However, these very inclusions were predicated on the
In 1950, a series of changes to ADC occurred, including
fortiﬁcations of false theories about black family deviance and a name change to Aid to Families with Dependent Children
dependency in female-headed homes in particular.81 Ideas (AFDC).89 Like its predecessor, AFDC continued to offer
derived from the infamous Moynihan Report82 and the urban cash assistance to the deserving poor. State and local governments
application of the “culture of poverty” theory would hide an controlled the administration and eligibility requirements for
entire history of white working class social mobility that had relief. Particularly in southern states, restrictive eligibility
been predicated on state and private aid. The misrepresentation requirements continued to exclude black mothers from relief.
of black deviance and the masking of white dependency For example, the infamous “man in the house” rule allowed
signaled the beginning of the end for welfare in America.
states to remove beneﬁts from black mothers who had a male
(not son) living in the home.90 Likewise, the “employable”
AID TO SOME FAMILIES WITH
standard required all black mothers to work unless they were
DEPENDENT CHILDREN
handicapped or sick.91
After a series of liberal amendments in the 1960s,
The postwar 1950s and 60s witnessed racial clashes the number of AFDC beneﬁciaries began to increase
and increasing ghetto unrest. State and local government- dramatically and more poor single black mothers gained access
8
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to the program’s beneﬁts.92 From 1960 to 1970 there were lower property taxes. This pulled the rug out from under the
approximately 5 million people receiving public assistance, ﬁve socio-economic infrastructure of central cities and instigated
times more people than were on the welfare rolls between 1950 the rise of what we now call “the ghetto.” Mythical binary
and 1960.93 With increasing caseloads and changes in the racial oppositions of group dependence versus individual will and
composition of recipients, AFDC came under severe political suburbanization versus ghettoization obscured the history of
attack followed by a profound resentment of this program and state funding for other immigrant and regional communities in
the poor. 94 The many reasons for this backlash include the their transition from ethnic European to white. 101
simple fact of the increased legions of poor citizens receiving
The commitment to engage in the “War on Poverty”
95
public relief from taxpayers.
during the Johnson administration had lost its zeal by the time
Another reason for the immense backlash, particularly California’s Hollywood screen star turned governor took ofﬁce.
against black mothers, was the notorious report authored by The Reagan Administration’s use of the “welfare queen” image
the Assistant Labor Secretary (and future Senator) Daniel fabricated and reinforced images of criminal and sexually
Moynihan. Moynihan suggested that the economic conditions promiscuous black women.102 This successful misinformation
of the black family resulted from their deviation from American campaign framed the national welfare conversation, and the
family norms.96 The reason for the terrible plight of the black public began to oppose welfare programs, fearing that high
family was that most black males had a signiﬁcantly high assistance payments reinforced the cycle of poverty and
rate of unemployment and therefore could not be adequate ensured long-term dependency. The Reagan Administration
breadwinners for their families.97 This in turn produced a promulgated policies based on these welfare fabrications by
signiﬁcant surge in unsupported illegitimate children among signiﬁcantly cutting beneﬁts, under-funding childcare and jobblack families, an increase in female-headed households and a training facilities, and creating legal barriers for poor women to
cultural dependency on welfare by black women and children.98 gain access to public assistance.103 Unfortunately, the effects of
So, not only was the taxpayer’s money being used to support a these policies outlasted the Reagan era. Reagan simply paved
huge population, it was being used to support a huge “Negro” the path for the decadent decline of federal cash assistance for
population. Moynihan’s report grossly mischaracterized the poor and the push of under-skilled and under-supported
black families in general and black mothers in particular. All black women into a labor market that did not even exist (no
demographic metrics upon which Moynihan relied ignored jobs or beneﬁts).
the historical legacy of systemic and intergenerational racism
that produced the high unemployment rates observed today.
A WOMAN’S WORK IS NEVER DONE
State and societal discrimination, not inherent deﬁciencies, is a
driving contributor to black poverty. Thus, Moynihan justiﬁes
Although Reagan succeeded in creating a negative
state indifference to poverty by ignoring historical context and image of welfare and limited the coverage for both working
places blame squarely upon the poor for their poverty.
and non-working poor, some cash assistance was still available
Lastly, the emerging “culture of poverty” theory, before the 1990s welfare reform agenda. By 1987, Congress
combined with the pre-existing Moynihan Report, explicitly was ready to take up the issue of welfare reform and passed
racialized and gendered the category of poverty as black and the Family Support Act (FSA) the next year. The FSA aimed
female. The “culture of poverty” theory posited that economic to assist middle-class white mothers with young children
inequality was not an issue of larger
who were entering the labor force.
social forces but a product of deviant
This focus gave states the ﬂexibility
the
emerging
“culture
of
poverty”
cultural behaviors antithetical to delayed
to require those poor mothers who
theory . . . explicitly racialized
gratiﬁcation, economic modesty and
were receiving beneﬁts to also work.104
productive labor; while the characteristics and gendered the category of poverty Despite the Reagan Administration’s
of economic dependency would be
signiﬁcant cuts and stringent guidelines,
as black and female
passed on through the generations.99
the number of poor people on AFDC
Unfortunately, this theory became largely
climbed 30 % between 1989 and
associated with black female-headed households. This in turn 1994, with a signiﬁcant rise in the single black household
reinforced a pre-existing suspicion of the black community. demographic.105 Ironically, it was during the ostensibly more
Welfare, once associated with deserving white women, became liberal Clinton Administration that policies of welfare would
despised as a relief program for allegedly lazy, poor black be central to discussions about governmental reforms and
women.
cutbacks. Despite images of a hip saxophone-playing Clinton,
As a product of these political and academic the so-called “ﬁrst black president,” Clinton’s policies proved
investigations, voices shouted to dismantle the American that he was no stranger to welfare reform106 and no friend to
welfare state and lynch the “welfare queen.”100 Simultaneously, poor black women. Clinton put welfare back on the agenda by
state aid was beginning to be stripped away from black deploying slogans such as “ending welfare as we know it” and
communities and redistributed to white suburban communities. “making work pay.”107 The focus of these debates, pulled from
Industrial factories were encouraged to leave urban centers for the Moynihan Report discourse, quickly turned to eliminating
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welfare and stopping the reported cycle of dependency among
the poor that was fueled by illegitimate births. At the same
time, the birth rate for unwed black mothers was 70 %.108 False
images of single black female-headed households galvanized a
political backlash, and black women became the symbol for
eliminating public assistance and “ending welfare as we know
it.”
Following Reagan’s lead, media images continued to
condemn black mothers as lazy “welfare queens” when they
stayed home with their children, while simultaneously praising
white mothers as good “soccer moms” for staying home
with their children.109 As political scientist Holloway Sparks
correctly notes, “[t]he portrayal of poor women of color—
and particularly African American women—as abusers of the
system, immoral… and [dependent] essentially destroyed their
ability to appear as legitimate and authoritative participants in
the democratic deliberations about welfare.”110 By portraying
public assistance as solely beneﬁting undeserving black
mothers, this scrutiny reinforced public policies relating to
welfare reform, emphasized race and class-based stereotypes
related to women and work, and maintained traditional blackwhite dichotomies.111
Public policy makers stressed eliminating welfare
because it
reportedly
promoted
inter-generational
dependency.112 This policy painted a picture of welfare
recipients who were poor, black, and female. Strikingly, lack of
employment opportunities, racism, or any other form of social
inequity did not enter into the discourse as possible variables
for poor, black women’s place on welfare.113 But laziness,
irresponsibility, and lack of a “strong work ethic” were assigned
as reasons that kept black women on the roll.114 Recall that, a
little over 100 years earlier, the image of poor black women was
not one of laziness but of women who had always worked and
therefore could always work. But, when faced with the idea
that the once lily white face of welfare was becoming black,
the discourse to eliminate welfare quickly turned to negative
images of black mothers as lazy and dependent. Missing from
the discourse is any acknowledgement of the fact that, when
they decided to enter the workforce, white women were wellequipped for a society that had progressed from a primarily
industrial era to an information technology era. Business
management, computer literacy, administrative assistance, and
other types of skills and education were available to white
women. Such training was unattainable by the working black
poor during the industrial era but was needed as economic
relations began to transform. Lacking transitional skills, black
families were forced onto welfare and were seen as resistant
to work, as opposed to unable to attain work or qualifying
skills.115
Against this backdrop, the Clinton Administration
signed the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Act (welfare reform), which abolished the federal guarantee
of welfare cash to poor families with dependent children in
1996.116 The federal government also created the Temporary
Assistance for Needy Families Act (TANF),117 which placed
10

deadlines on how long a family could receive public assistance.118
This program came out of the need for the government to
reduce the amount of cash assistance to black poor mothers
and, according to political scientist Richard Fording, it
“represent[ed] a more punitive and restrictive approach to
public assistance.”119 However, the agenda under Clinton was
more covert in its target of black women than was Reagan’s
“welfare queen” agenda, by focusing on studies and reported
“statistical” data that showed that black children lived in more
single-headed households and by using color-blind terms such
as illegitimacy instead of “black welfare queen” images.120 At
the same time, senators and representatives further portrayed
images of the undeserving welfare mothers as cheaters of
the system, robbing taxpayers of their money, child abusers,
drug addicts and the cause of poverty.121 Welfare mothers
were also seen as amoral characters because they refused to
get married and be supported by the male breadwinner.122
It is under these images that the welfare debate galvanized
a hostile environment aimed at poor black mothers. These
policies were shaped by views of black women because, at
this point, when the term “welfare recipient” was discussed,
a caricatured image of deviant black womanhood was ﬁrmly
etched in the national imagination.123 Therefore, welfare policy
reﬂected a sentiment that black mothers needed “tough love”
and that eliminating welfare was the only way to discipline
and instruct their behavior because they would continue to
depend on welfare if left to themselves. Welfare reform, and
TANF in particular, paternalistically imposed discipline and
accountability that came in the form of state-imposed time
limits, which eliminated beneﬁts to black mothers after a
certain date.124
CONCLUSION
It would be inconceivable to believe that a society that
stratiﬁes basic living conditions along racial lines would not
stratify access to public assistance along those very lines. Indeed,
from Progressive Era philanthropic aid to early work-to-welfare
reform, misrepresentations of black women have resulted in
their disparate treatment. During the Progressive Era, poor
black women were undeserving because entitlement to certain
social beneﬁts was predicated on losing a male provider and
offered protections only to women who labored in the home.
Further, only mothers who were considered of a “worthy”
character, were suffering from temporary hardship, and were
“deserving” mothers would be eligible for aid.125 Progressive
reformers deemed poor black working mothers as undeserving
poor, thus denying them aid. During the New Deal era, black
women continued to be excluded from beneﬁts. Access to
beneﬁts under the new American welfare state depended on how
society deﬁned the traditional family organization, and these
deﬁnitions were structurally distinguished by race and gender.
The idea that the American family included the breadwinning
father, the stay home mother, and numerous children guided
most welfare policy designs.126 This social construction of
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the family ran counter to the realities of black families and
the labor demands on black women in particular. During the
transformation of ADC to AFDC, the number of poor single
black mothers on welfare increased. Signiﬁcant shifts in policy
suggested that black women were now undeserving because of
a distinct deviant cultural behavior that encouraged immediate
gratiﬁcation, irresponsible ﬁnancial management, and a refusal
to engage in productive labor. Simply put, black women are
constructed as lazy, dependent “welfare queens.” Based on
these representations from the welfare reform agenda of the
1880s to the 1990s, a political backlash galvanized against
black women, who became the symbol for eliminating public
assistance and “ending welfare as we know it.” Scholars have
predicted that policies adopted by states under TANF with
regard to poor, black mothers will continue to be tough and
result in punitive rules and conditions.127 Finally, we cannot
continue to construct welfare policy that focuses more on the
misrepresentations of black women than on the structural
inequalities that affect everyone. If we continue in this
manner, there will forever be an unbreachable chasm between
the socio-economic realities of all Americans and the terms on
which we decide to further marginalize those very Americans
for being poor.
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ACHIEVING JUSTICE THROUGH REBELLIOUS LAWYERING:
RESTRUCTURING SYSTEMS OF LAW AND POWER FOR SOCIAL CHANGE
By: Ashly Hinmon 1
A dynamic equilibrium of power exists between law through twenty-four panels and workshops on rebellious
and social movements. Our role in social-change lawyering lawyering. Some sessions focused speciﬁcally on changing the
is not only to focus on the law itself, but also to understand rules of the game through litigation or legislation. For example,
and transform the frameworks that create and maintain one panel, “Domestic Remedies for Human Rights Violations
balanced systems of law in our society. Lani Gunier, the ﬁrst Abroad: The Future of Alien Tort Statute Legislation,”
woman of color to be appointed to a tenured professorship brought together leading Alien Tort Statute (ATS) litigators
at Harvard Law School, and Gerald Torres, a leading ﬁgure in to discuss how human rights advocates utilize the ATS as a
critical race theory and professor of law at the University of domestic remedy for international human rights violations.
Texas, gave a joint keynote address on restructuring systems of The panelists discussed a recent victory in which Nigerian
law and power for social change at the Rebellious Lawyering activists were awarded $15.5 million in compensation in a
Conference (RebLaw), held at Yale Law
suit charging Shell Oil with complicity
School in February 2010. Under the
in torture and killings, as well as a
Racism is nonetheless difﬁcult to
broad rubric of social change, Gunier
current case in which eleven Indonesian
eradicate because it is bound up
and Torres examined the transformation
citizens are suing ExxonMobil in D.C.
within society’s mechanisms of
of deeply entrenched traditions that
Circuit Court for kidnapping, torture,
perpetuate injustice in our society.
and murder. The panelists discussed
power.
Racism, for example, impacts the legal
the challenges and beneﬁts of the ATS
system on many identiﬁable levels but is
approach in promoting accountability
nonetheless difﬁcult to eradicate because it is bound up within for human rights violators.
society’s mechanisms of power.
Later at the RebLaw Conference, Karen Goodrow, the
Gunier likens the interaction between society’s Director of the Connecticut Innocence Project, led a workshop
traditions and the law to a game, and asserts that within every titled “The Unreliability of Forensics: Detecting Errors in
game there are three dimensions of power. The ﬁrst dimension Evidence.” Goodrow works to overturn wrongful convictions
is visible conﬂict–the players manipulate rules in order to win. through the use of post-conviction DNA testing. In 2006,
The second dimension involves the identity of the game’s the Innocence Project secured the release of James Calvin
designers, or the ability of those in power, to shape the rules Tillman, who served 18 ½ years in prison for crimes he did not
in a way that beneﬁts the rule-makers. The third dimension commit. As a result of his case, the Connecticut Legislature
involves an examination of the meta-narrative–the story we, as passed a new statute in 2008 providing for compensation for
a society, tell to explain why winners deserve to win and why the wrongfully convicted. Goodrow is a strong advocate for
losers deserve to lose.
the abolition of “junk science” in forensic gathering, including
Gunier and Torres argue that social-change attorneys such methods as dog tracking, bite mark analysis, and “pour
often focus on the second dimension of power and seek to patterns,” a type of arson evidence that frequently leads to
rewrite the rules in a way that yields more just results. The law, false-positive identiﬁcations.
as a societal institution, both allocates power and disciplines
Melissa Sontag Broudo, a Consulting Attorney with the
power-holders. Gunier and Torres, however, advocate for Sex Workers Project in New York City, led a lunch workshop
an increased awareness of and engagement with the third entitled “Legislative Advocacy for Sex Workers: Vacating Prior
dimension of power–the meta-narrative of law and justice, Prostitution Convictions & No Condoms as Evidence.” The
which functions both to justify the outcomes of the law and to Sex Workers Project uses human rights and harm-reduction
keep the design of our system hidden. According to Gunier approaches to protect and promote the rights of individuals
and Torres, social-change lawyering can most readily transform who engage in sex work, regardless of whether they do so
the hidden roots of injustice not only by shifting the rules, but by choice, circumstance, or coercion. Broudo discussed two
also by shifting cultural understandings of justice.
crucial pieces of legislation and how they can be used to help
To do this, we must engage on the micro-level. After disadvantaged groups. Namely, Broudo focused on New York
identifying sources of power, we must increase the democratic State Assembly Bill A03856, a bill to stop police and prosecutors
potential of speciﬁc marginalized groups, in order to enhance from using possession of condoms as evidence that people
their capacity to take control of their own identity and are engaged or intending to engage in prostitution, and New
power. Gunier and Torres also emphasize the importance of York State Assembly Bill A07670, a bill to vacate prostitution
horizontal relationships and developing “constituencies of convictions for trafﬁcked people, which passed the assembly
accountability” across group lines.
and is now awaiting action in the New York Senate.
At the conference, these themes were developed
Other sessions at the conference focused on the meta-
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narrative process of rewriting the stories that society tells itself
about what is “just.” For example, a panel titled “Identity
Construction and the Law: How Civic, Racial, Gender and
Sexual Identity Operate and Converge in the Legal Arena”
explored the interaction of these four identities, among each

Identities achieve dominance within
a particular setting, group, or circumstance illuminating the courts’ and
society’s treatment of these identities.
other and with the law. Each panelist analyzed how people
formulate these identities, how some identities achieve
dominance within a particular setting, group, or circumstance,
and which legal theory illuminates the courts’, and by extension
society’s, treatment of these identities. Imani Perry, a professor
at Princeton University’s Center for African American studies,
examined racism as a cultural practice transmitted through
language, symbols, media, and other mechanisms of cultural
construction. She emphasized the importance of seeing each
marginalized group in a more complex and nuanced way and
encouraged a reading of identity that allows each category
to be embedded with distinctions. For example, she noted
that the construction of patriarchy is not simply a category
that divides men from women; patriarchy also constructs the
category of “the man” in a way that disadvantages many men
who are not acting to reinforce the dominant paradigm of
masculinity. Professor Perry argued that, while many forms
of discrimination are deeply entrenched in the legal system,
a paradigm shift to allow a holistic analysis of oppressed
groups would permit a more functional understanding of how
oppressed groups encounter the law and how the system can
be restructured to produce more just and equitable results.
Tony Varona, another “Identity Construction” panelist
and a professor at the American University Washington College
of Law, discussed recent losses by the lesbian, gay, bisexual,
and transgender (LGBT) community in individual states

and identiﬁed ways to make the gay rights community more
encompassing and effective. He focused on the importance
of restructuring the movement’s leadership to be more racially
and culturally diverse and argued that the LGBT movement
must create alliances with faith communities and religious
institutions. Professor Varona also encouraged more LGBT
people of color to come out of the closet and challenge
prevailing stereotypes within their communities–stereotypes,
for example, that might label homosexuality as completely
external to that community. In light of some states’ use of
ballot initiatives to target gay rights, Professor Varona argued
that it is even more important for the LGBT community to
ﬁnd effective ways of engaging and transforming the dialogue
to become as inclusive and encompassing as possible. Only
then would direct democracy systems be unable to manipulate
the biases of dominant groups in order to stall the progress of
gay rights.
The RebLaw Conference advanced the transformation
of our society by bringing together exemplary public-service

The Conference urged
lawyers to be rebellious and to
dismantle those social structures that
reinforce hierarchy and injustice.
lawyers and activists focused on a range of social justice
issues and by pushing participants toward greater engagement
with exigent issues of injustice and inequality. It challenged
participants to think locally and on speciﬁc issues, as well as to
ask how to transform broad social structures that perpetuate
injustice yet go unnoticed. It rejected the notion that social
change equals taking a few people from a marginalized group
and inserting them into the top tiers of society’s hierarchy.
Instead, the Conference urged lawyers to be rebellious and to
dismantle those social structures that reinforce hierarchy and
injustice.

Endnotes
Ashly Hinmon is a ﬁrst year law student at the American University Washington College of Law. She received her B.A. from Reed
College, where she studied anthropology and gender. At the Washington College of Law she is President-elect of the Women’s Law
Association and an editor for the Human Rights Brief. Before coming to law school she worked as a domestic violence advocate. This
summer she will work with Legal Aid Services of Oregon on their domestic violence project.

1

16

THE MODERN AMERICAN

SPECIALIZATION HAS THE POTENTIAL TO LEAD TO UNEVEN JUSTICE:
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CASES IN THE JUVENILE & DOMESTIC VIOLENCE COURTS
By: Allison Cleveland 1

Rather than focus on process and precedent,
problem-solving justice focuses on the
outcome. Problem solving courts are
“specialized courts that seek to respond to
persistent social, human, and legal problems,
such as addiction, family dysfunction,
domestic violence, mental illness, and qualityof-life crime.” These courts adapt their
processes to suit the sources of the problems,
which are driving the actions that bring the
wrongdoer to court in the ﬁrst place. The
focus is on the individual, and the courts
provide particularized responses designed
to change that speciﬁc offender’s future
behavior.
- Kathryn C. Sammons2
I. Introduction
In October of this year, I observed an initial hearing
at the Boston Juvenile Court for a care and protection case
involving four children, all less than ﬁve years of age.3 The
Massachusetts Department of Children and Families (“DCF”)
presented evidence that the mother used cocaine during her
pregnancy with the youngest of the four children–a newborn.
This was the entirety of the DCF case. The other three children
were present at the hearing and appeared to be very happy,
energetic, and well-cared for. Though the children’s mother
and father did not live together, they still saw each other socially
and coordinated child care. Counsel for the mother argued
that the DCF presented no nexus between the mother’s drug
use and her ability to care for her older children. The older
children, reasoned the mother’s counsel, should therefore
remain in her care. The judge reviewed documents submitted
into evidence and came to the father’s criminal record. Noting
multiple restraining orders against the father for domestic
abuse, the judge voiced concern about the mother’s failure to
separate herself from a man with such an extensive history of
domestic abuse. Accordingly, the judge ordered DCF to take
custody of all four children.
Following the hearing, I spoke with another juvenile
court judge. I admitted my surprise that all four children were
removed from their mother’s home based on their father’s
violent history against women. The judge was not surprised
by the outcome and voiced his strong feeling that the outcome
was correct. He noted that, based on the ﬁrm language used
by the Supreme Judicial Court in Custody of Vaughn,4 juvenile
court judges take no risks in situations involving domestic
abuse. The court would rather remove a child from his or her
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family than run the risk of abuse. As here, evidence of intimate
partner violence is enough to remove children from the home.
He underscored the harm that he believes can be done to a
child by simply observing abuse and his belief that mothers
are not likely to escape the cycle of intimate partner violence.
In the ensuing weeks, I observed more cases in
which children were removed from their families and placed
into DCF custody based largely on the mother’s status as a
domestic violence victim. These decisions continued to strike
me. Would the outcome be different in other courts? Would
the outcome differ, speciﬁcally, in courts that specialize in
domestic violence cases?
This paper examines the ways in which judges in the
juvenile and domestic violence courts have dealt with, and are
likely to deal with, cases of intimate partner violence where
children live in the household. Speciﬁcally, this paper suggests
that the divergent goals of these two specialty courts likely
result in uneven justice. In juvenile courts, a judge’s focus is on
the welfare of the child. Consequently, children are more likely
to be removed from an abused parent’s custody to protect the
child’s physical safety. In domestic violence courts, on the
other hand, judges are likely to adopt a more favorable position
toward domestic violence survivors, in that the abused party
is seen less as a victim and more as a capable caretaker. This
is especially true in jurisdictions where more services exist
to help victims become self-sustaining, as custody in those
jurisdictions appears more likely to be awarded to the nonabusive parent as part of the rehabilitation process.
II. Specialization: The Domestic Violence
and Juvenile and Courts
Domestic Violence Courts
“Domestic violence courts,” as the name implies, are
specialized courts that adjudicate cases involving domestic
violence. The Violence Against Women Act (“VAWA”) (Title
IV of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act
of 1994)5 routed substantial funds into the nation’s court
systems and other areas of criminal justice to demand more
accountability from domestic violence perpetrators and to
provide help and safety to victims.6 Beginning in the 1990s,
courts nationwide began to allocate special court sessions
and other procedural resources for domestic violence cases.7
These “domestic violence courts” were deemed necessary,
in part, to handle the growing number of domestic violence
cases as arrests for partner abuse became mandatory and
as district attorneys faced increasing pressure to prosecute
such crimes.8 There are currently more than 300 courts
17

with special procedures in place to handle domestic violence
matters.9 The goals of specialized domestic violence courts
around the country have been relatively uniform and include
protecting and empowering domestic violence survivors10 in
addition to holding perpetrators accountable.11 Improving
case management efﬁciency is also often cited as a goal.12
Domestic violence courts vary greatly in structure.13
Some domestic violence courts may hear only requests for civil
restraining orders, while others may adjudicate all issues—such
as restraining orders, criminal charges, and divorce and custody
issues—for a single family when domestic violence is involved.
The term “domestic violence court” can encompass anything
from specialized intake processes to an actual separate court
system dedicated to domestic violence cases.14 For example,
in 1987, the Quincy District Court in Quincy, Massachusetts
began its Domestic Violence Prevention Program, a procedural
system designed to efﬁciently address domestic violence
cases. Although not a separate court, the program integrated
a network of judges, clerks, police ofﬁcers, prosecutors,
perpetrator’s intervention programs, and other agencies to
streamline the system in which victims and perpetrators of
domestic violence would have their problems addressed.15 In
2001, Massachusetts instituted its ﬁrst (and only) domestic
violence court in Dorchester.16
Generally, domestic violence courts will, at a minimum,
hold specialized sessions for restraining orders and other civil
matters involving intimate partner violence. Special attention
will also be afforded to victims. Elena Salzman describes what
a victim can expect in the Quincy District Court:
When a woman comes to the Quincy
District Court seeking a restraining
order, her ﬁrst contact will likely be
with a domestic abuse clerk in the
Restraining Orders Ofﬁce. The Quincy
Program innovators felt that the
establishment of a separate restraining
orders ofﬁce would be more conducive
to providing the one-on-one assistance
women need to ﬁll out the proper
paperwork. . . . A woman entering the
court is often confused, scared, and
uncertain. The clerks help provide the
security a woman needs to embark on
the intimidating process of requesting
a restraining order.
Many of the domestic abuse clerks in
Quincy are volunteer interns from law
schools and social work programs at
local universities. Their duties include
disseminating: a sheet listing the
critical information the woman should
provide to the assisting clerk;
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a sheet detailing procedures on how
to ﬁle a drug/alcohol petition; and
an informational brochure entitled
“Help and Protection for Families
Experiencing Violence in the Home,”
which includes a list of emergency
resources.
After the initial intake procedure,
domestic abuse clerks refer the woman
to the daily brieﬁng sessions hosted by
the District Attorney’s Ofﬁce. During
these sessions, women not only receive
information about referral services and
their legal rights, but they also receive
emotional support. After the brieﬁng,
a clerk accompanies a woman to the
courtroom for her emergency hearing,
which is usually conducted ex parte,
without the batterer or his counsel
present. Often the clerk will stand
with the woman before the bench to
provide moral support. 17
Domestic violence courts have received widespread
praise for reducing case ﬁlings related to violence between
intimate partners.18 Victims also appear to be generally satisﬁed
with their court experiences and the adjudication process.19
However, specialized domestic violence courts are not without
critics. Some argue that such courts are victim-oriented and
focus so heavily on holding perpetrators accountable that
there is a bias in favor of alleged victims.20 The criminal
defense bar has been especially concerned, complaining that
“judicial education about family abuse and extended tenure
on a calendar devoted to such cases creates a pro-victim, antidefense bias.”21
I interviewed a local Boston defense attorney who
represents alleged abusers. She strongly echoed the sentiment
that Dorchester Domestic Violence Court judges are “much
harder” on defendants than their district court counterparts,
often denying bail or setting bail much higher than defendants
can afford. In her opinion, this placed an unreasonable burden
on defendants and resulted in differential treatment across
courts.22 It is perhaps unsurprising that a local prosecutor in
the Suffolk County Domestic Violence Unit held a different
opinion. Domestic violence courts, she reasoned, appropriately
recognize the danger that perpetrators of domestic violence
pose to victims and to society-at-large. In her view, the
seriousness with which domestic violence crimes have been
treated in these specialized courts is a model for the district
courts to follow.23
Internal criticism also exists. Domestic violence judges
themselves have cited increased workloads and emotional
burnout as disadvantages of specialization.24 Externally, some
have expressed concern that domestic violence courts usurp
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the power of the legislature by enforcing court-made domestic
violence policy.25
Finally, confusion sometimes arises where district
court domestic violence programs lack jurisdiction over
certain matters, resulting in conﬂicting orders between courts.
Massachusetts, for example, solved this problem by giving the
Dorchester Domestic Violence Court jurisdiction over criminal
and civil matters in domestic violence cases.26
Juvenile Courts
Juvenile courts are not new to the judicial system.
Special courts to adjudicate child neglect and delinquency
cases originated more than one hundred years ago, in Cook
County, Illinois, and all states now have a juvenile court
system.27 Juvenile courts have broad jurisdiction over matters
involving children. The special subject matter jurisdiction of
any particular state’s juvenile court system is proscribed by state
statute,28 and usually includes adjudicating child welfare cases
(regarding child care and protection), delinquency cases, and
issues involving children in need of services.29 In all contexts,
the mandate of the juvenile court is to protect the best interests
of the subject child.30
The juvenile court system is grounded in the philosophy
that “when parents are unable to care for or discipline a child,
it becomes the state’s duty to intervene on the child’s behalf.
This is the [concept] called parens patriae.”31 The ultimate
goal of the juvenile courts, therefore, is to protect the interests
of the child, even when the child’s interests conﬂict with the
fundamental liberty interest of parents in the care, custody
and control of their children.32 This emphasis on the child’s
interest in remaining safe from harm is especially important
in the context of intimate partner violence, where one parent,
though “ﬁt” in other ways, may be viewed as unable to protect
the child.33
The Importance of Specialized Knowledge in Domestic Violence Cases
Domestic violence cases can present special problems
to judges.34 Because domestic violence is common and likely
to be relevant to many legal actions,35 it is advisable that
judges and court staff receive specialized training.36 Because
decisions about custody are among the most important
decisions made in the judicial system,37 and there is a strong
probability that domestic violence will be considered as a factor
in those decisions, training in domestic violence is especially
important for judges38 who make decisions regarding custody
and visitation.39 Most states require the court to consider
domestic violence issues when awarding custody and visitation
rights.40 Without knowledge of the particular dynamics of
each situation involving intimate partner violence, judges
may be misled by information received in court. Victims of
domestic violence often make poor witnesses.41 The trauma
experienced by victims may manifest itself as nervousness,
timidity, and body language that may be perceived as suspect
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or deceptive by the judge.42 In addition “[w]ithout . . .
understanding of the dynamics of intimate partner violence,
a judge may question the ability of an individual to tolerate
such severe acts of violence. . . . As a result, a judge may
question the actual level of violence or the victim’s motives
if she remained in the abusive relationship. . .”43 Abusers,
on the other hand, are often conﬁdent and self-controlled,
giving an appearance of reliability and truthfulness in court.44
Despite appearances, abusers can be, and often are, “master
manipulators.”45 Domestic violence includes “tactics [that] are
more than physical violence and include a penumbra of threats
and actions to induce fear, humiliation, social isolation and
resource deprivation. Batterers cast aspersions on the moral
character, parenting and mental health of battered women to
discredit them with those who might intervene.”46 Moreover,
although a batterer may appear calm and trustworthy on the
stand, he likely still presents a danger to his victim, even when
they no longer reside in the same home. Indeed, the most
dangerous period for an abused woman47 is immediately after
separation, when her abuser may—in a panic—take desperate
measures to regain control.48
Victims may also not be seen in a favorable light when
a judge evaluates the best interests of the child for custody
purposes.49 Best interest factors focus on the stability and
security of the child’s environment, putting domestic violence
victims at a disadvantage.50 Victims are often dependent on
their abusers for housing, income and other forms of support.51
Consequently, separation from her batterer may leave a mother
without immediate access to a job and ﬁnancial resources. As
noted by Betsy McAlister Groves:
When a mother decides to leave
her partner, the children’s situation
may actually worsen. Mothers (and
children) are at continued or increased
risk of being harmed after they make
the decision to leave the relationship.
The batterer often reacts with anger,
disbelief, and increased attempts to
control the woman’s relationship.
Many women we have seen in the
Child Witness to Violence Project
described escalating danger as their
partners
attempted,
sometimes
through desperate means, to ﬁnd them
and persuade them to return home. 52
Taken together, these patterns are not intuitive. Special
knowledge on the part of judges and others in the criminal
justice system is therefore needed to effectively address the
special problems of families affected by domestic violence.
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III.

The Domestic Violence Courts

As noted above, the domestic violence courts are
victim-oriented. These courts protect and empower victims
and hold abusers accountable for their violent behavior.53 In
addition, because judges in domestic violence courts
have specialized knowledge regarding domestic violence, they
are much more likely to grasp the patterns and complexities
involved where violence occurs in the home.54 This is not only
because judges and other court ofﬁcers hear domestic violence
cases so frequently, but also because judges often receive
specialized training and tend to engage in frequent dialogue
regarding the functioning of the courts, how parties are being
served, and how the court system could do better.55
As a result of specialized knowledge, judges in
domestic violence courts are likely to perceive victims as logical
and capable people, rather than as “battered women” trapped
in a “cycle of violence.” While the learned helplessness
concept of Battered Women’s Syndrome56 still pervades the
general court system, judges in the domestic violence courts
have greater exposure to the currently recognized variation in
survivor personalities, capabilities, and resources. They are less
likely to become caught up in the mental trap described by two
legal scholars below:
Lawyers and judges subscribing to the
‘Why doesn’t she just leave?’ theory
too often ignore the battered woman’s
experience-based determination that
leaving may be more dangerous to
her and the child than staying. As a
result, battered women seeking justice
in a family law context may well face
two unnerving consequences: more
abuse from the batterer and state
coercive authority to remove her
children against her will on grounds
that a ‘traumatized’ person is less ﬁt to
care for her children than the parent
who is responsible for the abuse. The
critical family law assumption clouds
the legal system’s capacity to see that
the victimized parent’s decision may
have a secure foundation – that the
victimized parent is indeed capable of
complex thinking and acting, including
performing subtle acts of compliance,
resistance, and direct action to further
her own and her children’s safety and
autonomy in the world in which she
lives. 57
In practice, it is certainly much easier to allow custody
to remain with the logical, capable mother described above than
with a helpless victim. In this light, survivors are more likely to
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be seen as capable caretakers. Domestic violence courts tend
to adopt the “criminal law facet of domestic violence,” which
“recognizes that one intimate partner is a perpetrator and one
is a victim . . . and seeks to hold the perpetrator accountable.” 58
In contrast, family law views conﬂict in terms of two intimate
partners who must ﬁnd ways to cooperatively regulate their
relationship and their family affairs. Because the juvenile court
focuses so intently on the child, it is reasonable to believe that
juvenile court judges are more inclined toward the “family law”
perspective.
IV.

The Juvenile Courts

As noted above, the goal of any case in the juvenile
court is to protect the best interests of the child. As one
Boston juvenile court judge indicated,59 he and his fellow
judges make the physical and emotional safety of the
child paramount. They act on the demands articulated in
Vaughn,60 removing the child where it is possible that the
child may suffer physical or emotional harm as a result of
domestic violence in the home.61
Given the ways in which the juvenile court typically
functions, it is not surprising that children would be removed
from homes in which domestic violence occurs. First, the
juvenile court relies strongly on department of social services
expertise.62 The department is invariably a party in abuse and
neglect cases, and will take a position on whether it believes the
child should be removed from the home. As one commentator
notes, child welfare departments often have a checkered history
in terms of domestic violence cases,63 at least from the point
of view of domestic violence victims.64 She describes these
views as follows:65
[O]pponents claim that child protective
involvement in cases of childhood
exposure to domestic violence typically
has not served the best interests of
children or their abused caregivers.
Opponents argue that such intervention
traditionally has been ineffective,
discriminatory,
and
destructive,
endangering the safety of adult victims
and their children, blaming battered
women for their children’s exposure,
and reﬂexively removing children
from their abused parent’s custody.
Finally, opponents argue that not all
children exposed to domestic violence
are harmed by their exposure, and thus
intrusive government intervention
and its negative concomitants will be
extended to many families where such
intervention is unnecessary.
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My own conversations with local attorneys support
this view. One victim advocate opined that the Massachusetts
Department of Children and Families (“DCF”) is extremely
quick to take custody of children whose mothers are abused
following a report of a domestic disturbance.66 A local defense
attorney vigorously agreed, saying that “DCF seems to show
up as soon as an incident is reported to the police. Before a
victim can even get a restraining order, her kids are in DCF
custody.”67 Whether or not these accounts exaggerate, it is
logical to assume that child welfare agencies, like
the courts, err on the side of caution to prevent physical
harm to the child. It is not unlikely that judges are heavily
inﬂuenced by child welfare departments in court, particularly
when the alternative is to risk putting a child in a dangerous
environment. Courts and child welfare agencies have a shared
policy goal to protect the child,68 suggesting that judges defer
to agency expertise where the legitimacy of a child removal
action is considered. It is reasonable to assume that this would
be particularly true where the alternative to removal is to leave
a child at risk in a dangerous environment.
Scholar Lois Weithorn69 argues that courts have
generally deferred to child welfare agency removal actions and
have historically
“blame[d] these women for any negative
ramiﬁcations of their abuse for their children;
remove[d] children from their mothers’
custody when doing so [was] not necessary
for the child’s protection; fail[ed] to hold
the abuser accountable for his conduct; and
fail[ed] to provide any services that contribute
to the short-or long-term well-being of the
child or the nonabusive parent.”70
However, juvenile court judge concerns for the safety
of the child are based in fact. For example, children in homes
in which intimate partner violence occurs are at increased risk
for physical harm.71 Between 30 % and 60 % of children whose
mothers are abused are likely to suffer abuse themselves.72 It
is also true that children who witness domestic violence are
more likely to develop emotional and psychological problems,
show aggressive behavior, and are more likely to exhibit signs
of post-traumatic stress disorder and depression.73 It is unclear
whether these effects occur as a result of the child witnessing
violence, from the abuser’s dysfunctional parenting patterns in
general, or from a combination of both.74 However, social
science studies seem to support the proposition that these
problems can be counteracted to a great extent by a stable and
loving relationship with the non-abusive parent.75 If the goal
is to secure the best possible situation for each child, a pattern
of removing children from both parents, rather than just the
abuser, seems counterproductive.76
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V. Conclusion
Domestic violence courts and juvenile courts, while both
“speciality courts,” approach issues of child custody and
domestic violence from very different perspectives. Juvenile
courts, charged with protecting the child’s best interests, are
likely to err on the side of caution by removing children from
homes in which domestic violence is evident. These orders
are based largely on social science data showing the emotional
and psychological harm to children who witness violence in
the home, and on a desire to safeguard the child from physical
harm. Domestic violence courts, on the other hand, are strongly
victim-oriented and are more likely to provide services meant
to facilitate continued custody with the non-offending parent.
This approach more accurately reﬂects the social science
understanding of domestic violence phenomena, the strength
and resilience of survivors, and their competence as caregivers.
More broadly, since the divergent perspectives of these two
specialty courts are likely to result in very different decisions
regarding child custody in domestic violence situations, family
integrity very much depends on the court in which each family
ﬁnds itself.
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WILL THE CURRENT ECONOMIC CRISIS FUEL A RETURN TO RACIAL POLICIES
THAT DENY HOMEOWNERSHIP OPPORTUNITY AND WEALTH?
By: Marcia Johnson 1
Introduction
Property ownership in America
has traditionally been linked to power and
wealth.2 French political historian Alexis
de Tocqueville observed, “[T]he love of
property is keener in the United States
than it is anywhere else, and Americans
therefore display less inclination toward
doctrines that threaten, in any way, the
way property is owned.”3 Property-related
wealth comes in many forms, including
the right to control tangible assets such
as land and buildings.4 Homeownership
today remains the single greatest source
of wealth and symbol of well-being for
most Americans.5
Owning a home facilitates access
to numerous privileges and opportunities
borne from government law and policy,
including tax credits, increased credit
options, and increased worth and wealth.
Homeownership also increases the value
of communities, neighborhoods, and the
homes themselves. It allows for better
educational opportunities, social mobility,
and community stability.6 Therefore, it is
particularly signiﬁcant that government
housing policies and practices have
historically stiﬂed the opportunity of
African Americans to own and retain
real property. The consequences of
these discriminatory policies continue to
be dire.
The ultimate aspiration of
nearly every American family is to own
a home.7 For many African American
families this was still a near unattainable
goal for more than one hundred years
after the Emancipation Proclamation
was signed.8 Government policies that
excluded many African Americans from
access to homeownership in the 1930s
began changing in the late 1970s, leading
many to anticipate an increase in African
American homeownership.9 However,
in the years between the Community
Reinvestment Act (CRA) of 1977 and
1995, the rate actually dropped 2.6%.10
Still, the CRA likely opened the door for
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post-1995 programs that provided easier
access to credit, down payment assistance,
and deferred mortgage payments.
Indeed, more aggressive policies begun
under Presidents Clinton’s administration
provided greater opportunities, resulting
in a rate increase in African American
homeownership from 42% in 1995 to
47.4% by 2008.11
Perhaps the greatest threat
to the continued realization of the
American dream is the latest economic
crisis rooted in the sub-prime mortgage
collapse.12 Some blame the CRA of
1977 for creating a market that they
claim provided housing loans to noncreditworthy borrowers – particularly
African American families – in the low
and moderate income range.13 However,
this charge is without direct factual
support as the post-CRA period saw a
decline in homeownership for African
Americans but a mild increase for White
homeowners.14 Illegal and fraudulent
practices in property appraisals and
income reporting directed program
beneﬁts away from those the program
was meant to aid.
Nevertheless, of the more
than 3.6 million mortgage foreclosures
projected to occur during the January
2007 - December 2009 period, up to
39% are sub-prime mortgages.15 Subprime mortgages were far more popular
with African American homebuyers than
any other group, particularly from 1995to-2005.16 Although mortgage failures
certainly pose an economic problem,
it is not enough to have caused the
collapse of 2008 or to support a return
to housing policies that effectively deny
homeownership opportunities to African
American buyers.
Even recent government action
to stunt such a return suggests that there
were other sources of the collapse, beside
African American homeownership, or
other sub-prime mortgages. For example,
in 2008, the United States government
approved a $750,000,000,000 bail-

out of ﬁnancial institutions ostensibly
due to the collapse in the sub-prime
markets.17 Had the government instead
paid every mortgagee the full amount of
their initial mortgage loan, assuming a
$200,000 loan average, the government
could have purchased all bad mortgage
debt for $720,000,000,000.18 100% of
foreclosures from 2007 to 2008 would
be paid. If only sub-prime mortgages
were covered, the government could
have paid all such foreclosures from
2006 through 2008.19
It is common for markets to rise
into bubbles, for the bubbles to burst, and
for industries proﬁting from the bubbles
to fail. However, it is not common
for the burst to lead to the collapse of
the entire global market. In the 1980s,
savings and loans fell at a cost of about
$152.9 billion with taxpayers paying 82%
or $126 billion. In the early 2000s, the
technology industry bubble burst.20 Still,
none of these industry failures caused
the world market to crater.
This paper is written to examine
the potential effect of the market
collapse on our nation’s homeownership
policies.
Part I reviews America’s
historical housing and homeownership
policies. Part II considers the expansion
of
homeownership
opportunities
to
historically
non-participating
communities, particularly the African
American community. Part III reviews
the culprits of the economic crash
of 2008 and explains why sub-prime
borrowers often get blamed.
Part
IV examines solutions to maintain
America’s pro-homeownership policy,
and Part V concludes that America’s
homeownership policy should continue
to be vigorously pursued with a goal
of including African Americans who
have long been excluded by government
policies and sanctions from building
wealth and thereby stabilizing their
communities.

25

Part I: The History of America’s
Housing Policy
The American government has
historically attended to the housing needs
of citizens who are unable to purchase
homes. Since the 1700s, the housing
needs of the poor have been addressed
through formal systems including the
provision of “outdoor relief,” “boarding
out,” almshouses and asylums. As people
began moving away from small seaport
towns21 and farms to cities in the 1900s,22
increased housing demand23 caused a
20-year building boom in urban areas.24
This boom turned bust during the late
1930s largely as a result of the Great
Depression when many Americans could
afford neither to rent nor purchase a
home.25 It was the Industrial Revolution
that rejuvenated the development of
American cities.26
The late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries marked the
beginning of housing development
within residential subdivisions.27 To
assure both peaceful enjoyment of one’s
property and to maintain property value,
developers and home buyers purportedly
sought legal control mechanisms that
would aid in protecting and preserving
their property interests.28 Developers of
these subdivisions relied on restrictive
covenants, equitable servitudes, negative
easements and zoning ordinances to
ensure separation within residential,
commercial, and industrial areas.29 The
more sinister goal of these devices was
to divide people based on economic,
social, and racial lines.30 Still, these new
communities represented an expanded
housing market driven by the growing
need for homes.
The federal government sought
to address the expanding need for lowcost homes through the Housing Division
of the Public Works Administration
(PWA), which constructed public-owned
housing units.31 Through the PWA, the
government took control of privately
owned land for the public purpose of
providing housing to those who could
not otherwise afford it. The seizure of
land during this period was later found
to be a wrongful exercise of the federal
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government’s eminent domain power.32
As a consequence, construction under
this program ended, but the government’s
ability to create housing opportunities
ﬂourished.33
The United States Housing
Act of 1937 (USHA)34 was the ﬁrst
national housing program and its
goal was “to provide ‘a decent home
in a suitable environment for every
American Family…’”.35 In the 1940s,
the federal government began providing
low-interest ﬁnancing through both the
Federal Housing (FHA) and Veterans’
Administrations (VA) in keeping with this
federal housing goal. When American
soldiers returned home from World War
II, the nation’s policy of homeownership
continued to expand.36 Homeownership
rates increased from about 45% to 65%
after World War II due to government
policies that increased access to credit and
introduced innovative lending products,
like the thirty-year ﬁxed mortgage to the
middle class.37
USHA was controversial at
the time and was challenged as an
unconstitutional intrusion by the
government in the private market.38 The
United States Supreme Court found the
Act within Congress’ power to provide
for the public’s general welfare.39 This
decision would have a compelling impact
on housing opportunities in America, as
USHA authorized the federal government
to pay the principal and interest on taxexempt bonds, enabling the construction
of public housing developments for lowincome individuals.40 However, USHA
was not an equal housing program, and
assistance within the program operated
on a racially-segregated basis.41
Between 1937 and 1949, middleincome Americans began moving outside
the central cities and into suburban areas,
resulting in diminished homeownership
opportunities in urban areas. Many of
these urban areas became infested with
slums and public housing. Congress
reacted to this growing problem by
passing the United States Housing Act
of 1949,42 which is often touted as being
the nation’s ﬁrst ofﬁcial housing policy.43
The policy was designed to remedy
housing shortages, eliminate substandard

housing, and provide a reasonable living
environment for every American.44
The policy had three major objectives:
(1) to encourage private development
in the housing market; (2) to provide
governmental assistance to enable
private enterprise; and (3) to fuel local
governments in developing programs to
help improve cities and housing.45 The
Housing Act of 1949 authorized urban
redevelopment and provided for the
construction of 810,000 new housing
units in six years.46
This Act had a decidedly negative
impact on African Americans because
it forced them to move from their
homes as construction began, only to
be placed on long waiting lists for public
rental housing.47 In addition, although
the federal government’s original plan
was to revive urban communities, the
government’s interest in the program, as
well as the available funding, decreased
rapidly.48 Consequently, many of the
completed units were substandard,
meeting only basic housing necessities.49
The fact that African Americans
were not permitted to beneﬁt from
government-provided low-interest loans
only exacerbated the plan’s negative
impact. For example, racially disparate
application of the FHA/VA loan
programs, meant to encourage national
homeownership, magniﬁed and enforced
economic and racial separation.50 As a
result, the government created a twotiered system of affordable housing: the
upper tier consisted of FHA and VA
home acquisition loans while the lower
tier was comprised of public housing
rental programs.51
Under this two-tier system,
minority and low-income families were
placed in public housing rental programs,
while Whites and other preferred classes
were given FHA or VA home loans
for homeownership.52 Even African
Americans that met the qualifying criteria
for loans were generally unsuccessful
because the homes they could afford
were located in neighborhoods that
were predominately comprised of
minorities and thus considered risky
investments.53
As urbanization
continued to rise, fear, ignorance, and

THE MODERN AMERICAN

hatred propelled political groups toward
considering race and class as factors
when constructing planning devices
and promulgating new housing laws.54
Deliberate policies favoring segregation
successfully divided classes and races.55
Even after laws prohibited segregation,
signiﬁcant racial transition within White
neighborhoods often caused Whites to
vacate these once segregated white areas,
resulting in segregated African American
neighborhoods.56
In 1968, the United States
Congress committed “to meet all of the
nation’s housing needs and eliminate all
of its substandard housing.”57 Congress
acknowledged that not only had
Americans failed to live up to the national
commitment, but that the burden of that
failure was borne primarily by the poor.58
This new housing policy made clear that
it was designed to address the needs
of all Americans, including the poor.
The Housing Act states: “It is hereby
declared to be the policy of the United
States to promote the general welfare of
the nation . . . to . . . remedy the unsafe
and unsanitary housing conditions and
the acute shortage of safe, decent and
sanitary dwellings for families of lowincome . . . .”59 This national policy laid
the foundation for the government’s
role in providing housing and housing
opportunities for low-income people.60
More than one hundred years
after the Emancipation Proclamation
freed slaves in America, Congress
banned racial discrimination in housing
practices. Title VIII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1968, also known as the Fair
Housing Act (FHA),61 the Equal Credit
Opportunities Act (ECOA), the Home
Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA),
and the Community Reinvestment Act
(CRA), were all measures designed to
ensure equal housing opportunities to
all Americans. The FHA was a more
comprehensive law addressing housing62
and prohibits discrimination on the
basis of race, national origin, religion,
sex, disability, and family status in real
estate transactions.63 Similarly, the 1974
ECOA prohibits discriminatory lending
practices based on sex, marital status, race,
religion, national origin, age, and receipt
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of public assistance.64 Discrimination
is further prohibited in consumer credit
transactions under the Consumer Credit
Protection Act and the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation Improvement
Act.65 Later, the HMDA was enacted to
require lending institutions to publicly
disclose loan information to ensure racial
equality in home mortgage lending.66
Despite all these legislative
efforts to ensure equal housing
opportunities,
Congress found it
necessary to take additional steps to
encourage ﬁnancial institutions to
meet the credit needs of traditionally
neglected communities by enacting
the Community Reinvestment Act of
1977 (CRA).67 Banks historically took
consumer deposits but failed to provide
access to credit, particularly for minority
and low-income communities. The goal
of the CRA was to ensure that ﬁnancial
institutions would reinvest deposits back
into these communities. Under CRA,
supervisory agencies were given the
authority to deny banks the opportunity
to merge, relocate, open a new ofﬁce or
close a particular branch if they failed to
comply with CRA demands.68
In 1989, the Financial Institution
Reform and Recovery Enforcement Act
(FIRREA) was enacted to strengthen CRA
enforcement by requiring publication of
CRA ratings. Banks were obligated to
meet the credit needs of the communities
they served but were also obligated to
disclose their performance record by
making available the written evaluations
prepared by regulatory agencies.69 This
disclosure requirement gave community
organizations the leverage to ensure
that ﬁnancial institutions were FIRREA
compliant.
In 1994, in an effort to
improve both community development
and the accessibility of capital within
deteriorating communities, Congress
passed the Community Development
Banking and Financial Institutions Act
(CDBFIA).70 This legislation established
a “fund” that would aid in providing
economic support to new and existing
Community Development Financial
Institutions (CDFIs).71 A CDFI is an
institution whose primary purpose is to

promote economic development, equity
investments, and loans to persons within
a speciﬁed target area.72 CDFIs are
important to increasing homeownership
because they are specialized ﬁnancial
institutions that work in communities
or markets that traditional ﬁnancial
institutions have not adequately served.73
CDFIs include community development
banks, credit unions, loan funds, venture
capital funds, and micro-entrepreneurial
loan funds. CDFIs provide numerous
services including mortgage ﬁnancing
for ﬁrst time home buyers, ﬁnancing for
needed community facilities, commercial
loans and investments to start or expand
small businesses, loans to rehabilitate
rental housing, and ﬁnancial services
needed by low income households and
local businesses. These institutions also
provide services to ensure that credit
is used effectively, such as technical
assistance to small businesses and credit
counseling to consumers.74
The Home Ownership for
People Everywhere (“HOPE”) programs
of the 1980s and 1990s added another
dimension to the federal housing policy,
which previously focused on rental units.
HOPE reoriented American housing
policy
towards
homeownership.75
Reafﬁrmed by Presidents Bill Clinton
and George W. Bush, this expanded
policy embodied the belief that enhanced
homeownership serves the public
interest, and justiﬁes the use of public
dollars to achieve this goal.76
Part II: Expanding Homeownership
Opportunities to African
Americans and Other Historically
Disenfranchised Populations
Some theorists suggest that
the American policy of increasing
homeownership to poorer populations
and expanding mortgages was the single
biggest contributor to the destruction
of the global market economy.77 Due,
in part, to America’s renewed focus on
homeownership, the share of Americans
who owned homes rose from 64% in 1994
to 69% in 2005. These new homeowners
were largely low- and moderate-income
families and minorities. Over that same
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time period, the homeownership rate in
the lowest tenth of the income scale rose
4 %, the second lowest rose 4 %, and the
rates for African Americans and Latinos
rose 7 and 8 %, respectively. About
12 million new homeowners emerged,
roughly half of them African Americans,
Latinos, and others of mixed race. By
2005, the United States occupied the top
rung in world homeownership rates.78
Poverty, Income and Homeownership
A large part of the population
remains beyond the reach of traditional
ﬁnance vehicles. Almost 20 % of all
children in the U.S. live in poverty.79
Poverty has a substantial impact on the
quality of education to which children
have access.
Although numerous
programs and policies exist to ensure
that all children—regardless of race
or economic background—have equal
educational opportunities, a substantial
number of children living in poverty
endure inferior student services and
substandard facilities. These conditions
help create a cycle of poorly housed
renters who contribute less overall to the
good of society than do better trained
citizens. Poor families often face barriers
that restrict their ability to improve their
socio-economic status. For example,
the ability to move to communities with
better educational opportunities is not
an option for many poor families. A
majority of these families are renters
and cannot afford rent or purchase
prices in suburban or well-to-do urban
neighborhoods. Statistics support this
observation. According to the U.S.
Census Bureau (Bureau), in 2002, about
56% of American families (owners
and renter combined) could afford to
purchase a modestly priced80 home in
the area in which they lived.81 Among
families that were current homeowners
approximately 75% could afford to
purchase a modestly priced home while
only 10% of those families who rented
could afford to purchase such a home.82
Since the late 1940s, the
Bureau has surveyed and reported on
the distribution of income among U.S.
citizens.83 According to the Bureau’s
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studies, family income inequality
decreased by 7.4 % from 1947 to 1968,84
But income inequality increased by 24.4
% between 1968 and 1998.85 The income
difference between households in the 95th
percentile and those in the 20th percentile
increased from approximately $96,000 in
1994 to over $127,000 in 2000.86
From 1999 to 2000, the median
household income held at $42,100,87 the
poverty rate in fell to the lowest it had
been since 1979,88 and the number of
poor persons fell.89 African American
and Latino incomes rose as poverty90
rates for these two groups fell,91 but
their income still lagged far behind
that of Whites.92 Further, poverty
rates for African American and femaleheaded households reached their lowest
recorded level in 2000.93 Nevertheless a
1989 National Research Council study
reported that the standard of living for
African Americans lagged far behind
that of Whites94 and showed that African
American unemployment rates were
more than two times that of Whites.95
Even in 2008, the African American
unemployment rate was still more than
two times that of Whites.96
All this demonstrates that
while the standard of living for African
Americans has improved, a substantial
number of African American, Latino,
and female-headed households continue
to live in poverty at disturbing rates
today. While the income gap between
African Americans and Whites decreased
in 2006, by 2007 the gap returned and, a
2007 Bureau report found that over 22%
of all African American families still
have incomes below the ofﬁcial poverty
line.97
The Impact of Poverty on Homeownership
Statistics show that a thriving
home mortgage market needs to rely
on untapped— increasingly poor and
minority—borrowers.
In 1991, the
Bureau reported that 57 % of American
families could not afford a median priced
home in the area in which they lived.98
African Americans and Latinos made up
three-quarters of these families.99 Four
years later, the Bureau reported that 80

% of African American and Latino nonhomeowner families, almost double that
of White families,100 could not afford a
median-priced home in the area in which
they lived.101 By 2004, Bureau reports
indicate homeownership rates for Whites
was 76.2 % while African Americans and
Latinos had homeownership rates of
49.1 and 48.7 %, respectively.102 Overall
homeownership rates in 2009 were at
67.6%.103
True comparisons of racial and
ethnic disparity in homeownership rates
are more difﬁcult because the Census
Bureau changed the way it reported race
in 2003.104 Using current race and ethnic
standards, however, we can compare
2006 to 2009 rates of homeownership.
The homeownership rates for Whites
(non-Latinos) were about 76 % in 2006
and about 75 % in 2009. For African
Americans, the rates were about 48 %
in 2006 and about 46 % in 2009, and
for Latinos (of any race), the rates were
about 49.5 % in 2006 and 48.7 % in
2009. 105
In 2002, the Pew Institute
reported that the median net worth was
$88,651 for White households, $7,932
for Latino households, and $5,988 for
African American households,106 and
that home equity was the key component
of household wealth, accounting
for two-thirds of mean net worth.107
Public policy tends to support reaching
out to these latter two ‘untapped’
communities of potential homebuyers
for a number of reasons. In addition to
strengthening community development,
homeownership is one of the principal
means by which low-income families
acquire wealth. Traditionally, home
purchases were thought to be good
investments because they allowed
homeowners to build long term assets,108
while also resulting in assets that
homeowners could borrow against in
the short term. Policy considerations
also include the
recognition that
neighborhood environment affects
the general welfare of the nation and
that homeownership has the potential
to catalyze community growth,
development,
and
stabilization.109
Community stability in turn tends to
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increase property values.110
Moreover, racial and ethnic
homeownership disparity has disturbing
implications for a nation that is
increasingly diverse, and this disparity
played an important role in the decision
to increase homeownership opportunities
for these communities.111 The Bush
White House initiative of 2000 included
a goal to increase the number of minority
homeowners by at least 5.5 million by
2010.112 The initiative also included
an identiﬁcation of the barriers that
many minorities faced when seeking to
purchase a home as well as strategies to
overcome the barriers. One of the most
signiﬁcant barriers to implementing this
initiative proved to be ﬁnancial.113
Identifying the Financial Barriers114
The White House identiﬁed
numerous
ﬁnancial
barriers
to
homeownership, including inability to
make down payments, limited access
to credit, poor credit histories, limited
mortgage products, regulatory burdens,
and lack of access to ﬁnancing in
general.
The federal government
then launched efforts to help targeted
borrowers overcome these barriers.115 It
was apparent that home loans were not
unavailable per se but were unattainable
for many Americans. This lack of access
can be attributed to a number of things,
including racial barriers that remain
rooted in society.
Denying Access
“Redlining” is one method of
denying people access to ﬁnancing and
refers to the practice of outlining in red
those areas on a map to which ﬁnancial
institutions are unwilling to extend
their credit services. These areas tend
to include primarily minority and lowincome borrowers. Although inequality
and housing discrimination has existed for
centuries in our nation,116 banks initiated
the practice of redlining in the 1960s117
after race riots brought inequality to the
forefront of national concern.118 The
federal government began to pay more
attention to America’s legally-sanctioned
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discriminatory housing practices. The
Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) is
often hailed as an act against redlining.119
Although redlining is no longer a
blatant practice, lenders continued to
issue loans on a discriminatory basis by
using marketing strategies that targeted
borrowers based on race and adopting
inequitable institutional policies.120 Many
lenders who offered prime loans neither
marketed nor solicited applications from
minority or low-income applicants,121
with the exception of sub-prime
alternatives offered in compliance with
CRA requirements.
One scholar has identiﬁed
racial redlining as a barrier to African
Americans’ ability to accumulate wealth
because it restricts their participation
in the marketplace as home sellers and
buyers. Banks use racial redlining to deny
access to credit so that a prospective buyer
would not qualify for a home mortgage,
in fact, “in a study conducted by the
Federal Reserve Board, [it was reported
that] ‘banks reject African Americans
‘for home loans 80% more often than
equally qualiﬁed Whites.’ This rampant
discrimination
disadvantages Blacks
and contributes to the poverty cycle.”122
Moreover, African-Americans who reside
within identiﬁably African American
neighborhoods were historically redlined
out of the mainstream mortgage
market and forced to rely instead on
sub prime loans and predatory lending
practices. The effect of securing loans
through these more expensive markets
also impacts the homebuyer’s ability
to purchase homeowner’s insurance.123
The FHA created two housing
markets between the early 1930s and
the 1960s by systematically excluding
African Americans from lower priced,
conventional mortgages.124 The FHA
rated loan applicants from most
desirable “A” to least desirable “D”.
“A” neighborhoods were principally
or exclusively white, native-born
professionals and “D” neighborhoods
were not.”125 In 1950, the FHA only
granted 5% of conventional loans to
non-Whites thereby limiting low-cost
mortgages to Whites. FHA-redlined
neighborhoods
encouraged
racial

segregation and their monopoly on
the mortgage market meant that any
exclusion from the program constituted
exclusion from the housing market.126
The CRA is to some extent responsible
for the decreased disparity between
loans awarded to Whites and those
awarded to minorities.127 Although there
has been some decrease, minorities are
increasingly and disproportionately
serviced by sub-prime lenders.128 Even
afﬂuent African Americans are twice
as likely to reﬁnance in the sub-prime
market as low-income Whites.129 With the
skyrocketing rate of immigration, home
ownership in immigrant communities
has risen on the priority list of many
lending and governmental institutions.
As immigrants buy homes at an everincreasing rate, unscrupulous lenders
will frequently target them, because they
often lack a sophisticated understanding
of the American mortgage system. This
is especially true for non-ﬂuent English
speakers who fall prey to predatory
lenders who impose exploitative loan
terms and conditions.130
Sub-prime lenders tend to target
minorities, low- to moderate-income
borrowers, and borrowers who live in
certain communities that are considered
high risk. These communities are also
most likely to be affected by the hardships
associated with predatory lending, such
as high interest rates, unreasonable fee
scales,131 loss of home equity, and even
social and psychological problems.132
In some cases, these lenders take
advantage of borrowers with excellent
credit histories who may not realize
their eligibility to obtain a prime market
loan133 and direct them instead to subprime loans.134
According to current Home
Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) data,
African Americans and Latinos are still
consistently denied credit when applying
for home loans and when reﬁnancing
at rates disproportional to those of
Whites.135
Discriminatory lending
practices in the conventional lending
market continue to expand the subprime mortgage market.
The road to a national policy
of homeownership has been a long one
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from that time in our nation’s history
when some were denied the opportunity
because of their race. During the last
decade, attempts were made to open
the door of the American dream of
homeownership to all people. One
potential by-product of the 2008 economic
crash is the reversal of homeownership
encouraging policies, but such a reversal
would ignore the underlying problems of
the crash by placing blame on the wrong
culprit. Placing the sole blame upon the
homeownership policy or minority home
buyers would be unfair and inaccurate.
Part III: Homeownership and the
Economic Crash of 2008: Is the
sub-prime borrower to blame?
The sub-prime mortgage
The sub-prime mortgage is
traditionally described as a type of loan
granted to individuals who have poor
credit score histories (often below 600)
that disqualify them from conventional
mortgages.136
Because sub-prime
borrowers present a high risk for lenders,
sub-prime mortgages charge interest
rates above the prime lending rate.137
Borrowers with credit scores above
650 are generally charged a signiﬁcantly
lower rate of interest on their loans
than are charged on sub-prime loans.138
Lower interest rates and high capital
liquidity encouraged lenders to grant
sub-prime loans from 2004 to 2006.
More importantly, lenders sought
additional proﬁts through these higher
risk loans, charging interest rates above
prime to balance against heightened
default risks. More than the government
homeownership policy, it was the
perceived potential for large proﬁts that
motivated lenders to increasingly give
out sub-prime mortgage loans.
Sub-prime mortgage lending can
be described as predatory.139 Borrowers
who are either ﬁnancially unsophisticated
or ﬁnancially desperate for credit may
agree to unjustiﬁed high interest rates,
payments that they cannot afford,
frequent reﬁnancing arrangements,
high and unfair prepayment penalties,
excessively high points or origination
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fees, and high broker fees. Predatory
lending also involves abusive lending
practices in which the terms of the
loan are inadequately correlated to the
riskiness of the loan.140 In essence,
buyers least able to afford their homes
were charged more than those who
are better able to – the poor paid
more for their houses than the rich.
Moreover, statistics show that minority
buyers who qualiﬁed for conventional
mortgages with better terms were often
steered toward sub-prime mortgages.141
Research has shown that approximately
half of sub-prime borrowers qualify
for conventional loans but are led to
accept sub-prime loans instead. These
borrowers are unaware that they qualify
for lower interest rates because the
lenders withhold the information in
order to swindle minority borrowers into
accepting higher interest rates, insurance
payments, and other fees associated with
the process.142 These buyers were also
more likely to face “creative” ﬁnancing
options that included adjustable rate
mortgages (ARMs), interest only loans,
and other products that induced the
buyer into the transaction only to get
a substantial increase in mortgage
payments or balloon payments within a
period of a few years.143 These so-called
“teaser mortgage products” provided
short term success and often produced
long term failure.
The interest rates tied to
loans traditionally given to minorities
also demonstrate the existence of
discrimination.
African Americans
typically pay interest rates one-third of
a percent higher than Whites. This
amounts to approximately $11,756 over
the life of a thirty-year $145,000 loan,
and is evidence of predatory lending.
If poorer African American families
are paying a higher monthly mortgage
than wealthier White families for
equal or poorer facilities, then African
Americans are at a disadvantage and
will have less disposable income than
their White counterparts. Additionally,
African Americans in low-income
communities typically live in older,
more dilapidated housing.
This
discrimination further serves to foster

an

African

American

underclass.144

A deeper look into foreclosures
In 2007, home foreclosures
reached 2.2 million, a 75 % increase
from the previous year.145 Many who
lost or were at risk of losing their homes
to foreclosures were unexpected victims.
For example, foreclosures in military
towns and their surrounding towns and
cities are outpacing the national average
four times over.146 Working Americans
with secure employment lost their
homes to foreclosures because they
were unable to make their mortgage
payments, suggesting that much of these
defaults were due to the structure of the
mortgage—many involved adjustable
rates frontloaded with teaser rates that
escalated to amounts that working
families could not manage.
Signiﬁcantly,
as
bad
as
the mortgage
crisis has been, an
estimated 94% to 99% of mortgages
are performing.147 Moreover, it is
estimated that more than 75% of subprime mortgages will perform.148 By
2012, however, 13% of all American
residential loans are projected to end
in foreclosure.149 This would mean
that 87% of mortgage loans would be
performing, but it is the proﬁle of the
13% that compels further review.
Sub-prime lending accounts
for the greatest percentage of home
mortgage foreclosures.150 While subprime mortgages represent only 14 %
of the mortgage loans, they represent
almost 50 % of the foreclosures. The
general consensus is that low-income
and minority homeowners have suffered
disproportionately because they have
participated in the sub-prime lending
market at greater rates than White and
Asian borrowers. In 2006, African
American and Latino communities
accounted for more than 53 and 46 % of
the sub-prime home loans, respectively.151
By 2007, African Americans carried 34%
of high priced mortgages compared
with 10.6% for Whites.152 According to
an analysis of loans reported under the
federal Home Mortgage Disclosure Act,
African Americans were 2.3 times more
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likely to take out sub-prime mortgages
and Latinos twice as likely.153 In 2007,
59 % of all sub-prime loans were in
tracts that were less than 30 % minority
and only 17% were in tracts that were
more than 70 % minority.154
While creditworthiness may be
one reason for the high number of subprime loans in minority communities,
a greater reason appears to be race.155
Despite the CRA’s intent to address
redlining by requiring banks to make
loans in lower income neighborhoods,
it did not require banks to actually be
located in those communities. As a
result, banks typically maintain ofﬁces
and branches in White communities
while lending institutions offering subprime loans are strongly visibility in
minority communities.156 This helps to
explain why minority borrowers eligible
for lower cost loans obtain higher cost
products instead.
A Wall Street Journal study found
that as many as 61 % of all sub-prime
borrowers in 2006 could have qualiﬁed
for more conventional products based
on their credit scores.157 Various ﬁrms
record the states and cities hardest hit
by foreclosures,158 and most of these
states and cities are overwhelmingly
White.159 In other words, while a higher
percentage of people of color than of
Whites assume sub-prime mortgages,
most sub-prime loans overall do not
go to people of color.160 This suggests
that even though sub-prime mortgages
made to minority buyers has affected the
overall foreclosure numbers, something
other than sub-prime lending may be
responsible for the national downturn.
How sub-prime mortgages fueled the economic
crisis of 2008
Since World War II, the
nation’s housing policy has sought to
expand housing opportunities. More
recently, housing policies also aimed
to make mortgages available to poorer
Americans.161 In theory, this policy
recognizes that national wealth is
dependent on the wealth of each of the
nation’s citizens, and it also sought to
address the history of racial and ethnic
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discrimination that affected property
lending and insurance practices, such
as redlining.162 The policy was steeped
in good intention, but many argue that
it forced lenders to abandon sound
business practice in order to lend to the
poor and to minorities, resulting in the
housing bubble burst that brought the
global economy to its knees.163
As discussed earlier, sub-prime
mortgages are characterized as risky,
which means lenders are more likely to
see defaults on sub-prime loans than on
conventional or prime loans. However,
in relation to the economic crisis of 2008,
the sub-prime mortgage was merely
an essential element in the ultimate
collapse. In the early 1990s, a collapse
of the sub-prime market may have been
inconsequential as it accounted for less
than 1% of all mortgage lending.164 By
2005, sub-prime lending grew to 20% of
all mortgage lending.165
Demand for sub-prime loans
increased after the dot-com bubble burst
in 2001. To boost conﬁdence in the
market, the federal government lowered
interest rates, encouraging people to
borrow. For most Americans, homes
represent their largest investment, so
the credit market sought to attract more
home loans. Capital ﬂowed into the
hands of borrowers who in turn bought
more homes. Property values increased,
but some of these values were based on
aggressively unreliable appraisals that
artiﬁcially inﬂated housing valuation and
increased loan amounts. People whose
homes were already mortgaged were
enticed to secure second and even third
liens against their home equity, relying
on these escalating home valuations. In
many instances, borrowers ultimately
owed more than their houses were
worth.
Much of this activity was fueled
by an unquenchable thirst for wealth.
Mortgage brokers and sub-prime lenders
sought out people who would borrow at
exorbitant rates and fees. Theoretically,
these loans would not put brokers and
lenders in grave jeopardy because risk
supposedly goes down as it is spread
out. Instead of the bank holding all of
the risk, the government would share a

signiﬁcant portion of that risk through
FNMA, FHA, and others. At ﬁrst, this
risk-sharing plan appeared to work well,
and securitization emerged as a way to
increase proﬁt while addressing growing
market demands.
Securitization166
Responding to the increasing
interest of the non-depository mortgage
lenders to ﬁnd a source of liquidity
for conventional loans, government
sponsored entities (GSE) began issuing
mortgage-backed securities (MSB)
that passed interest to investors.167
The investors, in turn, found these
securities to be easily transferable on the
market because the GSEs guaranteed
the principal and interest income of
the securities even if the mortgagors
defaulted.168 Private institutions soon
recognized the proﬁtability of these
investments and began pooling home
mortgages but speciﬁcally excluded
home equity loans and sub-prime
mortgages.169 This created a market
niche for private pooling that basically
began in 1977 with Bank of America and
Salomon Brothers.170 Unfortunately, this
securitized mortgage vehicle was based
on a highly unreliable risk assessment
model.171
Beginning in the 1990s,
mortgage ﬁnancing found creative ways
to reach otherwise unqualiﬁed borrowers.
Numerous mortgage products aimed
at attracting ‘untapped’ borrowers
included balloon mortgages, adjustable
rate mortgages, interest only loans, and
others. Initially, these loan products were
made to prime borrowers who carried a
low risk of default. However, extending
securitization to higher risk sub-prime
borrowers became increasingly attractive
for investment banks seeking higher fees
and greater proﬁts.172 Wall Street analysts
produced computer models supposedly
demonstrating that risks associated with
pooling sub-prime debt were comparable
to risks of prime backed securities.
Initially, the models seemed
accurate. Between 2001 and 2005, subprime defaults dropped from 10 % to
5 %. Many borrowers, however, were
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warding off default by getting new
housing equity loans to pay off the
original debt. This created the illusion
that the loans were performing and
were therefore low risk. In actuality, the
borrower’s situation typically worsened,
as new debt was generally higher than
the original high-cost debt. Instead
of avoiding default, the borrower was
simply deferring an increased liability.
Moreover, because securitized subprime mortgages were a relatively new
phenomenon, there was little data with
which to test the computer models. In
other words, the combination of easy
capital and an abundance of available
money far exceeded the underlying goal
of increasing American homeownership.
The new goal was to target as many new
buyers as possible to fuel the unregulated
greed that was consuming Wall and
Main Streets. Based, in large part on
the optimistic models, ninety percent
of securitized sub-prime loans received
the highest rating available: AAA.
Reality ultimately struck and about 50
% of AAA-rated sub-prime securities
defaulted. During this same period of
mirage, collateralized debt obligations
(CDO) were revived as a way to diversify
the mortgage pool by mixing sub-prime
mortgages with asset-backed securities
and credit derivatives. When the smoke
cleared, almost 100% of all AAA CDOs
had at least partially defaulted.173
CDOs and ABSs are secured by
underlying real estate. When the note
defaults, the holder of the CDO or ABS
should be able to sell the underlying
property to recover any ﬁnancial loss.
However, in this new market, the property
is likely to be worth far less than the debt
it secures. Moreover, the housing market
has been stalled by the collapse of the
credit market. The credit market stall
should have been temporary and should
have been reversed with the infusion
of government TARP funds, but it was
neither temporary nor reversed, thus
exacerbating the decline of the housing
market. Inaccessibility to credit has less
to do with housing policy or sub-prime
mortgages and more to do with another
Wall Street invention designed to make
more money for investors. Coupled
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with failing sub-prime market securities,
the failure and potential failure of credit
default swaps would send the global
markets reeling.
Credit Default Swaps and Their Role in the
Credit Collapse
American billionaire Warren
Buffett described speculatively-bought
derivatives as ﬁnancial weapons of mass
destruction.174 A credit default swap
(CDS) is a credit derivative where one
party makes periodic payments to the
other and gets promise of a payoff if a
third party defaults.175 The ﬁrst party gets
credit protection and is called a buyer.
The second party gives credit protection
and is called the seller. The third party is
known as the reference entity. The CDS
is an insurance policy written in favor of
the insured who is not the owner of the
product that is actually being insured.
An investor, also known as the buyer,
can gamble that a company will likely
default and purchase an insurance policy
that pays the investor-buyer money if
the reference entity defaults.176
The underlying theory for the
CDS probably comes from the 1958
Modigliani-Miller theorem,177 which
ﬁnds that the value of a ﬁrm can be
independent of the ﬁrm’s ration of
debt to equity,178 and that swaps and
derivatives ensure the safety of the
ﬁnancial system.179 However, it is a
mathematical computerized ﬁnancial
model created by David Li that is at
the core of the ﬁnancial collapse of
2008.180 Li’s model, which catapulted
the Modigliani-Miller theorem into the
huge derivatives market, was designed
to calculate default correlations by
predicting risk.181 Notwithstanding Li’s
own warnings about important ﬂaws in
his model, investment bankers, beginning
with those at Banker’s Trust and J P
Morgan Chase, relied on the model.182
An estimated $58 trillion in
outstanding CDS liability exists. If this
CDS market collapses, it will produce
consequences far greater than sub-prime
mortgage defaults.183 There will not
be enough money to pay all the claims,
which is why the federal government

is attempting to shore up banks and
insurance companies with cash infusion
and why the cash is not being used to
extend credit. The cash infusions are
being hoarded to pay off the CDS
claims of savvy billionaire investors, not
of sub-prime borrowers. These buyers
who have cashed out (and will cash out
in the future) by insuring products they
didn’t even own have made out like
bandits. Yet, because the CDS market
is completely unregulated,184 it will be far
more difﬁcult to identify these winners
than it was to identify the hedge fund
winners.
Selling Short (Short sales)
Out of the CDS market grew
“the short sale,” another tool investors
used to make unimaginable sums of
money.185 Unlike the traditional “‘long
sale’” where the investor bets that the
company in which she is investing will
prosper, the short seller bets that the
company will fail.186 The short sale has
existed since the seventeenth century and
has remained controversial throughout
its lifetime. Short trading is legal,187 but
the government sought to regulate the
practice, which one congressman called
“the greatest evil that has been permitted
or sanctioned by the Government,” after
the stock market crashed in 1929.188
Until recently, the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC)
regulated short selling.189 The regultion
prohibited the short sale of an exchangetraded security in a falling market. The
prohibition applied to every transaction
effected on a national securities exchange
and to transactions in certain exchangetraded securities affected in the over-thecounter market.190 On the other side of
the debate, de-regulators suggested that
the short seller is a valuable town crier
in the economic marketplace. Arguing
that the short seller does not cause the
company to fail, but merely identiﬁes
which companies are struggling due to
poor management and overvaluation,
the SEC deregulated the industry on July
2, 2007.
At issue in this article is how
signiﬁcant a role short sales played in the
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current economic crisis. Some investors
viewed mortgage trading as a bubble that
would eventually burst and shorted the
companies—principally banks, insurance
companies, and mortgage companies—
that were investing in this debt. As
debtors began to default and credit
schemes began to unravel, short sellers
proﬁted—some in huge amounts. If the
short sale represents a peculiar industry
of buying and selling borrowed stock, the
credit default swap, which gives investors
unregulated power to insure companies
that they do not own, makes the short
sale seem less menacing.

for so-called toxic debt, they would be
able to make more loans to companies,
consumers, and home buyers. The
current economic catastrophe is rooted
in the failure of these myriad investment
vehicles’ inability to expand the sale of
single family homes to Americans. That
said, a healthy economy cannot survive
purely on credit and consumerism. Nor
can opening the credit markets alone
restore the economy. Credit should be
governed by sensible business principles
that include re-opening mortgage
markets even to higher risk borrowers.

increasing homeownership opportunities
in America. Instead, government policy
should continue to recognize the value
of homeownership to individual and
national wealth. This would require
the nation to continue to address the
barriers to homeownership, particularly
the ﬁnancial barriers, in a comprehensive
and rational way. That said, not every
American needs or is able to own a home.
Financial prudence and good sense
must work in concert with any program
designed to expand homeownership
opportunities.

Part IV: Looking for Solutions

Addressing the absence of Credit

You got Wall Street
ﬁrms, Bear Stearns,
Lehman
Brothers.
You got insurance
companies like AIG.
Merrill lost a ton of
money
on
this…
Everybody’s lost a ton
of money.
They’re
supposed to be the
smartest investors in
the world. And they
did it to themselves.
They blew themselves
up.194

The government has tried to
stimulate the ﬁnancial markets and
reinvigorate lending, but the credit
market remains closed. Instead, banks
are putting money received from the
government into reserves in anticipation
of CDS claims. While estimates of
potential CDS claims continue to rise,
it is likely they are in the hundreds of
billions of dollars. Chase Bank alone is
involved in over 4 trillion dollars in CDS
investments.198 At these rates, there will
never be enough money to stimulate the
ﬁnancial markets back into lending again.
This leaves the government as the major
source of loans, and there are a number
of government-backed programs in
place to provide the funding necessary
to support homeownership.
In order to stop the market’s
ﬁnancial bleeding, regulators should put
a halt to CDSs. There should also be a
time-speciﬁc requirement that all holders
of CDS instruments must report their
holdings. In this way, potential liability
can be calculated and the proper amount
of reserves needed to compensate can
be set aside. Since CDSs terminate after
time, the markets will also know how long
the potential loss exists. In the event the
CDS continues as an investment vehicle,
the law prohibiting regulation should be
overturned so that the CDS market will
be at least as transparent as the overall
investment market.199

Credit
A weak American credit market
substantially affects the overall health of
international economies. The American
consumer uses credit to pay for homes
and education in the U.S., but also for
goods imported from abroad. American
businesses rely on credit to conduct,
maintain, and expand operations both
domestically and abroad. When lenders
fail or refuse to lend, people around the
globe suffer.
One of the reasons banks are
unwilling to lend is because they fear
that toxic debt, otherwise described as
potential CDSs and short sale liability,
is yet to be fully identiﬁed or assessed.
Banks are hoarding money in reserve to
defray potential losses in debt. Generally,
a bank’s equity-to-debt ratio is about one
dollar in equity to support every twenty
dollars in debt. The SEC permitted
investment banks to have a 1:30 equityto-debt ratio.191 To assess the accuracy
of the ratio and therefore the risk,
banks rely on rating agencies. When
the rating agencies incorrectly rate high
risk ABSs, CDOs, and sub-prime MBSs
as AAA, thereby severely discounting
the risk, lenders are left seriously
undercapitalized.192 The government’s
infusion of capital into these banks,
while bolstering the reserves needed
to ward off potential liability, has not
adequately contributed to re-opening the
credit markets.193
In other words, if the banks
did not have to provide reserve funds
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Numerous factors contributed to
the economic collapse of 2008. The subprime mortgage market was one factor
but was not the only culprit. Indeed,
losses related to high risk mortgages are
dwarfed by those related to derivatives
and securitization. According to Frank
Partnoy, “we wouldn’t be in any trouble
right now if we had just had underlying
investments in mortgages. We wouldn’t
be in any trouble right now.”195 In fact,
even though foreclosure rates on subprime mortgages are much higher that
foreclosure rates on prime mortgages,
some 80 % of sub-prime loans are
still performing, and sub-prime loans
continue to enable borrowers to own
homes, increase wealth, and convert their
sub-prime loans to conventional ones.196
If Partnoy is correct (and the
numbers reﬂect that he is),197 it would
be foolhardy to abandon the goal of
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Speciﬁc Financial Remedies: No need to reinvent the wheel
Various existing government
programs provide ﬁnancial ﬁxes through
subsidies that ﬁll the gap between funds
needed to close sales and funds potential
buyers have to purchase homes.200
These programs provide down payment
assistance, tax credits,201 expanded funds
to the secondary mortgage market202 and
various ﬁnancial incentives to private
homebuilding and ﬁnancing entities.203
There is signiﬁcant value in these
programs, but additional government
money to support these programs
where few alternatives exist could serve
as a much needed ‘TARP’ for ordinary
citizens.

The Land Trust
Land trusts are used to protect
natural resources.204 While the land trust
movement has grown tremendously
since its inception more than one
hundred years ago, it remains principally
a conservation and environmental
protection tool.205 The land trust concept
can easily be expanded to include the goal
of protecting affordable housing stock
and homeownership opportunities.206
Land trust corporations207
may acquire land in fee simple for
the charitable or public purpose of
providing affordable homeownership
opportunities.208 Technically, the trust
would acquire the land and retain
ownership of it,209 and the homeowner
would purchase the house itself but
not the underlying land. This option
could be particularly helpful in gentriﬁed
communities where land values, property
taxes, and insurance costs are so high
that homeownership can become
unaffordable.210
Under this option, homeowners
would pay the taxes assessed solely on
the house value, while property taxes
assessed on the land value would be
exempt or paid by the trust.211 Similarly,
homeowner insurance would be based
on the cost of replacing the house
and not on the price of the land. The
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homeowner could acquire the land
over time at a low purchase price (preescalated or modiﬁed escalation value)
and even share proﬁts from the sale of the
property with the trust.212 The ﬁnancial
gain to the homeowner at the sale of
the property would be based on the
number of years the property would be
held as affordable. A homeowner could
sell the property to another qualiﬁed
buyer without penalty allowing the land
use restrictions to transfer to the new
owner. On the other hand, a homeowner
who sold the property to a fair market
purchaser could share some proﬁt from
the sale with the trust. The amount of
proﬁt realized would be related to the
number of years the homeowner owned
the property under the affordability
restriction.213 Moreover, an incentive to
participate in such a transaction could
be to permit the initial buyer to share in
some of the appreciated land value as
well as the value of the house itself.
The sales agreement between
the trust and the homeowner can provide
for an affordable housing payment
to the trust. Rather than securing a
sub-prime mortgage, the qualiﬁed
buyer would contract for a loan that
would be affordable. Not only might
this affordable housing program help
improve the buyer’s ﬁnancial condition,
but the homeowner will pay a return to
the public upon sale.
Tax Abatement and Exemption Programs
Property taxes are calculated
based on the assessed value of the
property and are commonly described
as ad valorem taxes. Affordable housing
developments are often constructed
on land with low valuation. Low value
appraisals are essential for ensuring low or
affordable sales prices. Pre-development
residents generally pay lower taxes
than do residents who move in postdevelopment, when property values for
the area have risen. Affordable housing
developments tend to address blighted
conditions, upgrade the community,
and generally increase the value of new
residences as well as existing ones.214 As
more housing is developed and a more

stable community is established, values
continue to increase. The double-edged
sword of development is that it could tax
existing residents as well as newcomers
out of their homes.215 This is especially
true of development near downtown
locations where land values may increase
dramatically and quickly.216
Effectively addressing the
property tax problem is challenging.
One option is for the owner to sell at
higher value, enjoying the windfall of
equity build up in the land since it was
purchased. This is not necessarily averse
to the public interest of building wealth in
historically impoverished communities.217
However, the drawback to electing the
windfall option is the potential reduction
in economic and racial diversity in the
community and the displacement and
replacement of longtime community
residents. This is commonly referred
to as gentriﬁcation—the replacement
of lower income residents with higher
income residents through increased
property taxes and sale prices.
A second option tempers the
ﬁrst option’s market-driven approach.
A municipality or developer can impose
restrictive affordability covenants that
run with land purchased under the
affordable housing program. Presuming
that the program is designed to increase
affordable housing stock and expand
homeownership
opportunities
to
historical renters, the covenant would
be designed to retain affordability for an
express term and could be written in a
way to permit the homeowner to recover
a share of the equity that would be less
than the windfall of option one. Under
this second option, the homeowner may
sell the property at a price higher than
was paid based on the higher valuation
but may keep only a percentage of the
proﬁt based on the length of time he
or she owned the property. This meets
two goals: increasing homeowner wealth
and retaining an affordable housing fund
even if the speciﬁc housing stock is no
longer affordable.
A third option is tax abatement.
Commonly used by municipalities to
attract business enterprises, it could
also be used to encourage economically
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diverse communities and reduce the
displacement of residents who have
no viable relocation alternatives. Tax
abatement and tax exemption programs
are legislatively-established measures for
shifting the burden of property taxes away
from a target taxpayer population.218 The
general purpose of the tax exemption
is to encourage publicly desired
objectives.219 A cost-beneﬁt analysis
should be done to determine which
groups will be impacted positively, which
groups will be affected negatively, and
whether a complete or partial exemption
is or should be available.220
Tax
abatements are also ﬁnancing tools that
may be used to revitalize economicallydepressed areas.221
Abatements
commonly forgive all or a portion of
property taxes for a speciﬁed period of
time. Tax abatements are often used to
attract business communities with the
goal of creating jobs and encouraging
community vitality.222 It is unclear how
beneﬁcial such business abatements have
actually been in the past, but as part of a
comprehensive redevelopment program,
they could increase the level and speed
of a community’s revitalization.223
Tax Credits
Tax credit programs provide
incentives for tax-burdened entities
to participate in low-income housing
programs. The Tax Reform Act of 1986
established the low income housing tax
credit and was designed to increase the
number of affordable housing rental
units in the United States.224 It is often
criticized,225 but there is also a growing
movement to expand the program to
include low-income homeownership
tax credits.226 Among the proposals is a
low-income second mortgage tax credit
that would encourage homeownership
by lowering down payment and closing
costs and by reducing housing costs in
general.227
Tax Increment Financing (TIF)
Tax increment ﬁnancing (TIF) is
a mechanism by which local government
provides homeownership opportunities.
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TIF allows local governments to ﬁnance
improvements, in infrastructure for
example, in an effort to attract business
redevelopment in a target area.228 TIF
relies on property value increases
and property tax revenue to pay for
community revitalization that could
include redeveloping or rehabilitating
deteriorated areas of a city, facilitating
the construction of low-to-moderate
income housing, promoting economic
development, and providing employment
opportunities.229
Addressing Creditworthiness
Some potential buyers who
have adequate income to pay the house
note and costs are still not creditworthy
under traditional lending criteria.230
Though helpful, programs designed
to clean buyers’ credit histories are not
designed to monitor buyers’ future
credit habits. A three-part program that
allows the purchaser to buy the home
during the pending credit “cleanup” will
likely yield better results. Under this
option, the buyer would qualify for the
program based on income and evidence
of ﬁnancial stability. Those with less
than stellar credit ratings will have to
participate in a credit counseling and
cleaning program during the ﬁrst year
of homeownership as a condition of the
mortgage subsidy or other assistance.
Finally, the buyer will agree to a wage
garnishment plan that hedges against the
risk posed by the buyer’s limited credit
worthiness.
It may also be possible to divert
attention from the traditional house to
a less expensive form of housing like
the modular housing that was popular
in places like Levittown during the post
war era.231 Other forms of construction
could also be made available, as well as
smaller cottages and bungalows that
support lower construction and sales
prices.
Standard ﬁnancing programs
need to address the cost of constructing
homes and its effect on affordability.232
In markets where housing prices fall
below the average, demand tends to be
very high.233 These markets consist of

the working poor who do not qualify for
public housing but do not make enough
money to purchase a home. While
no person should be pressured into
homeownership, the opportunity could
be made available for those Americans
who desire to be homeowners. Often,
construction costs limit the accessibility
of this market in several ways. Contractors
who build in the affordable market
already realize limited proﬁt margins
that discourage entrepreneurial interest.
They are not equipped to reduce the
sales prices of homes to meet the needs
of this forgotten market.234 The working
poor generally do pay for housing and its
amenities in the form of rent and utility
payments, but they often do not qualify
for homeownership opportunities at
rates comparable to rent.
Foreclosure
Access to credit does not always
portend success as a homeowner. Some
will lose their home to foreclosure.
There are three sources of risk that
commonly lead to mortgage payment
terminations:235 interest-rate related
reﬁnancing, default, and moving.236 For
various reasons, higher risk loans are
more likely to be affected by mortgage
payment factors. Market conditions
may reduce the homebuyer’s ability
to maintain mortgage payments. For
example, a slow market may affect
the owner’s ability to resell the home
and move unless the seller is willing to
accept a loss. Clearly, selling at a loss
undermines the home purchase as a tool
for building wealth.237 On the other
hand, high risk homeowners in a fast
market are commonly impacted by the
rising costs, including increased property
taxes, associated with the house, but
such costs can be offset by the sale of
the property at its enhanced value. Here,
the homebuyer is forced from her home
as a “victim” of a gentriﬁed community.
While such displacement does not
necessarily mean ﬁnancial detriment to
the homeowner, it could signiﬁcantly
affect the maintenance and availability
of affordable housing.238 Foreclosure
then looms as a potential threat to the
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affordable homebuyer.
Addressing the Roots of Barriers to
Homeownership Comprehensively
Capital and access to capital
signiﬁcantly impact a family’s ability
to purchase a home. As short term
remedies, down payment assistance,
mortgage buy downs, and other subsidies
are very helpful but should be employed
as part of a long-term plan. Education
is internationally recognized as the single
most powerful tool against poverty,239
yet illiteracy in America is believed to be
at least 20 %.240 Since the United States
provides access to public education, it
seems infeasible that so many Americans
are uneducated or undereducated.242
Studies show that when poor people are
relocated from depressed communities
to more mainstream communities, they
tend to develop and maintain a new
culture supportive of upward mobility
and education.243 Thus, concentrated
communities of poor people limit
homeownership, and any potential
solution should address racial, cultural,
and economic diversity as part of its
design.
Conclusion
There
is
substantial
reason to maintain a strong policy
of
homeownership in America.
Homeownership is the primary means
of developing wealth for most American
families. When whole groups of people,
deﬁned often by their race, are denied
access to this source of wealth, it sustains
an economic division that retards
national growth and development. As
the American population is increasingly
dominated by this group of have-nots,
the impact of poverty on the United
States and world economy is clear.
For over six decades, the United
States has promoted a policy favoring
safe, decent, and sanitary housing for its
citizens. For much of that time, however,
homeownership was reserved for
Whites, while signiﬁcant barriers existed
for African Americans who wanted to
own their own homes. These barriers
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often closed the door to homeownership
altogether for African Americans. In
other cases, the cost was so high as to
have a deleterious impact on wealth,
even for those African Americans who
owned homes. During the last decade,
the policy has shifted to encourage
homeownership, particularly for African
Americans. Regardless of whether this
shift occurred because the nation ﬁnally
recognized that African Americans
were being denied an important vehicle
to prosperity, because of a desire for
racial equality, or because of investor
greed, the shift did produce an increase
in African American homeownership.
At any rate, recognition of the goal of
homeownership is meaningless without
an assault on the remaining barriers to
reaching that goal. If the goal is to be
achieved, solutions must be aggressively
pursued.
The current world economic
state has multiplied the challenges
America faces.
Many of the last
decade’s ﬁnancial practices have failed
in catastrophic ways, and recovery is
expected to be very slow. Nevertheless,
the role of the mortgage market and
of the sub-prime loan in this calamity
is inﬁnitely small, so the American
policy of homeownership should not
be reversed. We should ensure that all
Americans will share in the economic
recovery and that the history of disparity
will be reversed. An important part
of that recovery is the revival of the
housing market and the development
of strategies making housing more
affordable. Our efforts will be maximized
if we pursue a comprehensive program
that meets short-term needs but also
addresses long-term cures.
T h e
government must employ meaningful
regulation to help identify the extent
of the continuing CDS liability. Every
buyer, holder, broker or seller of a CDS
should be given a limited period of time
to report its existence and its potential
liability.
Companies or individuals
who fail to self report within the time
period should be subjected to speciﬁed
penalties. The ﬂedgling private lending
marketplace should be supplemented
with direct government mortgages,

and the government should work with
the private marketplace to ensure that
lending practices are sound. Mortgage
lending programs should be developed
that permit higher risk borrowers to
buy non–traditional, and affordable,
homes under more traditional ﬁnancing
structures. Public and private policies
must be in place to maintain reasonable
and realistic property valuations.
Programs that include features like
wage garnishment or mortgage escrow
agreements to help ensure loan repayment
should be considered. The costs of
affordable housing can be reduced in
various ways, one of which is through
waivers of income generating municipal
and regulatory fees. Also, historically
un- and underserved communities can
be targeted for capital improvements,
particularly in infrastructure. Lower
cost building product alternatives, such
as prefabricated or modular homes, can
be used. Land banks and/or land trusts
can also reduce the cost of housing. The
sources of low-cost loans (investments),
such as pension funds, should be
identiﬁed. Mixed-use and mixed-income
residential developments should be
encouraged, programs that provide down
payment assistance should be continued,
and predatory lending should be reduced
while shoring up fair sub-prime products.
Finally, homeownership illiteracy should
be reduced via, for example, continued
education components as part of loan
requirements or community-based
campaigns to inform target populations
of the various programs available. In the
long term, we must bridge the income
gap between Asian Americans, Anglo
Americans, African Americans, and
Latinos, especially in those situations
where the gap can only be explained
by race. We must reverse the trend of
school drop outs and public education
failure toward a trend of achievement
and productivity. Finally, we must enact
inclusive zoning laws and eliminate the
myth of the inherently substandard
African
American
residential
community.
The impact of a wealthier
nation will be felt by all Americans. The
fact that government policies denied
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access to wealth to its citizens because
of their race makes it important not

only to retain its policy of expanded
homeownership opportunities, but to

couple it with speciﬁc strategies to reach
a fair and equitable result.

Endnotes
Professor Marcia Johnson is a Professor
of Law at the Thurgood Marshall School
of Law and Director of the Earl Carl
Institute for Legal and Social Policy, Inc.
BS and JD, University of Florida. Special
acknowledgment to Professor Laurie
Cisneros, Thurgood Marshall School of
Law who reviewed and commented on an
early draft of the paper, Associate Dean L.
Darnell Weeden, Thurgood Marshall School
of Law for his assistance and support; the
Earl Carl researchers, S.K. Alexander, and to
Dr. Luckett Johnson.
2
See ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT
TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF
DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 23 (2000),
quoted in Ann M. Burkhart, The Constitutional
Underpinnings of Homelessness, 40 HOUS. L.
REV. 211, 239 n.270 (2003) (explaining that
property ownership was a prerequisite for
suffrage in nearly every state during the
Revolutionary Era); see also JOHN PHILLIP
REID, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION IN
THE AGE OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 128
(1989), quoted in James Thomas Tucker,
Tyranny of the Judiciary: Judicial Dilution
of Consent under Section 2 of the Voting
Rights Act, 7 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 443,
459 n.62 (1999) (explaining that “even in
the most representative colonial legislatures,
suffrage only was extended to one-sixth of
the population. Women, children, servants,
and those without property all were ineligible
to vote”).
3
ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, Democracy in
America (1835), in DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA:
AND TWO ESSAYS ON AMERICA 73 (Gerald
Bevan trans., Penguin Books 2003) (“[T]he
strength of free nations resides in the
townships. Town institutions are to freedom
what primary schools are to knowledge: they
bring it within people’s reach and give me the
enjoyment and habit of using it for peaceful
ends.”); see also DONALD G. HAGMAN & JULIAN
C. JUERGENSMEYER, URBAN PLANNING AND
LAND DEVELOPMENT CONTROL LAW, § 2.9 (2d
ed. 1986); Patrick J. Skelley, Public Participation
In Brownﬁeld Remediation Systems: Putting
Community Back on the (Zoning) Map, 8 FORDHAM
ENVTL. L. J. 389, 395-98 (1997) (discussing
the challenges to cleaning hazardous waste, a
presumably positive modiﬁcation of land use,
if surrounding landowners are not brought
into project as participants. Among the other
things landowners may be concerned with
the affect on the nature of the surrounding
1

FALL 2010

community. It alters trafﬁc patterns and
density, increases noise, and changes the
balance of uses in a particular area).
4
See Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, Measuring and
Representing the Knowledge Economy: Accounting
for Economic Reality under the Intangibles Paradigm,
54 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 1-2 (2006) (recognizing the
historical measure of wealth by tangible assets
but suggesting that the technological age may
increase the importance of intangible assets);
Jeanne Goldie Gura, Preserving Affordable
Homeownership Opportunities in Rapidly Escalating
Real Estate Markets, 11 J. AFFORDABLE HOUS.
& CMTY. DEV. L. 78, 79 (2001) (explaining
that home ownership has traditionally been
considered an integral step toward building
wealth and achieving the American Dream;
Michael A. Stegman, Roberto G. Quercia, &
George McCarthy, The Center for Housing
Policy, Housing America’s Working Families,
1 New Century Housing Issue 1 (June
2000) available at http://www.ccc.unc.edu/
abstracts/0600_Housing.php (last visited
November 30, 2009).
5
See Brian Gilmore et al., The Nightmare on
Main Street for African-Americans: A Call for
a New National Policy Focus on Homeownership,
10 BERKELEY J. AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y 262,
264-66 (2008) (tracing the history of
homeownership among African-Americans
since emancipation in 1865); Charles L. Nier,
III, Perpetuation of Segregation: Toward a New
Historical and Legal Interpretation of Redlining
Under the Fair Housing Act, 32 J. MARSHALL L.
REV. 617, 618-19 (1999) (tracing the history
of mortgage-based discrimination in the
housing market).
6
Id. See also Lee Anne Fennell, Homeownership
2.0, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1047, 1054 (2008)
(listing many reasons why homeownership
is valued in American households). Cf.
Dearborn, supra note 77, at 40, 44, where the
author acknowledges that research supports
these purported beneﬁts of homeownership,
however she argues “homeownership
advocates fail to recognize that most of the
evidence supporting these claims comes from
studies of middle- to upper-income White
populations. The premise that homeownership
has absolute beneﬁts has rarely been tested
among low- to moderate- income and
minority populations. As a result, few of
the putative beneﬁts of homeownership can
be expressly substantiated for traditionally
underrepresented groups.”
7
See Melissa B. Jacoby, Home Ownership

Risk Beyond A Subprime Crisis: The Role Of
Delinquency Management, 76 FORDHAM L.
REV. 2261, 2276 (2008) (explaining that
home ownership is key to wealth-building);
John K. McIlwain, Show Me the Money: A
Proposed Federal Response to Urban Sprawl, 11
J. AFFORDABLE HOUS. & CMTY. DEV. L. 26,
27 (2001) (citing home ownership as the
American dream for millions of Americans);
Rick Santorum, Wealth Creation in the New
Millennium: Transforming Poverty in America, 16
NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 383,
391 (2002) (explaining that most Americans
consider home ownership the signal that they
have reached the “economic mainstream”).
8
See Charles Lewis Nier, III, The Shadow
Of Credit: The Historical Origins of Racial
Predatory Lending and its Impact upon African
American Wealth Accumulation, 11 U. PA. J.
L. & SOC. CHANGE 131 (2007) (attributing
the homeownership gap between AfricanAmericans and Whites to the nation’s history
of racial discrimination in the housing market
and blaming lack of available and fair credit
as a source of this problem).
9
Id. at 133 n.12 (citing the 2005 report
which conveyed President Clinton’s goal of
increasing minority home ownership); see also
Lorna Fox, Re-Possessing “Home: A Re-Analysis
of Gender, Homeownership and Debtor Default
for Feminist Legal Theory, 14 WM. & MARY J.
WOMEN & L. 423, 470-71 N. 327 (2008) (citing
the speciﬁc agenda of the William Clinton
administration to expand homeownership
opportunities to minorities); Adam Gordon,
The Creation of Homeownership: How New Deal
Changes in Banking Regulation Simultaneously
Made Homeownership Accessible to Whites and
Out of Reach for Blacks, 115 YALE L.J. 186,
189, 216-220 (2005) (describing how the
intent of banking regulations during the
Kennedy administration were designed, in
part, to eliminate the segregation patterns
fostered by the Roosevelt legislation, but
failed to do so); George Steven Swan, The
Law and Economics of Afﬁrmative Action in
Housing: The Diversity Impulse, 15 U. MIAMI
BUS. L. REV. 133, 135 (2006) (describing the
exclusionary effect of the homeownership
regulations implemented during the Franklin
D Roosevelt presidency).
10
KERWIN CHARLES AND ERIK HURST, The
Transition to Homeownership and the BlackWhite Wealth Gap, in 84(2) THE REVIEW OF
ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS 281-297(MIT
Press, 2002).

37

U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, HOUSING VACANCIES
HOMEOWNERSHIP, ANNUAL STATISTICS:
2007, TABLE 20: HOMEOWNERSHIP RATES BY
RACE AND ETHNICITY OF HOUSEHOLDER, 1994
TO 2007, available at http://www.census.
gov/hhes/www/housing/hvs/annual07/
ann07t20.html [hereinafter U.S. CENSUS
HOMEOWNERSHIP RATES]. Gilmore et al.,
supra note 4, at 266-67 (highlighting Clinton’s
housing programs’ speciﬁc targeting of lowincome and underserved populations).
12
Matthew Nielsen and Kara AltenbaumerPrice, The Civil, Regulatory and Criminal
Responses to the Subprime Mortgage Meltdown, 14
ANDREWS SEC. LITIG. & REG. REP. 1, 1 (2008)
(tracing the efforts of the SEC to search out
those responsible for creating the sub-prime
mortgage crisis); see also Rachel Carlton,
Mortgage Forgiveness Debt Relief Act Of 2007,
45 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 601, 601-03 (2008)
(describing the Mortgage Forgiveness Debt
Relief Act).
13
See Scott C. Matasar, (Commentary) Defenses
In Subprime Litigation, ANDREWS BANK AND
LENDER LIABILITY LITIG. REP. (2008) (stating
that the role of the Community Reinvestment
Act is a large part of the mortgage and
mortgage backed securities collapse); but
see Richard D. Marsico, Subprime Lending,
Predatory Lending, And The Community
Reinvestment Act Obligations Of Banks, 46
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 735 (2002) (discussing
the Community Reinvestment Act and
its antipathy toward bad debt including
predatory and some sub-prime lending).
14
See U.S. CENSUS HOMEOWNERSHIP RATES,
Historical Census of Housing Tables
Ownership Rates, available at http://www.
census.gov/hhes/www/housing/census/
historic/ownrate.html (The 1970 report
shows African American homeownership
rates at 41.6 %, increasing by 1980 to 44.4%
but decreasing by 1990 to 43.4%; the rates
for Latinos were 43.7% in 1970 but by
1980 had dropped to 43.4 % and by 1990
to 42.4%. By 2000 the rates for African
Americans had increased to 46.3% and for
Latinos had increased to 45.7% suggesting
that it was post 1990 initiatives rather than the
enactment of the CRA that was responsible
for the highest rates of homeownership for
this population); see also Thomas M. Shapiro,
Race, Homeownership and Wealth, 20 WASH. U.
J.L. & POL’Y 53, 65 (2006) (stating that in
1995, 42.2 % of African-American families
owned homes, increasing to a historic high
of 49.5 % in 2004); JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS.
STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV., THE STATE OF
THE NATION’S HOUSING:
2005 at 15-19,
in Shapiro, supra note 13, at 65 (The 1995
homeownership rate for African Americans
was lower than the 1980 and 1990 census
reported rates and only .6% higher than the
1970 rate).
15
Michael Aleo and Pablo Svirsky, Foreclosure
11

AND

38

Fallout: The Banking Industry’s Attack on Disparate
Impact Race Discrimination Claims under The Fair
Housing Act and The Equal Credit Opportunity
Act, 18 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 1, 16-17 (2008); see
Al Yoon, Foreclosures to Affect 6.5 Mln Loans
by 2012-Report, REUTERS, April 22, 2008,
available at http://www.reuters.com/article/
bondsNews/idUSN2233380820080422
(explaining that falling home prices and lack
of available credit may result in foreclosures);
CENTER FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, UPDATED
PROJECTIONS OF SUBPRIME FORECLOSURES
IN THE UNITED STATES AND THEIR IMPACT
ON
HOME VALUES AND COMMUNITIES
(2008),
http://www.responsiblelending.
org/mortgage-lending/research-analysis/
updated-foreclosure-and-spillover-brief-818.pdf (providing statistics of foreclosures).
16
WILLIAM C. APGAR & ALLEGRA CALDER, THE
DUAL MORTGAGE MARKET: THE PERSISTENCE
OF DISCRIMINATION IN MORTGAGE LENDING,
JOINT CENTER FOR HOUSING STUDIES, HARVARD
UNIV., Dec. 2005, http://www.jchs.harvard.
edu/publications/finance/w05-11/pdf.,
at 12-14; see Darnellena Christie Burnett,
Justice in Housing: Predatory Lending, 15
APR NBA Nat’l B.A. Mag. 14.
17
See Emergency Economic Stabilization
Act of 2008, 12 U.S.C. §§ 5201, 5211 (2008)
(establishing the Troubled Asset Relief
Program to “restore liquidity and stability to
the ﬁnancial system of the United States”).
18
Press Release, Federal Housing Finance
Agency, and Federal Housing Finance Agency
Reports Mortgage Interest Rates (January 27,
2009), available at http://www.fhfa.gov/
webfiles/420/FHFA_Reports_Mortgage_
Interest_ Rates.pdf (reporting that the
average loan amount in December 2008
was $218,000); Mortgage Data Web.com,
Mortgage Industry Data and Statistics:
Average FHA Mortgage Loan Amount Surges
Higher and Higher! (Sept. 4, 2008), available
at
http://mortgagedataweb.blogspot.
com/2008/09/average-fha-mortgage-loanamount-surges.html (stating that the average
FHA mortgage loan is reported at slightly
lower than $200,000 around $184,282).
19
See US Foreclosures Rise in December; Reach
2.2 mln in 2007, up 75 pct from 2006, FORBES,
Jan. 2008, http://www.forbes.com/feeds/
afx/2008/01/29/afx4584956.html (Realty
Trac Foreclosure count statistics by state,
2008 totals at 3.16 million foreclosures
in 2006 were reported at 1.26 million for
three years total of 6.62 million. If half of
that number is attributable to sub-prime
foreclosures that would be 3.32 million. The
average subprime loan amount for 2006 was
about $201,000. The average loan amount
for subprime loans in the second half of
2006 was $202,295, only 1 percent higher
than the average loan amount for subprime
loans of $200,167 in the ﬁrst half of 2006 as
reported by Mortgage Bankers Association,

7/3/07).
See generally Justin Ak Amoah, Chicago
technology riding its ﬁrst wave since bubble burst,
MEDILL REPORTS CHICAGO, April 6, 2010,
http://news.medill.northwestern.edu/
chicago/news.aspx?id=83835 (referencing
the 2002 technology bubble burst before
discussing Chicago’s growth in the technology
ﬁeld).
21
William P. Quigley, Work or Starve:
Regulation of the Poor in Colonial America, 31
U.S.F. L. REV. 35, 41 (1996) (explaining that
immigrants began their life in America in
seaport towns).
22
Nicole Stelle Garnett, Suburbs As Exit,
Suburbs As Entrance, 106 MICH. L. REV. 277
(2007).
23
Federal Assistance In Financing Middle-Income
Cooperative Apartments, 68 YALE L.J. 542,
543 (1959) (By the 1900’s, a world housing
shortage existed, chieﬂy because of the
population increase and the concentration of
the population in urban areas. The expansion
of industry, a shortage of construction
workers, and a lack of money for new housing
also helped cause the housing shortage).
24
William E. Nelson and Norman R.
Williams, Suburbanization and Market Failure:
An Analysis Of Government Policies Promoting
Suburban Growth And Ethnic Assimilation, 27
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 197 (1999) (referring to
census reports of homebuilding in Nassau
County).
25
See James C. Smith, The Dynamics Of
Landlord-Tenant Law And Residential Finance:
The Comparative Economics Of Home Ownership,
44 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 3, 62 (1993)
(stating that “Economic slumps compel
more families to rent, as some families lose
their homes by foreclosure, and others, who
hoped to purchase, postpone that decision.
The lowest rate of owner occupation
reﬂected by the decennial censuses was
forty-four percent in 1940, after the country
had spent a decade struggling with the Great
Depression.”); see also Nier, supra note 8 (
discussing the government’s shift from a predepression laissez-faire role in housing to an
active post-depression role).
26
Richard C. Schragger, Cities, Economic
Development, And The Free Trade Constitution,
94 VA. L. REV. 1091, 1103 (2008) (finding
that urbanization is the chief agent of
demographic and economic change in the
United States, as it has been in all developed
countries since the Industrial Revolution
because of the “externalities” that are borne
from a diverse population of creators and
thinkers in a diverse industrial and now,
technological market; and further stating
that “the twentieth century has witnessed
monumental shifts in Americans’ work and
living patterns, including the great migration
to the cities, a later (and smaller) movement
out of the cities into the suburbs, and the
20

THE MODERN AMERICAN

development of increasingly large and dense
metropolitan areas. In 1860, less than twenty
percent of the population lived in urban
areas; in 2000, close to eighty percent did.”).
27
Timothy Jost, The Defeasible Fee and the Birth
of the Modern Residential Subdivision, 49 MO. L.
REV. 695, 698 (1984).
28
Id. at 701.
29
Id. at 702-06.
30
Id. at 724-25.
31
Michelle Adams, Separate and [Un]Equal:
Housing Choice, Mobility, and Equalization in the
Federally Subsidized Housing Program, 71 TUL. L.
REV. 413, 433-35 (1996).
32
United States v. Certain Lands in City of
Detroit, 12 F. Supp. 345, 348 (1935) (where
the court opined that the fundamental law
of both the United States and the state of
Michigan prohibits the taking of private
property except for public use) (cited in
Adams, supra note 32, at 434 n.77).
33
Id.
34
50 Stat. 888 (1937), 42 U.S.C. § 1401 (Supp.
1939).
35
Alfred M. Clark, III., Can America Afford
to Abandon A National Housing Policy?, 6
AFFORDABLE HOUS. & COMMUNITY DEV. L.
185, 185 (1997).
36
Yale Law Journal, No Room For Singles:
A Gap In The Housing Law, 80 YALE L.J.
395, 420 (1970). (discussing the post war
programs enacted to spur homeownership
opportunities).
37
Edward Gramlich, America’s Second Housing
Boom 1, THE URBAN INSTITUTE (2007), http://
www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/311418_
Second_Housing_Boom.pdf.
38
City of Cleveland v. United States, 323 U.S.
329 (1945).
39
Id.; see also Housing Act of 1937, §§ 1,30, 42
U.S.C. §§1401-1440.
40
Deborah Kenn, Fighting The Housing Crisis
With Underachieving Programs: The Problem With
Section 8, 44 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP.
L.77, 77 n.2 (1993).
41
Jon C. Dubin, From Junkyards To Gentriﬁcation:
Explicating A Right To Protective Zoning In LowIncome Communities Of Color, 77 MINN. L. REV.
739, 752-53 (1993) (stating that “while the
federal homeownership assistance programs
promoted the creation of homogenous
[W]hite suburbs, the federal public housing
program for low-income families with
children facilitated the development of
segregated and locationally deﬁcient [African
American] inner city neighborhoods. From
the public housing program’s inception
in 1937, tenants were assigned to projects
on a segregated basis, with many [African
American] projects located in slums. When
the program’s production goals were greatly
expanded in the United States Housing
Act of 1949, Congress virtually guaranteed
that all new housing would continue to be
constructed on a discriminatory basis when

FALL 2010

it rejected anti-discrimination amendments
to the Act”).
42
Housing Act of 1949 § 2, 42 USC §
1441a.
43
Peter W. Salsich, Jr., A Place to Call Home?
Affordable Housing Issues in America Toward
A Policy Of Heterogeneity: Overcoming A Long
History Of Socioeconomic Segregation In Housing,
42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 459, 480-81 (2007)
(stating that “The [Housing] Act [of 1949]
articulated a goal of construction of 810,000
new public housing units in six years, one
that required twenty years to meet, in part
because of continuing controversies about
the program. That same Act committed
the United States to an ambitious goal of
’the realization as soon as feasible of the
goal of a decent home and suitable living
environment for every American family’”);
see also Robert F. Drinan, Untying the Noose,
94 YALE L.J. 435, 436, n.5 (1984) (stating
that the Housing Act of 1949 “was the ﬁrst
time the federal government set a national
housing objective”).
44
See Judicial Review of Displacee Relocation in
Urban Renewal, 77 YALE L. J. 966, 968 n.12
(1968) (providing the language from the
Housing Act of 1949 and how it should be
read).
45
Shelby D. Green, The Search for a National
Land Use Policy: For the Cities Sake, 26 FORDHAM
URB. L. J. 69, n. 120 (1998)
46
Salsich, supra note 44, at 480.
47
Adams, supra note 32, at 438-49.
48
Id. at 439.
49
Id.
50
Id. at 436-38.
51
See CHARLES ABRAMS, FORBIDDEN
NEIGHBORS: A STUDY OF PREJUDICE IN
HOUSING 229 (Associate Faculty Press, Inc.)
(1955) (likening FHA’s protection of the
White neighborhood to the Nuremburg
laws due to FHA’s focus on racial and
social homogeneity in all housing projects),
quoted in Florence Wagman Roisman,
Teaching Important Property Concepts: Teaching
About Inequality, Race and Property, 46 ST.
LOUIS U. L. J. 665, 678 (2002); see also GAIL
RADFORD, MODERN HOUSING FOR AMERICA:
POLICY STRUGGLES IN THE NEW DEAL ERA
48, 188-89 (Univ. of Chicago Press 1996),
cited in Roisman, supra note 52, at 673 n.28;
GAIL RADFORD, The Federal Government
and Housing During the Era of the Great
Depression, in FROM TENEMENTS TO THE
TAYLOR HOMES 102-03, 110-18 (John I.
Bauman et al. eds. 2000), cited in Roisman,
supra note 52, at 676 n.44.
52
Id. at 676.
53
Id. at 670.
54
Id.
55
See Marc Seitles, The Perpetuation of
Residential Racial Segregation in America:
Historical Discrimination, Modern forms of
Exclusion, and Inclusionary Remedies, 14 J. LAND

USE & ENVTL. L. 89, 92 (1998) (providing the
“black ghetto” as an example of the result of
deliberate housing policies).
56
Id. at 95; see also Adams, supra note 32, at
437.
57
Elizabeth Sammann, The Reality of Family
Preservation under Norman v. Johnson, 42 DEPAUL
L. REV. 675, 688 (1992).
58
Id. (stating that while the number of
substandard housing decreased after the
1968 Act, the numbers of affordable units
became a much larger problem).
59
42 U.S.C. §1437.
60
Id. §§12701 (1990); 1441 (1965); 1425
(1940) (repealed 1990).
61
Id. §§ 804-806, 3404-06.
62
See Deborah Kemp, The 1968 Fair Housing
Act: Have its Goals been Accomplished?, 14 REAL
EST. L.J. 327, 328-332(1986) (discussing
the broad purpose of the Fair Housing
Act to cure urban problems of racially
segregated urban ghettoes); see also Dennis
M. Teravainen (Note) Federal Law’s Indifference
To Housing Discrimination Based On Sexual
Orientation, 7 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADVOC.
11, 22 (2002) (discussing the broad breadth
of the Fair Housing Act as a statutory
tool to prohibit discrimination in housing,
to promote integration and to eliminate
segregated housing).
63
42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (1994 & Supp. IV
1999); see also Kemp, supra note 63, at 329
(identifying the exemptions from the act).
64
15 U.S.C. § 1691(a)(1) (1994); see Joseph
J. Norton, Fair Lending Requirements: The
Intervention of a Governmental Social Agenda into
Bank Supervision and Regulation, 49 CONSUMER
FIN. L. Q. REP 17, 21-25 (1995) (stating that the
ECOA, the FHA, the CRA, and the HMDA
are the main fair lending laws. Although
they impose different requirements, these
requirements are sometimes interconnected.
As a whole, they are the tools the federal
government has used in its efforts to achieve
its objectives in the fair lending area).
65
15 U.S.C. § 1691(a)(1).
66
12 U.S.C. §§ 2801-2810 (1994 & Supp.
1999). See also Ronald K. Schuster, Lending
Discrimination: Is The Secondary Market Helping
To Make The “American Dream” A Reality,
36 GONZ. L. REV. 153, 161 (2000) (“The
HMDA requires ‘depository institutions’
to submit annual reports detailing home
purchase and home improvement loans
they have originated or purchased during
the covered period, as well as applications
received for the loans... The required HMDA
disclosures encompass not only the location
of the property and type of loan, but the
borrower’s race, ethnicity, national origin,
gender, and income as well.”).
67
Id. at 162.
68
Id.
69
E.L Baldinucci, The Community
Reinvestment Act: New Standards Provide

39

New Hope, 23 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 831, 83839 (1996).
70
12 U.S.C. §§ 4702-4713 (1994).
71
Norton, supra note 65, at 20.
72
David E. Runck, An Analysis Of The
Community Development Banking And Financial
Institutions Act And The Problem Of “Rational
Redlining” Facing Low-Income Communities, 15
ANN. REV. BANKING L. 517, 531-33 (1996)
(citing 12 U.S.C. § 4702(5)(A) (1994)).
73
Id. at 532.
74
Jeffrey S. Lesk and Richard M. Price,
An Introduction to the Community Development
Bank Network, 4 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING
& COMMUNITY DEV. L. 267, 269 (1995)
(describing the Community Development
Financial Institute Fund as having been
created to expand the availability of credit,
investment capital and ﬁnancial services in
distressed urban and rural communities).
75
See BARRY G. JACOBS, History of Federal
Housing and Community Development
Law, in HDR HANDBOOK OF HOUSING AND
DEVELOPMENT LAW, §1:56 (2009) (stating
the HOPE programs were designed to
encourage the use of government-owned
or government ﬁnanced housing for lowincome home ownership); see also Danielle
Pelfrey Duryea, Gendering The Gentriﬁcation
Of Public Housing: Hope VI’s Disparate Impact
On Lowest-Income African American Women,
13 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 567 n.1,
(chronicling the various HOPE programs
and showing the focus change from rental to
homeownership).
76
Lynne Dearborn, Homeownership: The
Problematics Of Ideals And Realities, 16 J.
AFFORDABLE HOUS. & CMTY. DEV. L. 40
(2006) (explaining that some previous and still
existing remedial actions taken by the federal
government include insurance programs for
those ﬁnancial institutions that lend within
low-income communities as well as the
promotion and sponsorship by the federal
government of community development
programs and ﬁnancial institutions).
77
Matasar, supra note 12 (discussing the
feasibility of banks reliance on the Community
Reinvestment Act and its mandates as
defenses to subprime litigation brought by
minority and low-income borrowers).
78
See Jo Carrillo, In Translation For The Latino
Market Today: Acknowledging The Rights Of
Consumers In A Multilingual Housing Market,
11 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 1, 5 (2008)
(discussing the relative homeownership
rates between Latinos and Whites and
concluding that the rates for Latinos is low);
Kenya Covington and Rodney Harrell, From
Renting To Homeownership: Using Tax Incentives
To Encourage Homeownership Among Renters,
44 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 97, 100-103(2007)
(comparing homeowner rates between
African-Americans and Whites).
79
Carmen DeNavas-Walt et al., Poverty Status

40

of People by Age, Race, and Hispanic Origin:
1959 to 2007, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, INCOME,
POVERTY, AND HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE
IN THE UNITED STATES: 2007 52 (Aug. 2008),
http://www.census.gov/prod/2008pubs/
p60-235.pdf (showing poverty status of
persons by age, race, and Hispanic origin
from 1959-2007); but see NAT’L ASS’N OF
CHILD CARE RES. AND REFERRAL AGENCIES,
SCHOOL-AGE CHILDREN 5-17 LIVING IN
POVERTY 1 (2007), www.naccrra.org/randd/
docs/School-Age_Children_in_pverty.pdf
(reporting that the number rises to about
one-third for all school-aged children living
in poverty).
80
Howard A. Savage, Who Could Afford to
Buy a Home in 2002? BUREAU OF THE CENSUS
STATISTICAL BRIEF (2007), www.census.gov/
prod/2007pubs/h121-07-1.pdf
(stating
that the 2002 number was unchanged from
1995. According to the report, “[h]ouse
prices were determined for areas deﬁned
by the nine census geographic divisions and
by whether a house was inside or outside a
metropolitan area or in or out of a central
city in a metropolitan area. A modestly
priced house is one priced so that twentyﬁve percent of all owner-occupied houses in
the area in which the survey respondents live
are below this value and seventy-ﬁve percent
above. A low priced house is priced so that
ten percent of all owner-occupied houses
in that areas are below this value and ninety
percent are above.”).
81
Id.
82
Id.
83
EDWARD N. WOLFF, DOES EDUCATION
REALLY HELP? SKILL, WORK AND INEQUALITY
(Oxford Univ. P. 2006); see Daniel H.
Weinberg, A Brief Look at Postwar U.S.
Income Inequality, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU
191 (1996), http://www.census.gov/hhes/
www/p60191.html (discussing poverty and
income trends overall, for regions, by race
and ethnicity and by differences in age).
84
Id.
85
See id. (ﬁnding that income inequality
increased from 16.1 percent between 1968
and 1994 to 22.4 percent).
86
Id. (reporting that the income of
households within the 95th percentile was
more than 8 times that of those households
in the 20th percentile. In 1968, the household
at the 95th percentile had 6 times the income
of the household at the 20th percentile).
87
Press Brief by Daniel H. Weinberg, Press
Brieﬁng on 2000 Income and Poverty
Estimates, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, available
at
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/
income/income00/prs01asc.html (stating
that the median household income held at
$42,100 meaning that half of all households
had incomes above $42,100 and half
below).
88
Id.

Id.; see also Bernadette Proctor & Joseph
Dalaker, Poverty In The United States: 1999,
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (2000) 1, http://www.
census.gov/prod/2000pubs/p60-210.pdf
(stating that in 1999, 32.3 million people
were poor, down from 34.5 million in 1998);
see Bernadette Proctor & Joseph Dalaker,
Poverty In The United States: 2000, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU (2001) v, http://www.census.gov/
prod/2001pubs/p60-214.pdf at 1 (stating
that about 31.1 million people were poor in
2000, 1.1 million fewer than in 1999).
90
Id.; see also Bernadette Proctor and Joseph
Dalaker, Poverty in the United States: 1999
and 2000, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (reporting
statistics showing the level of income).
91
Id. (reporting the poverty rate for African
Americans fell from 23.6 percent in 1999
to 22.1 percent in 2000. For Latinos, the
poverty rate fell from 22.8 percent in 1999 to
21.2 percent in 2000).
92
Id. (reporting in 2005 that African American
households had the lowest median income
at $30,134, Latino household income was
$34,241, for non-Latino Whites income was
$48,977 and for Asian was $57,518).
93
Id.
94
See generally A COMMON DESTINY: BLACKS
AND AMERICAN SOCIETY 3-11 (Gerald David
Jaynes & Robin M. Williams, Jr. eds., 1989)
(discussing the conditions of African
Americans relative to white America and
determining that the disparities that exist are
stark and long standing).
95
See Current Population Survey, Table 24,
BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, April 6, 2010,
ftp://bls.gov/pub/special.requests/lf/
aa2003/pdf/cpsaat24.pdf (2002 and 2003
statistics); Current Population Survey, Table
24, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, Aug. 7,
2009,
http://www.bls.gov/cps/cpsaat24.
pdf (showing unemployment rates by race
from 2007 to 2008).
96
Id.
97
Poverty: 2007 Highlights, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, April 6, 2010, http://www.census.
g ov/hhes/www/pover ty/pover ty07/
pov07hi.html (reporting that poverty rates
in 2007 were statistically unchanged for
non-Hispanic Whites (8.2 percent), Blacks
(24.5 percent), and Asians (10.2 percent)
from 2006. The poverty rate increased for
Hispanics (21.5 percent in 2007, up from
20.6 percent in 2006)); see also Household
Income Rises, Poverty Rate Unchanged
Number of Uninsured Down, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, April 6, 2010, http://www.census.
gov/Press-release/www/releases/archives/
income_wealth/012528.html
(reporting
that real median income (adjusted for
inﬂation) for black and non-Hispanic white
households rose between 2006 and 2007,
representing the ﬁrst measured real increase
in annual household income for each group
since 1999. Real median household income
89

THE MODERN AMERICAN

remained statistically unchanged for Asians
and Hispanics. Among the race groups
and Hispanics, black households had the
lowest median income in 2007 ($33,916).
This compares to the median of $54,920
for non-Hispanic white households. Asian
households had the highest median income
($66,103). The median income for Hispanic
households was $38,679).
98
Howard A. Savage, Who Could Afford to
buy a Home in 1991?, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
April 6, 2010, http://www.census.gov/apsd/
statbrief/sb93_16.pdf.
99
Id.
100
Id. (showing that the rate of White families
not of Latino origin that could not afford a
home in the area in which they resided was
forty three percent).
101
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, Housing Vacancies
and Homeownership, Annual Statistics:
2006, Table 20: Homeownership Rates by
Race and Ethnicity of Householder 1994 to
2006 (2006), http://www.census.gov/hhes/
www/housing/hvs/annual06/ann06t20.
html.http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/
housing/hvs/annual06/ann06t20.html.
102
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, Reports on residential
Vacancies and Homeownership, Table 7,
April 6, 2010, http://www.census.gov/hhes/
www/housing/hvs/qtr107/q107press.pdf.
103
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, Housing Vacancies
and Homeownership, Historical Tables,
Table 14, , April 6, 2010, http://www.census.
gov/hhes/www/housing/hvs/historic/
index.html.
104
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, Housing Vacancies
and Homeownership, Annual Statistics, Table
20, (2000), http://www.census.gov/hhes/
www/housing/hvs/annual00/ann00t20.
html. In Census 2000, homeownership
among White householders was 7.1 percent,
higher than the national rate of 66 percent.
In contrast, householders who were African
American (47.2 percent) and those who were
Native Hawaiian and Other Paciﬁc Islander
(53.5 percent) had homeownership rates less
than the national rate. Latino householders
had a 46.3 percent homeownership rate,
compared with 73.8 percent for non-Latino
White. Those householders with rates higher
than 50 percent but less than the national rate
were American Indians and Alaska Natives
(56.2 percent) and Asians (52.8 percent).
105
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, Housing Vacancies
and Homeownership Rates, 1994-2005,
Table 20: Homeownership Rates by Race
and Ethnicity of Householder, 1994-2005
(2005), http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/
housing/hvs/annual05/ann05t20.html.
106
Rakesh Kochhar, The Wealth of Latino
Households: 1996 to 2002, PEW HISPANIC
INSTITUTE 4 (2004), http://pewhispanic.org/
ﬁles/reports/34.pdf.
107
Id. at 2; see also id. at 16 (reporting that the
only exceptions arose in the case of White

FALL 2010

households who owned homes, interest
earning assets and unsecured liabilities at
rates in excess of 50 percent).
108
Id.
109
See Sean Zielenbach, A Critical Analysis
Of Low-Income Homeownership Strategies, 13
J. AFFORDABLE HOUS. & CMTY DEV. L. 446,
452 (2004) (discussing the advantages and
disadvantages of homeownership generally
and states, “Both policy makers and
practitioners often view homeownership
as a central component of community
development strategies. Since owners tend to
remain in their homes for longer than renters
(because of their ﬁnancial investment, among
other things), homeownership contributes to
a neighborhood’s residential stability. That
stability can lead to both the development
of greater social capital in the community
as well as an appreciation of local property
values.”).
110
Id. at 453-54.
111
See Fox, supra note 8, at 470-71 (stating that
“one study published by the Department of
Housing and Urban Development (HUD)
in 2005 indicated that while homeownership
rates were currently at historically high
levels for all sections of the U.S. population,
‘dramatic gaps in homeownership rates have
been stubbornly present over the last several
decades, and even increased somewhat
during the decade of the 1990s.’ This study
identiﬁed several factors accounting for the
homeownership gap, including not only
race and ethnicity, but also differences due
to income, wealth, marital status, and age
of household. Yet, while concerns about
homeownership rates have triggered major
policy initiatives under both the Clinton and
Bush Administrations to increase access to
homeownership, it is also important to note
that it is not only access, but the sustainability
of homeownership that will have a signiﬁcant
impact on national homeownership rates
over the medium and long term.”).
112
Remarks by President George Bush,
President Calls for Expanding Opportunities
to Home Ownership, http://georgewbushwhitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/200
2/06/20020617-2.html
113
Id. (stating, “First, the single greatest
barrier to ﬁrst time homeownership is a
high down payment. It is really hard for
many, many, low income families to make
the high down payment. And so that’s why I
propose and urge Congress to fully fund the
American Dream Down payment Fund. This
will use money, taxpayers’ money to help a
qualiﬁed, low income buyer make a down
payment. And that’s important. One of the
barriers to homeownership is the inability to
make a down payment. And if one of the
goals is to increase homeownership, it makes
sense to help people pay that down payment.
We believe that the amount of money in our

budget, fully approved by Congress, will help
40,000 families every year realize the dream
of owning a home.”).
114
See Press Release, Barriers to Minority
Homeownership, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING
AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, June 17, 2002,
available at http://www.hud.gov/news/
releasedocs/barriers.cfm (describing the
multiple barriers that prevent minority
families from becoming homeowners).
115
See Leonard S. Rubinowitz and Ismail
Alsheik, A Missing Piece: Fair Housing And
The 1964 Civil Rights Act, 48 HOW. L.J. 841
(2005) (chronicling the feral government’s
efforts to help minorities overcome barriers
to homeownership ).
116
David J. Garrow, The Federal Courts and
School Desegregation in the 1970’s, 21 LAW &
SOC’Y REV. 879, 881 (1988).
117
Frank Lopez, Using the Fair Housing Act
to Combat Predatory Lending, 6 GEO. J. ON
POVERTY L. & POL’Y 73, 75 (1999).
118
ALEXANDER VON HOFFMAN, JOINT CENTER
FOR HOUSING STUDIES, HARVARD UNIVERSITY,
LIKE FLEAS ON A TIGER? A BRIEF HISTORY OF
THE OPEN HOUSING MOVEMENT 29-31 (2010)
http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/ publications/
communitydevelopment/von_hoffman_
W98-3.pdf , 1998 (where author shows
that various historical events including the
race riots of the 1960s sparked changes in
American civil rights including housing
policy ).
119
See Gilmore, supra note 4, at 635 (explaining
that the CRA, along with the Fair Housing
Act and the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act,
.were enacted to respond to the ills associated
with redlining).
120
Id.
121
See id. at 637 (recognizing that “the
continuing prevalence of redlining was
directly related to the effects of the policies
and practices adopted by lenders”).
122
Andrene Smith, (Note) A Different World:
Financial Determinants Of Well-Being In New
Orleans In Black And White, 14 GEO. J. ON
POVERTY L. & POL’Y 179, 189 (2007).
123
Leland Ware, Race And Urban Space:
Hypersegregated Housing Patterns And The Failure
Of School Desegregation, 9 WIDENER L. SYMP. J.
55, 67 (2002).
124
Smith, supra note 123, at 189.
125
Id. at 189-90.
126
Id. at 190.
127
Lopez, supra note 118, at 75 n.9 (citing
Mark Anderson, Subprime Lending to
Minority Groups Rises, Study Finds, WALL
ST. J., Nov. 25, 1998, at B11).
128
Id. at 75.
129
See Darnellena Christie Burnett, Justice
in Housing: Curbing Predatory Lending, NBA
NAT’L B. ASS’N MAG, Mar./Apr. 2001, at
14 (explaining that high-income AfricanAmerican neighborhoods were twice as likely
to have sub-prime mortgages as otherwise

41

similar low-income White neighborhoods).
130
Eric C. Bartley (Comment) And Regulation
for All: Federally Regulating the Mortgage Banking
Industry, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REV. 477, 485
(2006).
131
Lopez, supra note 118, at 77.
132
Id. at 79 (positing that “the loss of a
home can be ﬁnancially and psychologically
devastating. Financially, a homeowner may
lose all equity in his home, and ultimately
may end up homeless. Psychologically,
homeowners facing the loss of their homes
are more likely to suffer from mental
illnesses, commit suicide, or engage in
criminal behavior. Therefore, the problem of
predatory lending in minority communities
is a grave concern.”).
133
Id. at 77-78.
134
Cecil J. Hunt, II, In the Racial Crosshairs.
Reconsidering Racially Targeted Predatory
Lending Under A New Theory of Economic
Hate Crime, 35 U. TOL. L. REV. 211, 213
(2003) (stating that the recent explosive
growth in the predatory subprime market has
“created a crisis of epidemic proportions for
communities of color, elderly homeowners,
and low-income neighborhoods [because
of] the plague of predatory mortgage
lending.”).
135
FORMAN CTR. FOR REAL ESTATE & URBAN
POLICY, DECLINING CREDIT & GROWING
DISPARITIES: KEY FINDINGS FROM HMDA
2007 1 (2008), http://www.furmancenter.
org/ﬁles/KeyFindingsfromHMDA2007
FurmanCenterReport.pdf.
136
Holden Lewis, What Exactly is a Subprime
Mortgage?, BankRate.com, April 18, 2007,
http://www.bankrate.com/brm/news/
mortgages/20070418_subprime_mortgage_
deﬁnition_a1.asp (“There are conﬂicting
accounts of the size of the subprime market.
Depending on whom you talk to, it accounts
for 20 percent of all mortgage loans, 15
percent or 13.5 percent. Estimating the
size of the subprime market is tricky for a
number of reasons. For one, it’s sometimes
hard to distinguish between a subprime
mortgage and an Alt-A loan -- a grade of
mortgage between prime and subprime. For
another, there are two ways to count them: by
the number of loans or by total dollar value.
Then there’s the question of whether you’re
talking about all loans originated in a certain
year or all outstanding mortgages. Standard
& Poors says subprime originations totaled
$421 billion in 2006. The Mortgage Bankers
Association says all originations totaled $2.5
trillion. If both data sources are accurate,
that means 16.8 percent of mortgage volume
consisted of subprime loans last year. That’s
dollar volume, not the number of mortgages.
Subprime mortgage balances are probably
smaller than average, so more than 16.8
percent of borrowers got subprime loans.
These statistics rely on lenders to deﬁne

42

what they mean by subprime, and different
lenders have different deﬁnitions. As a rule of
thumb, a subprime mortgage is a home loan
to someone with a credit score below 620.
But some lenders count loans as subprime
even if the borrowers have credit scores of
660 or higher, if the borrower makes a down
payment of less than 5 percent or does not
document income or assets. Other lenders
might count those loans as Alt-A. There
isn’t a deﬁnition of subprime that everyone
agrees on. That’s partly what makes it difﬁcult
to judge the size of the subprime market.”)
(emphasis added).
137
Heather M. Tashman, The Subprime Lending
Industry: An Industry in Crisis, 124 BANKING
L.J. 407, 408 (2007) (explaining the nature of
a subprime mortgage).
138
Lewis, supra note 140, (stating that an
industry of subprime mortgage lenders
has sprung up to serve the vast number of
Americans who have credit problems).
139
See Cassandra Jones Havard, To Lend or Not
to Lend: What the CRA Ought to Say About SubPrime and Predatory Lending, 7 FLA. COASTAL
L. REV. 1, 2 (2005) (explaining the predatory
nature of subprime mortgaging).
140
Cathy Lesser Mansﬁeld, The Road to
Subprime “HEL” Was Paved with Good
Congressional Intentions: Usury Deregulation and
the Subprime Home Equity Market, 51 S.C. L.
REV. 473, 540-41 (2000).
141
Bartley, supra note 131, at 484 (stating that
afﬂuent blacks are twice as likely to reﬁnance
in the sub-prime market as low-income
whites).
142
Smith, supra note 123, at 191.
143
PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE, SUBPRIME
INSTITUTE 2008, RICARDO GUERRA AND ERIC
OCHOA V. GMAC LLC, GMAC MORTGAGE,
LLC ET. AL., UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT,
EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 748
(2008).
144
Smith, supra note 123, at 180.
145
Allison D. Matthews, To Stop a Predator:
Is a Complete Ban on For-Proﬁt Foreclosure
Rescue Operations the Best Way to Prevent Equity
Stripping?, 20 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 477,
478 n.4 (2008).
146
Kathleen M. Howley, Foreclosures in Military
Towns Surge at Four Times US Rate, BLOOMBERG.
COM, May 7, 2008, http://www.bloomberg.
com/apps/news?pid=20601109&refer=h
ome&sid=awj2TMDLnwsU
(referencing
RealtyTrac, Inc., research).
147
See 60 Minutes, A Look at Wall Street’s
Shadow Market (CBS News broadcast
October 5, 2008) (transcript available at
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2008/
10/05/60minutes/main4502454.shtml?tag=
contentMain;contentBody). Howley, supra
note 150 (the rate of affected mortgage loans
was 1% in 2007, up from .58% in 2006). See,
e.g., CBS Evening News, American Dream
Slipping Away, (CBS television broadcast

Mar. 6, 2008) (media report stating that up to
6% of homeowners are months away from
foreclosure).
148
Tashman, supra note 141, at 411 (stating
that one out of ﬁve sub-prime mortgages
will go into foreclosure); see Aleo, supra note
14, at 16-17 (“Not surprisingly, borrowers
default on subprime loans at far higher rates
than typical loans and lead to foreclosure far
too often. In 2008, the Mortgage Bankers
Association (MBA) found that the rates of
delinquency, foreclosure initiations, and
loans in the process of foreclosure continue
at record levels. In the ﬁrst quarter of 2008,
seasonally adjusted delinquency rates were
3.71% for prime loans and 18.79% for
subprime loans, while in 2007 the delinquency
rates were 2.58% for prime loans and 13.77%
for subprime loans. Foreclosures follow
similar trends; the foreclosure inventory rate
in 2008 is 1.22% for prime loans and 10.74%
for subprime loans, as compared to 0.54%
and 5.10% in the ﬁrst quarter of 2007.
Alarmingly, “while subprime . . . [adjustable
rate mortgages] represent[ed] only 6 % of
all loans outstanding,” they accounted for a
whopping 39 % of foreclosures. Fixed rate
mortgage foreclosures for subprime loans
are six times higher than prime loans, while
mortgage foreclosures for adjustable rate
mortgages are over four times more likely for
subprime than for prime loans. Unfortunately,
the situation continues to worsen. Two million
adjustable-rate mortgages will reset to higher
interest rates in 2008 alone, and these loans
will continue to adjust in 2009 and beyond.”
Homeowner vacancy rates grew from 1.5
percent in the ﬁrst quarter of 1995 to 2.8
percent in the second quarter 2008, including
a climb from 1.5 percent to 2.8 percent from
1995 to 2005 and a 2.0 percent to 2.8 percent
climb from 2005 to 2008.); see also ROBERT
R. CALLIS AND LINDA B. CAVANAUGH, CENSUS
BUREAU REPORTS ON RESIDENTIAL VACANCIES
AND HOMEOWNERSHIP, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU
NEWS (2009), http://www.census.gov/hhes/
www/housing/hvs/qtr209/ﬁles/q209press.
pdf (the latest census report on residential
vacancies shows that the homeowner
vacancy rate for the second quarter of 2008
was statistically insigniﬁcant when compared
to the homeowner vacancy rates for the prior
quarter and the entire 2007).
149
See Al Yoon, Foreclosures to affect 6.5 million
by 2012, REUTERS, April 22, 2008, http://
www.reuters.com/article/bondsNewws/
idUSN2233380820080422 (“Falling home
prices have made an increasing number
of U.S. homeowners more vulnerable to
default”).
150
Mansﬁeld, supra note 144, at 553-54
(“[S]ubprime loans still generally default
earlier than non-subprime home equity
loans, and high interest rate loans-- most of
which are subprime--end up in foreclosure at

THE MODERN AMERICAN

a higher rate than non-subprime loans.” Also
stating that by 1999 subprime mortgage loans
had very high delinquency rates, especially
when one looks at more serious delinquencies
and foreclosures.); see also Ben S. Bernanke,
Chairman, Speech at the Columbia Business
School’s 32nd Annual Dinner (May 5,
2008) (transcript available at http://www.
federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/
Bernanke20080505a.htm) (May 5, 2008)
(“The sharpest increases have been among
subprime mortgages, particularly those with
adjustable interest rates: About one quarter
of subprime adjustable-rate mortgages
are currently 90 days or more delinquent
or in foreclosure. Delinquency rates also
have increased in the prime and near-prime
segments of the mortgage market, although
not nearly so much as in the subprime
sector.”).
151
See NAT’L URBAN LEAGUE POL’Y INST.,
2007 HOME MORTGAGE DISCLOSURE ACT
DATA 1 (2008), http://www.nul.org/sites/
default/ﬁles/2007%20HMDA%20Data.pdf
(reporting the race-based disparity in higher
priced lending markets).
152
Id.
153
Vikas Bajaj & Ford Fessenden, What’s
Behind the Race Gap?, THE NATION, November
4, 2007, reprinted in N.Y. TIMES, http://www.
nytimes.com/2007/11/04/weekinreview/
04bajaj.html.
154
NAT’L URBAN LEAGUE, supra note 155, at
2.
155
See ALGERNON AUSTIN, ECONOMIC
POLICY INSTITUTE, SUBPRIME MORTGAGES
ARE NEARLY DOUBLE FOR LATINOS AND
AFRICAN AMERICANS (June 11, 2008)
http://www.epi.org/economic_snapshots/
entry/webfeatures_snapshots_20080611/
(stating that “[r]ecent studies suggest that
creditworthiness—alone or in combination
with factors other than race—cannot account
for race based subprime disparities. When
researchers from the Federal Reserve and the
Wharton School of Business conducted an
analysis that took into account the percent
of adults in a neighborhood who were a very
high credit risk, they still found a positive
relationship between the prevalence of
subprime loans and the share of minorities
in a neighborhood.”); see also Aleo, supra
note 14, at 20 (stating that “[a]ccording
to the CRL study, the racial disparity in
subprime lending has not been strictly based
on borrowers’ income-levels or risk-related
credit factors. The study breaks down its
data by LTV, FICO credit score range, and
race. In the highest-risk borrower category-featuring an LTV of above 90% and FICO
score below 620--African Americans were
only 6% more likely than white borrowers to
receive a subprime loan for a home purchase
and 5% more likely to receive a subprime
loan for reﬁnancing. For borrowers with the

FALL 2010

best credit histories and thus the lowest risk
categories-- LTV below 80% and FICO score
of above 680--African Americans were 65%
more likely to receive subprime loans than
their similarly situated white counterparts
for a home purchase and 124% more likely
when reﬁnancing. Beyond the clear racial
disparities in lending, the increased disparity
in reﬁnancing is particularly unsettling as
minorities who reﬁnance with subprime
loans are at risk of losing the equity that
they have invested in their homes, often
comprising their life savings.”).
156
See Bajaj, supra note 157 (stating that
the biggest home lenders in minority
neighborhoods are subprime lenders).
157
See NAT’L URBAN LEAGUE, supra note
155, at 2 (citing Rick Brooks and Ruth
Simon, Subprime Debacle Traps Even
Very Creditworthy, WALL ST. J., December
3, 2007, http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB119662974358911035. html).
158
See REALTYTRAC, AS SOME TOP METRO
FORECLOSURE ACTIVITY RATES DECREASE,
NEW FORECLOSURE HOT SPOTS EMERGE
IN Q3 2009, (Oct.28, 2009) http://www.
realtytrac.com/contentmanag ement/
pressrelease.aspx?channelid=9&itemid=773
3 (showing the top cities hit by foreclosures);
see also Nick Timiraos, Move Over Merced:
Foreclosures Intensify in New Crop of
Western Cities, http://blogs.wsj.com/
developments/2009/10/28/move-overmerced-foreclosures-intensify-in-new-cropof-western-cities/. (Oct. 28, 2009, 12:53
PM ET) (“foreclosure activity increased
most sharply in several mid-size Western
markets”).
159
See State and County Quick Facts, U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, http://quickfacts.census.
gov/qfd/index.html (citing to the index page:
select state and city to view demographics).
160
Austin, supra note 159; see also WILHELMINA
A. LEIGH AND DANIELLE HUFF, JOINT CENTER
FOR POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC STUDIES,
AFRICAN AMERICANS AND HOMEOWNERSHIP:
THE SUBPRIME LENDING EXPERIENCE 19952007 6 (2007), http://www.scribd.com/
doc/24189487/African-Americans-andHomeownership-The-Subprime-LendingExperience-1995-to-2007-November-2007Brief-2 (reporting on the disparity in incidence
of subprime mortgages among African
American and Latino populations showing
that large percentages of minorities who
receive mortgage and home improvement
loans get subprime loans).
161
ROBERTA K. MCINERNEY, PRACTISING LAW
INSTITUTE, SUBPRIME INSTITUTE 2008, RECENT
FDIC SPEECHES, TESTIMONY 311 (2008)
(reporting on the FDIC announcement that
it will sponsor a Forum aimed at encouraging
Mortgage Lending for Low- and ModerateIncome (LMI) Households on July 8,
2008). “The purpose of the LMI Mortgage

Forum is to explore a framework for LMI
mortgage lending in the future, including
identifying market and regulatory incentives
for encouraging responsible LMI mortgage
lending. The Census Bureau reports that
the national homeownership rate was about
68 percent as of the ﬁrst quarter 2008.
However, the homeownership rate is only
about 51 percent for those households with
below median incomes. Moreover, data
from the Federal Reserve’s 2004 Survey
of Consumer Finances, the latest income
stratiﬁcation information available, show
that for households with incomes in the
bottom ﬁfth of all earners, homeownership
rates are far lower - about 40 percent. ‘I
remain deeply concerned that disruptions
in mortgage credit availability and in the
secondary market will make it even more
difﬁcult for households of modest means
to realize the beneﬁts of owning their own
homes,’ said FDIC Chairman Sheila C
Bair. ‘Particularly in this environment of
tightening lending standards, government
must remain focused on the right incentives
to promote responsible and sustainable
mortgage lending. I look forward to a wideranging and constructive dialogue on the
issues facing LMI borrowers and identifying
recommendations on strategies that will
beneﬁt consumers, lenders, investors, and
the economy.’”).
162
Gilmore et al., supra note 4, at 266 (stating
“ Former President Bill Clinton attempted
to address homeownership during his time
in ofﬁce through a homeownership policy
initiative. At the time of drafting the initiative
later labeled Urban Policy Brief #2, the
homeownership rate for White Americans
was approximately 70% while the rate for
African Americans was 43%. By any measure,
this was a signiﬁcant gap between the races
with respect to homeownership. It existed
well after most of the nation’s segregation
laws had been repealed, which suggests
that the difference in homeownership
rates between whites and blacks was a
complex issue that lacked an easy solution.
The Clinton initiative, while directed at all
Americans, did have a positive effect on the
homeownership rates of African Americans
and Latinos. One study from the Brookings
Institution shaped the homeownership
landscape during the Clinton years, and
provided evidence that homeownership rates
among African Americans and Latinos were
improving signiﬁcantly: Over the past decade,
the gap between rates of homeownership
has narrowed, due in part to an increasing
number of mortgage loans to low-income,
minority households. According to a recent
report from the Brookings Institution,
mortgage lending increased by 98 percent
for African American homebuyers and by
125 percent for Hispanic homebuyers during

43

the 1990s. Rising rates of homeownership
among minorities represent a positive step
toward closing the wealth gap between
whites and other groups.”).
163
See Aleo, supra note 14, at 11 (“Villain
Phil writing on behalf of the editors at the
National Review, in a more measured tone,
claimed that “bankers cannot blame CRA
entirely; they made a lot of bad bets on rising
home prices. But the CRA did inﬂuence
lending standards across the banking industry,
even in those institutions that are not strictly
liable to its jurisdiction. The subprime
debacle is in no trivial part the result of
lending decisions in which political extortion
trumped businesses’ normal bottom-line
concerns.” The conservative critiques of
the CRA were met with stern rebukes
from liberal commentators. The President
of the National Urban League called on
Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson “to refute
statements by conservative politicians and
pundits that subprime mortgages provided
to minorities led to the ﬁnancial crisis and
a $700 billion federal rescue of Wall Street,”
calling such allegations a “big lie.” Daniel
Gross responded, “Let me get this straight.
Investment banks and insurance companies
run by centimillionaires blow up, and it’s
the fault of Jimmy Carter, Bill Clinton, and
poor minorities?” Gross blamed the crisis on
“stupid, reckless lending, of which Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac and the subprime
lenders were an integral part.” As he saw
it, “Investment banks created a demand for
subprime loans because they saw it as a new
asset class that they could dominate. They
made subprime loans for the same reason
they made other loans: They could get paid
for making the loans, for turning them into
securities, and for trading them--frequently
using borrowed capital.”).
164
Leigh, supra note 164, at 3.
165
Id.
166
See Claire A. Hill, Securitization: A LowCost Sweetener For Lemons, 74 WASH U L Q
1061, 1062 (1996) (stating that securitization
has existed since the 1970s). Kathleen C.
Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, Turning A
Blind Eye: Wall Street Finance of Predatory
Lending, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2039, 204647 (2007) (explaining that securitization is a
method of bundling a group of loans that
are sliced into pieces called tranches. Each
slice is rated by the rating agencies. Tranches
are securities that are backed by a pool of
cash-producing assets).
167
Christopher L. Peterson, Predatory
Structured Finance, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2185,
2198 (2007) (describing GSE as including
Federal National Mortgage Association
(FNMA, commonly referred to as Fannie
Mae), Government National Mortgage
Association (GNMA commonly referred
to as Ginnie Mae), and Federal Home Loan

44

Mortgage Corporation (commonly referred
to as Freddie Mac)).
168
Id. at 2199.
169
Id. at 2200.
170
Id.
171
Nomi Prins, The Risk Fallacy, FORTUNE,
Oct. 27, 2008, available at http://money.
cnn.com/2008/10/27/ magazines/fortune/
riskfallacy_prins.fortune/index.htm.
172
Thomas O. Porter, II, The Federal Reserve’s
Catch-22: A Legal Analysis of the Federal
Reserve’s Emergency Powers, 13 N.C. BANKING
INST. 483, 486-89 (2009) (where author
generally contextualizes the housing collapse
by chronicling the dual role of the market to
make money and to do by exercising some
prudence).
173
Id.
174
See, e.g., Frank Partnoy & David A. Skeel,
Jr., The Promise and Perils of Credit Derivatives,
75 U. CIN. L. REV. 1019, 1021 n.1 (2007)
(citing Warren Buffett, Letter to Berkshire
Hathaway Shareholders, and explaining that
derivative are either highly praised or darkly
critiqued by commentators).
175
Brian J.M. Quinn, The Failure of Private
Ordering and the Financial Crisis of 2008, 5 N.
Y. U. J. L. & BUS. 549, 583 (2009).
176
Id. (“[T]he default swap transfers the risk
of default of a reference entity . . . from one
party to another. The buyer of the default
swap makes periodic payments to the seller
of the contract. In the event of a default
by the reference entity bond, the seller of
the swap is obliged to stand in the shoes of
the reference entity and make payment of
the notional principal to the buyer of the
swap.”).
177
See José Gabilondo, Leveraged Liquidity:
Bear Raids and Junk Loans in the New Credit
Market, 34 J. CORP. L. 447, 506 (2009) (in
1990, three U.S. Economists shared the
Nobel prize for their work on the theory
of ﬁnancial economics; Merton Miller,
Harry Markowitz and William Sharpe); see
also Americans Win Nobel for Economics,
BBCNEWS, Oct. 15, 2007, http://news.bbc.
co.uk/2/hi/business/7045067.stm (noting
that the theory the three 2007 prize winners
developed “allows us to distinguish situations
in which markets work well from those in
which they do not.”).
178
See Merton Miller & Franco Modigliani,
Corporate Income Taxes and the Cost of Capital,
53 AM. ECON. REV. 433 (1963). Merton Miller
and Franco Modigliani, The Cost of Capital,
Corporation Finance and the Theory of
Investment, 53 AM. ECON. REV. 261 (1958)
(The theorem is called the capital structure
irrelevance principle because it holds that, in
the absence of taxes, bankruptcy costs, and
asymmetric information and in an efﬁcient
market, the value of a company is unaffected
by how that company is ﬁnanced. The theory
ﬁnds that whether the company is ﬁnanced

by equity or debt is irrelevant as is its policy
of proﬁt distribution.).
179
See MERTON H. MILLER, UNIV. OF
CHICAGO GRADUATE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS,
DO WE REALLY NEED MORE REGULATION
OF FINANCIAL DERIVATIVES? 10 available
at
https://www.chicagogsb.edu/faculty/
selectedpapers/sp75.pdf (stating that a
bank’s swaps and derivates book is managed
to control interest-rate risk).
180
See Mark Whitehouse, How a Formula Ignited
Market that Burned Some Big Investors, WALL ST.
J., Sept. 12, 2005, available at http://math.
bu.edu/people/murad/MarkWhitehouseSli
cesofRisk.txt (noting that the model “helped
to estimate what return investors in certain
credit derivates should demand, how much
they have at risk and what strategies they
should employ to minimize that risk.”).
181
Robert Block & Nir Kossovsky, IP Transfer
And Pricing Considerations For Financial
Service Firms, PAT. STRATEGY & MGMT., Feb.
2006 , at 1 (“A credit default swap (“CDS”) is
a credit derivative that provides a buyer (often
the owner of underlying bonds) protection
against speciﬁc risks. Common risks include
bankruptcy, failure to pay, debt restructuring,
acceleration or repudiation. Building blocks
of the product include complex risk pooling
techniques and risk correlation calculations.
The cornerstone insight is said to be the
application of the Gaussian Copula to
correlation calculations, but each major
player in the market reﬁnes this method with
its own proprietary systems.”).
182
Id. (“[S]pecialists now believe that CDS
markets process new market information
more efﬁciently than bond markets and thus
set superior pricing signals. Impending credit
downgrades will be reﬂected in CDS price
movements before they are reﬂected in the
underlying assets. It is the industry consensus
that innovation leadership in CDS products
and proprietary modeling is squarely centered
in London.”).
183
INT’L MONETARY FUND, GLOBAL FINANCIAL
STABILITY REPORT: CONTAINING SYSTEMIC RISKS
AND RESTORING FINANCIAL SOUNDNESS 37
(2008), http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/
ft/gfsr/2008/01/pdf/text.pdf (explaining
the difﬁculty of developing a clear picture of
which institutions ultimately hold the credit
risk transferred and quantifying the amount
of risk transferred).
184
Commodity Futures Modernization Act
of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763
(2000) (passed by the House and Senate
without debate and signed by President
William Clinton less than a week later); see
Andrew M. Kulpa, Minimal Deterrence:
The Market Impact, Legal Fallout, and
Impending Regulation of Credit Default
Swaps, 5 J. L. ECON. & POL’Y 293, 297 (2009)
(“The CFMA speciﬁcally prevents state and
local laws from regulating gaming contracts

THE MODERN AMERICAN

and bucket shops in the context of CDS
agreements.” “[C]ongress also expressly
excluded CDS agreements from regulation
under the Securities Act of 1933 and the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. This was
another speciﬁc carve out by the CFMA
that actually expanded the deﬁnition of a
“security” under the 1933 and 1934 Acts but
explicitly excluded CDS agreements.”).
185
17 C.F.R. § 242.200 (2007) (The short
sale refers to “any sale of a security which
the seller does not own or any sale which is
consummated by the delivery of a security
borrowed by, or for the account of, the
seller.”).
186
James W. Christian, Robert Shapiro &
John-Paul Whalen, Naked Short Selling: How
Exposed are Investors?, 43 HOUS. L. REV.
1033,1041-42 (2006) (describing a traditional
short sale).
187
SEC v. Lyon, 529 F. Supp. 2d 444, 457
(S.D.N.Y. 2008); Occupational Urgent Care
Health Sys. v. Sutro & Co., 711 F. Supp. 1016,
1025 (E.D. Cal. 1989).
188
Jonathan R. Macey, Mark Mitchell & Jeffry
Netter, Restrictions on Short Sales: An Analysis
of the Uptick Rule and its Role in View of the
October 1987 Stock Market Crash, 74 CORNELL
L. REV. 799, 799 (1989).
189
15 U.S.C. § 78j(a)(1) (2000).
190
David C. Worley, The Regulation of Short
Sales: The Long and Short of it, 55 BROOK. L.
REV. 1255, 1256 (1990).
191
Michael Sloan, Investment Bank Regulation
and the Credit Crisis, 28 REV. BANKING & FIN.
L. 52, 59 (2008) (comparing the standard
equity to debt ratios with the SEC allowed
for investment banks);
Bethany McLean, Ratings Agencies Under Fire,
CNN MONEY.COM, Aug. 21, 2007, http://
money.cnn.com/2007/08/20/magazines/
fortune/ratings_agencies.fortune/index.
htm (attributing the boom to out-of-date
regulations, lax federal oversight, and the
complicity of the three rating agencies). See,
e.g., Credit Rating Agencies Come Under
Fire, FOX BUSINESS, Oct. 22, 2008, http://
www.foxbusiness.com/story/markets/
credit-rating-agencies-come/# (stating that
“inﬂated rating awarded to securities backed
subprime loans led investors to buy them
in enormous numbers. But now, most of
these securities have been downgraded and
the market for them has largely evaporated,
contributing to the current crisis.”).
192
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act
of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3765
(creating the Troubled Assets Relief Program
(TARP) and signed into law by President
George W. Bush on October 3, 2008).
201
Professor Frank Partnoy, University of
San Diego College of Law, former derivatives
broker and corporate securities attorney
and Steve Kroft Oct. 5, 2008, 60 Minutes,
A Look At Wall Street’s Shadow Market,

FALL 2010

http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2008/
10/05/60minutes/main4502454_page4.
shtml?tag=contentMain;contentBody.
193
See 60 Minutes, supra note 151 (discussing
the failures in judgment and otherwise that
led to the collapse of the world ﬁnancial
markets).
194
Todd J. Zywicki & Joseph D. Adamson,
The Law and Economics of Subprime Lending, 80
U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 12 (2009).
195
See Jonathan R. Macey, Wall Street Versus
Main Street: How Ignorance, Hyperbole, and Fear
Lead to Regulation, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1487,
1508 (1998) (labeling Partnoy’s positions on
derivatives as foolhardy).
196
See Bank Credit Default Swaps (CDS),
IBANKNET,
Notional Amounts, www.
ibanknet.com/scripts/callreports/fiList.
aspx?type=bankcds (reporting that Chase
is burdened with a $1 billion dollar CDS
exposure in the failure of the Chicago
Tribune).
197
Government Widens Support for Home
Loans, Credit (PBS television broadcast
Nov. 25, 2008) (transcript available at http://
www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/business/julydec08/fedrole_25.html) (reporting that
the $800 billion federal funds are aimed at
jump-starting mortgage lending, continuing
housing correction, and increasing consumer
spending by buying up $600 billion in debt).
198
See Kulpa, supra note 192, at 297 (referring
to the law prohibiting regulation of CDSs).
199
See, e.g., Abby Cooper, Note, $1 Per Lot for
Affordable Housing in Detroit: Non-Monetary
Beneﬁts Can Constitute Fair Value in the Sale
of City-Owned Surplus Property to Community
Development Corporations, 48 WAYNE L. REV.
1191, 1220 (2002) (providing a proposal for
addressing housing affordability by using a
Detroit, Michigan case model).
200
Dan Nnamdi Mbulu, Affordable Housing:
How Effective are Existing Federal Laws in
Addressing the Housing Needs of Lower Income
Families, 8 AM. U.J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y &
L. 387, 410 (2000) (explaining the LIHTC
program).
201
Clark, supra note 36, at 186-87.
202
Id.
203
Jean Hocker, Land Trusts: Key Elements in the
Struggle Against Sprawl, 15 NAT. RESOURCES &
ENV’T 244, 244 (2001).
204
Id. at 245.
205
Jeanne Goldie Gura, Preserving Affordable
Homeownership Opportunities in Rapidly Escalating
Real Estate Markets, 11 J. AFFORDABLE HOUS.
& CMTY. DEV. L. 78, 83(2001).
206
Hocker, supra note 212, at 246-47 (noting
land trusts are commonly private non-proﬁt
corporations but can also be established as
public non-proﬁt corporations).
207
Gura, supra note 214, at 83; see Itzchak E.
Kornfeld, Conserving Natural Resources and Open
Spaces: A Primer on Individual Giving Options, 23
ENVTL. L. 185, 206-07 (1993) (stating that

a land trust may be organized to preserve
“unique natural lands and the diversity of
wildlife” in fee simple).
208
Duncan M. Greene, Dynamic Conservation
Easements: Facing the Problem of Perpetuity in
Land Conservation, 28 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 883,
886-87 (2005).
209
Julie Farrell Curtin & Lance Bocarsly,
CLTS: A Growing Trend in Affordable Home
Ownership, 17 J. AFFORDABLE HOUS. & CMTY.
DEV. L. 367, 377 (2008) (discussing for
example, retaining housing affordability by
minimizing exposure to property tax increases
by virtue of the ground lease. The author
states “A CLT maintains the affordability of
the housing on its land through its ground
lease.”).
210
Benjamin W. Lund, Payment of Taxes and
Available Exceptions, NATIONAL BUSINESS
INSTITUTE, 02V7511 NBI-CLE 167 (2004).
211
See Curtin, supra note 218, at 377 (noting
that A CLT can balance the competing goals
of affordability and wealth building in its
resale formula).
212
See generally id. (stating the different
resale formulas one can use, which favors
affordability).
213
John A. Powell & Marguerite L. Spencer,
Giving Them the Old “One-Two”: Gentriﬁcation
and the K.O. of Impoverished Urban Dwellers
of Color, 46 HOW. L.J. 433, 464 (2003)
(providing examples of development that
has had a profound impact on the valuation
of existing homes. “Traditional working
class communities close to the city center
(for example, Lake View, Wicker Park) are
experiencing rapid gentriﬁcation. Census
tracts which have had a high percentage of
vacant housing, high poverty rates, and high
percentages of black or Hispanic households,
experienced higher home appreciation than
other locations in the 1990s. ‘New, expensive
housing is being built’ and ‘concentrations of
poverty [are] going farther west, southwest
and to the inner ring of suburbs.’” And
concluding that when viewed through the
lenses of race, class, space and time, the
beneﬁts of gentriﬁcation appear to outweigh
the costs as increased values results in
pushing out lower income people).
214
Lawrence K. Kolodney, Eviction Free Zones: The
Economics of Legal Bricolage in the Fight Against
Displacement, 18 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 507, 512
(1991) (“[A]s a neighborhood gentriﬁes, real
estate speculation may increase the value of
all units, thereby driving up property taxes,
a cost likely to be passed on to existing
tenants.”).
215
Powell, supra note 222, at 447.
216
J. Peter Byrne, Two Cheers for Gentriﬁcation,
46 HOW. L.J. 405, 426 (2003) (“Low-income
homeowners can be more easily protected
against being forced to sell prematurely
by devices that do not distort the basic
functioning of the market. Such homeowners

45

may both be harassed by rising costs and
enjoy the beneﬁt of a rapidly appreciating
asset—their home. To some extent, their
problem is not poverty, but the illiquidity of
assets.”).
217
Melvyn R. Durchslag, Property Tax
Abatement for Low Income Housing: An Idea
Whose Time May Never Arrive, 30 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 367, 377 (1993) (citing Stanley S. Surrey,
Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing
Government Policy: A Comparison with
Direct Government Expenditures, 83 HARV.
L. REV. 705 (1970)).
218
David Burke, The Stop Tax-Exempt Arena
Debt Issuance Act, 23 J. LEGIS 149, 150 (1997)
(noting that “[i]n 1968, Congress restricted
the tax subsidy to capital facilities which
beneﬁt the general public.”).
219
Id. (reporting that partial tax exemptions
would include ﬁxed dollar exemptions that
would exempt a speciﬁc amount of the value
of a residence from taxation. An example is
an exemption for the ﬁrst $20,000 of value.
Such an exemption grants proportionately
more relief to property assessed at a lower
value while encouraging residency by higher
income families to the area. Another form
of this exemption is a percentage–based
exemption where a percentage of the
property value is exempt from taxation).
220
Seth B. Cohen, Teaching an Old Policy New
Tricks: The 421-A Tax Program and the Flaws
of Trickle-Down Housing, 16 J.L. & POL’Y 757,
766 (2008) (ﬁnding that “tax abatements
encourage housing production by ‘providing
a declining exemption on the new value that
is created’ by the development.”).
221
Id.
222
See Durchslag, supra note 226, at 373-74
(challenging the success of tax abatement
programs for housing redevelopment because
it lacks economic incentive and explaining
that encouraging adequate investment in the
affordable housing industry is a problem on
both the private and public levels, because of
the low proﬁt margins).
223
See David Philip Cohen, Improving the Supply
of Affordable Housing: The Role of the LowIncome Housing Tax Credit, 6 J.L. & POL’Y 537,
537 (1998) (recognizing that the purpose
of the Tax Reform Act was to enable the
development of affordable housing).
224
See, e.g., Megan J. Ballard, Proﬁting from

46

Poverty: The Competition Between For-Proﬁt and
Non-Proﬁt Developers for Low-Income Housing
Tax Credits, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 211, 212 (2003)
(arguing in effect that the Tax Reform Act
creates an unfair advantage to for-proﬁt
entities to beneﬁt from government subsidy
to the detriment of nonproﬁt entities).
225
See Allison D. Christians, Breaking the
Subsidy Cycle: A Proposal for Affordable Housing,
32 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 131, 147 (1999)
(stating that the purpose of the tax credit is
to “encourage the development of affordable
housing.”). Kenya Covington & Rodney
Harrell, supra note 79, at 108 (2007); see also
Peter W. Salsich Jr., Expanding the Low-Income
Housing Tax Credit: Raising the Cap and Targeting
Homeownership, 9 J. AFFORDABLE HOUS. &
CMTY. DEV. L. 28, 28 (1999) (“[E]xpansion
of the LIHTC is the main hope for increasing
rental and homeownership opportunities for
low-income families.”).
226
Salsich, supra note 234, at 30.
227
George Lefcoe, Finding the Blight That’s
Right for California Redevelopment Law, 52
HASTINGS L.J. 991, 1001 (2001).
228
Gary P. Winter, Tax Increment Financing: A
Potential Redevelopment Financing Mechanism For
New York Municipalities, 18 FORDHAM URB.L.J.
655, 658 (1991).
229
Fred Galves, The Discriminatory Impact of
Traditional Lending Criteria: An Economic and
Moral Critique, 29 SETON HALL L. REV. 1467,
1475-76 (1999).
230
Christians, supra note 234, at 136.
231
Id. at 136-37.
232
Id. at 136.
233
JOE MATTEY & NANCY WALLACE, FEDERAL
RESERVE BANK OF SAN FRANCISCO, HOUSING
PRICES AND THE INSTABILITY OF MORTGAGE
PREPAYMENT MODELS: EVIDENCE FROM
CALIFORNIA 1 (1998), http://www.sf.frb.
org/ econrsrch/workingp/wp98-05.pdf.
234
Id.
235
William N. Eskridge, Jr., One Hundred
Years of Ineptitude: The Need For Mortgage Rules
Consonant with the Economic and Physiological
Dynamics of the Home Sale Loan Transaction,
70 VA. L. REV. 1083, 1156 (1984); see also
Margalynne Armstrong, Race and Property
Values Entrenched in Segregation, 52 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 1051, 1059 (1998) (considering the
effect of segregation on the marketability of
property in African American neighborhoods

and its effect on wealth building.)
See Christians, supra note 234, at 139.
237
Steven R. Berg, Observations from a Legal
Services Lawyer, 1 GEO. J. ON FIGHTING
POVERTY 67, 68 (1993).
238
NATIONAL CENTER FOR EDUCATION
STATISTICS, STATE & COUNTY ESTIMATES OF
LOW LITERACY, http://nces.ed.gov/naal/
estimates/Approach.aspx 1 (2003) (ﬁnding
that 14 percent of American adults scored
“below basic” literacy, meaning that they
could not perform simple, everyday tasks
that required reading or writing. The report
projected that an estimated 30 million
American adults possessed no more than
the most rudimentary literacy skills); see
Pierre Thomas, Jack Date, Clayton Sandell
& Theresa Cook, Living in the Shadows:
Illiteracy in America, ABC NEWS, Feb.
25, 2008, http://abcnews.go.com/WN/
LegalCenter/story?id=4336421&page=1
(reporting that one 2008 study found that
7 million Americans are illiterate, 27 million
are unable to read well enough to complete a
job application and 30 million cannot read a
simple sentence).
239
James A. Gross, A Human Rights Perspective
on U.S. Education: Only Some Children Matter,
50 CATH. U. L. REV. 919, 920-21 (2001),
(citing ELI GINZBERG & DOUGLAS BRAY, THE
UNEDUCATED 12 (1953)). Mildred Wigfall
Robinson, Financing Adequate Educational
Opportunity, 14 J.L. & POL. 483, 496 (1998)
(stating that “[f]ocusing on illiteracy as mere
access to education arguably is not only
simplistic, it is misleading. Minimal education
– i.e., mere access – passes constitutional
muster as enough to combat illiteracy.
However, minimal education is not enough
in today’s world. Instead, contemporary
societal effort must assure all children of an
adequate education; the effort must be to
provide the resources necessary to achieve
functional literacy.”).
240
See Greg J. Duncan & Anita Zuberi,
Mobility Lessons from Gautreaux and Moving to
Opportunity, 1 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 110, 111112 (2006) (comparing the dramatic results
of the early Gautreaux family studies with
less attractive later results and discussing
various reasons for the different results).
236

THE MODERN AMERICAN

FUTILE ARGUMENTS:
LAWRENCE V. TEXAS AND THE SUPREME COURT BAR
By: Heron Greenesmith 1
I. Introduction
I am a third year law student,
gearing up to face a bleak legal job
market, a bleaker economy, and almost
two hundred thousand dollars in student
debt.2 I entered law school from the
Peace Corps with a clear goal: to be an
advocate for gender and sexual minorities
through public policy, legislative drafting,
or appellate litigation.3 Now to make
that dream come true. Passion? Check.
Knowledge? Check. Partnership in a
D.C. law ﬁrm specializing in appellate
and Supreme Court litigation? Not yet.
Last semester, my penultimate,
I took a seminar on the Supreme Court
taught by long time Supreme Court
journalist Stephen Wermiel. The course
broadly covered several controversial
aspects of the Supreme Court, one of
which was the rise of the professional,
specialized Supreme Court bar. Our
class discussions led me to wonder
how appellate attorney Paul Smith, an
appellate attorney at Jenner and Block,
got the privilege of arguing Lawrence v.
Texas4 in the Supreme Court instead of
the lawyers at Lambda Legal. Mr. Smith
seemed to be a very kind, passionate
individual when he visited our class, but
Mitchell Katine, along with Lambda
Legal lawyers Ruth Harlow and Suzanne
Goldberg, had carried the case from
trial. I was sure that there was a story
behind Mr. Smith getting to argue in the
Supreme Court rather than Mr. Katine,
Ms. Harlow, or Ms. Goldberg, and I
wanted to hear it. Would the theme of
the story be the rise of the Supreme
Court bar: D.C.’s repeat players who have
over ten arguments under each of their
belts and whose names Supreme Court
buffs whisper in reverence?
The elite Supreme Court
bar rises as another hurdle, another
inequity standing between me (and by
proxy all passionate advocates) and
the chance to argue a case before the
Supreme Court. As a future public
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interest lawyer, it is hard to describe my
feelings: a mixture of jealousy, respect,
frustration, resignation. As an advocate
for a particular community, I know that I
do not want to work in general appellate
litigation, waiting around for the case of
my dreams to come to me. I am also
aware that dozens of years often pass
before appellate litigators and successful
advocates are offered the chance to argue
in the Supreme Court. I hope to spend
those years of my life as Ruth Harlow and
Suzanne Goldberg from Lambda Legal
spent theirs, working on a cause about
which they were passionate, creating
legal strategies, building reputations,
writing, researching, arguing, being cool.
But if after all that, Paul Smith was given
the opportunity to argue Lawrence v.
Texas in the Supreme Court instead of
Ruth Harlow, what chance have I? This
paper explores the impact that the elite
Supreme Court bar may have on the
chance that non-specialized lawyers will
be given the opportunity to advocate for
their clients and causes in the Supreme
Court.
II. The Supreme Court Bar
The current consensus in the
literature and among Supreme Court
litigators themselves is that hiring
specialized appellate counsel is generally
a good thing. Michelle Lore wrote an
excellent article for The Minnesota Lawyer
in 2007, detailing all the reasons a trial
lawyer should hand off an appeal to
an appellate specialist.5 Among other
advantages, she points out the specialized
skill set, familiarity with appellate judges,
and the objectivity that new appellate
counsel can bring to a case.6 She also
notes the prestige that attaches to
specialized counsel, recognizing that
clients view appellate work as “a distinct
service.”7
These clients may be correct in
their view. According to Kevin McGuire
and Joseph Swanson, specialized

appellate counsel achieve much higher
rates of being granted certiorari (also
known as “cert,” or review on appeal)
in the Supreme Court and possibly
reach higher rates of winning cases. In
his article, Repeat Players, Mr. McGuire
examined the lawyers in all Supreme
Court cases between 1977 to 1982 to
determine that “lawyers who litigate
in the high court more frequently than
their opponents will prevail substantially
more often.”8 Kevin McGuire proposes
that the more an attorney appears before
the Court, the higher the likelihood of
Joseph Swanson takes
his9 success.10
a micro look at the certiorari process by
examining three particular members of
the Supreme Court bar in three particular
cases, but arrives at a conclusion
similar to Mr. McGuire’s: “One can
only conclude that hiring experienced
Supreme Court counsel to petition the
Justices for review may improve one’s
chances considerably.”11
One consequence of the rise
of the elite Supreme Court bar is that
judges may expect something different,
if not better, of the parties appearing
before them than they have in the
past. According to Jennifer S. Carroll,
appellate judges expect a different level
of legal argumentation than trial judges.12
The “emotional pleas” considered the
norm at the trial level, she says, would be
“inappropriate at the appellate level.”13
In fact, she argues that “[a]pellate practice
has evolved into a specialized area of the
law, and justiﬁably so. The fundamentals
of appellate advocacy—writing a simple
persuasive brief, making an effective oral
argument, and having a command of the
appellate procedure—necessarily reﬂect
effort, skill, and at the highest level,
art.”14
Even the Supreme Court agrees.
The American Bar Association Journal
interviewed15 Justice Antonin Scalia
and Bryan A. Garner about their coauthored book Making Your Case: The Art
of Persuading Judges.16 The book instructs
47

appellate lawyers of at all levels on how
best to write briefs, argue cases, and,
ultimately, convince judges. When the
Journal asked Justice Scalia his thoughts
on the rise of the Supreme Court bar,
the Justice said:
I think that there are a
signiﬁcantly larger number
of lawyers who appear
at least once a term and
sometimes several times a
term than when I ﬁrst came
on the court . . . . I think I
can say that those who do it
with great frequency and are
paid a lot of money to do
it because they are good at
it are obviously going to be
better—other things being
equal—than a novice.17
A litigator approaching her ﬁrst
argument in the Supreme Court may
rightfully worry that this presumed level
of competence creates an ethical duty
to hire specialized appellate counsel.
Christine Macey compares the beneﬁts
of increased chances of being granted
certiorari, more effective oral arguments,
and the affordability of appellate
specialists to the “novice lawyer’s”
obligations to educate her client and
provide competent representation.18
Ms. Macey concludes that “although
statistics show that experience matters
at the High Court,” inexperienced
attorneys may fulﬁll their ethical duties by
comprehensively educating their clients
and preparing adequately for trial.19
Moot courts, Supreme Court clinics,
brief writing assistance, and online and
print resources (including those coauthored by Justices themselves) are
all resources attorneys may use to help
them prepare.20
Ms. Macey also discusses reasons
that attorneys may prefer to not pass on
their cases to appellate attorneys.
“A lawyer may want to keep [a]
case for legitimate reasons, such as
client trust or superior knowledge
of the facts. Alternatively, a
lawyer may wish to keep [a] case
for self-interested reasons. A
Supreme Court argument is a
once-in-a-lifetime
opportunity
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for most attorneys. It could
lead to television or newspaper
coverage, as well as future
business.
Supreme Court
advocacy is associated with
prestige. . . . Legal fees may also
motivate to keep the case to
herself.”21
Some of these reasons may also be related
to a lawyer’s connection with and passion
for the particular cause implicated in the
case. The lawyers involved in Lawrence
v. Texas exemplify the way in which the
rise of the Supreme Court bar can affect
who argues which cases. To explore
the rise of the Supreme Court bar, and
speciﬁcally the role of Lawrence v. Texas
and impact litigation, in the lesbian,
gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT)
movement, I interviewed Paul Smith and
Mitchell Katine and corresponded brieﬂy
with Suzanne Goldberg over email.
III. Interview with Mitchell Katine
Mitchell Katine is a founding
partner at Katine and Nechman, LLP.,
a general practice ﬁrm in Houston,
Texas that advertises its connection to
the LGBT community. The main goal
of my interview was to pinpoint Mr.
Katine’s role in Lawrence and his feelings
about his role and the oral arguments.22
Mr. Katine provided some
context by describing the time preceding
the case and how he and Lambda Legal
got involved. He graduated from law
school in 1985, a year before the Supreme
Court’s decision in Bowers v. Hardwick,23
upholding the constitutionality of the
Georgia law that criminalized homosexual
sodomy. When Mr. Katine started
practicing law in Houston, he was one of
few openly gay lawyers in a state hostile
to the gay community. When LGBT
people called him with problems related
to their sexual orientation, there was not
much he could legally do since Texas
had a statute criminalizing sodomy. Mr.
Katine instead focused his practice on
ﬁghting HIV/AIDS, particularly since
the Americans with Disabilities Act was
being reﬁned to prevent discrimination
on the basis of HIV status. Mr. Katine

developed his reputation as an activist
through his work with HIV/AIDS, and it
is through this work that he met Suzanne
Goldberg of Lambda Legal.
Soon after John Lawrence and
Tyrone Garner were arrested, their case
was “leaked” to gay and lesbian activists
who knew Mr. Katine through his
work with the HIV/AIDS community.
Mr. Katine agreed to help with the
initial criminal hearings. At the time,
he specialized in employment law, real
estate, and HIV discrimination but had
never handled a criminal or constitutional
law case. Still, he realized that this was a
crucial case and that he did not have the
knowledge or experience to handle it. He
contacted Suzanne Goldberg at Lambda
Legal for assistance and asked about the
possibility of Lambda’s involvement.
Fortuitously enough, Lambda was
meeting that day to talk about new cases,
so Ms. Goldberg asked him to fax her
the papers.
Ms. Goldberg agreed to help.
She ﬁrst explained how the relationship
between Lambda and Mr. Katine would
function: because none of Lambda’s
constitutional lawyers were licensed in
Texas, Mr. Katine would play the crucial
role of local counsel. At a fundamental
level, Mr. Katine was lead counsel and
Lambda constituted co-counsel. Mr.
Katine handled the local lawyers, the
media, and the defendants, Lawrence and
Garner. When the case landed on front
pages around the country, many lawyers
wanted to be involved. Lambda, Mr.
Katine, and these other lawyers worked
together. Lambda would call Mr. Katine
with local procedural questions, he would
call one of these lawyers who knew
criminal law or local procedure to ask
them the question, and then Mr. Katine
would forward the answer to Lambda so
that it could properly draft the response
or brief and proceed with the case.
Mr. Katine often found himself
in awe of the brilliant lawyers at Lambda,
and, even though he always considered
Lawrence his case, Mr Katine says he has
never thought that he could or should
have handled that case by himself. He
was not qualiﬁed to, but he appreciated
Lambda’s inclusion of him throughout
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the case. Mr. Katine understood that his
role was local while Lambda’s role was
more national, and he believes that he
never behaved in a way that showed he
felt threatened or wanted to challenge
Lambda’s leadership, even though
Lambda pretty much took over the case
immediately.24
I asked Mr. Katine about Paul
Smith. Mr. Katine’s ﬁrst thought was
that Mr. Smith was a gracious, kind
person, and he knows that Mr. Smith
appreciated him.25 Lambda made the
decision to have Mr. Smith argue the
case because of his experience—he
knew the Court, and the Court knew
that he was an openly gay lawyer—but
Mr. Katine hopes that people who
are in more inﬂuential positions can
emulate Mr. Smith’s appreciation of
the people on the ground. Mr. Smith
could have said “this is my case to get
to the Supreme Court” and could have
mishandled it, but he did not do that.
Mr. Katine hopes that lawyers will keep
their feet on the ground and recognize
that their reputation depends upon their
relationships with other lawyers who
do not have the opportunity to argue
the cases on which they work. Mitchell
Katine, Paul Smith, and Lambda Legal
continue to help each other when they
can, and those ties beneﬁt everyone.
IV. Interview with Paul Smith
I asked for Paul Smith’s opinion,
as a repeat player, on being asked to
argue Lawrence after so many lawyers had
worked so hard to bring the case to the
Supreme Court.26 Mr. Smith emphasized
that Jenner and Block did not take over
this case. First, Lambda made the
decision to take on specialized counsel
when Lawrence reached the Supreme
Court. Mr. Smith acknowledged that
Lambda’s decision was probably partly
based on the elite Supreme Court bar’s
25-year effort to emphasize the need for
specialized counsel and partly based on
the signiﬁcance of this case. Lambda
was worried about it even being safe to
bring Lawrence to the Court in the ﬁrst
place since the Court did (and does)
not have a record of being pro-LGBT
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rights. Lambda chose Jenner because of
its connections and because of the large
number of LGBT lawyers working at the
ﬁrm. Mr. Smith was not the sole reason
that Jenner was retained as counsel.
A second example Mr. Smith
used to demonstrate that Jenner and
Block did not take over the case was that
Ruth Harlow wrote half of the brief
and helped enormously in getting amici
to sign on. Going into oral arguments,
it was actually still assumed that Ms.
Harlow would speak to the Court.
When the Supreme Court granted
cert, the question of who would argue
ﬁnally arose, and Ms. Harlow decided
not to make her rookie Supreme Court
argument in this case. She had to talk
Lambda into agreeing with her. The
compromise was that she and Lambda
would get as much billing in the case as
Jenner and Block—Ms. Harlow would
stand with Mr. Smith in all conferences
and give as many quotes as he would.
She does not have any regrets about
this decision, and Mr. Smith has tried to
repay Lambda for allowing him to do the
arguments by securing recognition for
Lambda’s efforts and serving as co-chair
on its board of directors.
I asked Mr. Smith about the
accuracy of Mr. Katine’s assumption
that Lambda hired Mr. Smith because
he is gay and because the Court knew
at the time that he is gay. Mr. Smith
said that the Court was not then aware
of his sexual orientation. It was more
important that the LGBT community
knew he was gay and wanted someone
from the community to do the arguments.
In contrast, during the arguments in
Bowers v. Hardwick, Laurence Tribe
made a slightly distasteful comment
about the “embarrassing details” of
homosexuality.27 The statement may
have been a deliberate acknowledgement
of the Justices’ discomfort with
homosexuality, but it did not sit well
with those in the LGBT community for
whom he was advocating. Lambda was
aware that the LGBT community would
not want a repeat of that situation. As a
gay man, Mr. Smith felt the direct import
of the case, but he also says that he
would feel the same even if he were not

gay.
Mr. Smith believes that the rise
of the elite Supreme Court bar has largely
helped more than hindered advocacy
groups. The quality of oral arguments
has improved substantially since he was a
clerk at the Court in 1980, partly because
of the rise of this specialized bar, but
also because of mooting sessions, better
preparation, and the Supreme Court
Clinic at Georgetown University, for
example. Mr. Smith thinks that specialists
are necessary, and are especially valuable
because they are able to put a case in the
context of the Court’s jurisprudence.
Still, Mr. Smith thinks that Ms.
Harlow could have won the argument
as well. Mr. Smith and Lambda felt
they won the case as soon as the Court
granted cert, and he could not think of
any particular element of his argument
that won it for him. It was less about
convincing the Court and more about a
presence. There was a “sense of history
in the room.”
Mr. Smith also notes that there
was a deliberate effort to keep Mr.
Katine involved, and Mr. Katine did
receive a lot of credit in Houston for
the case. There are always lawyers who
litigate cases before appellate lawyers
argue them. Attorneys at all stages of
the litigation have to get used to it. There
is a certain awkwardness that comes
from adding lawyers to cases at the last
minute, but new and old attorneys must
be integrated.
V. Suzanne Goldberg and
Ruth Harlow
I asked for Ms. Goldberg’s
view of Mr. Katine’s role in the
litigation, as well as her own feelings
about the Supreme Court arguments.28
Ms. Goldberg agreed with Mr. Katine
that his role relative to Lambda’s was
very delineated. Mr. Katine was local
liaison, and Lambda contributed the
constitutional and LGBT law expertise.
Ms. Goldberg found it “terriﬁc to have
Mitchell as a colleague on the case as he
provided important insight into the local
environment as well as many colleagues
through his law ﬁrm who had criminal
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law and related expertise that was very
useful for the litigation.” Ms. Goldberg
does not regret leaving Lambda in the
midst of Lawrence. Indeed, she is “very,
very happy with the ultimate outcome.”
Regarding her feelings about the decision
to let Paul Smith give the oral arguments,
as opposed to Ruth Harlow or herself,
she recognizes that “[t]he decision was
made by Lambda’s lawyers . . . on the
view that Paul Smith would be the ideal
advocate for the issues raised by the case,
and he did a terriﬁc job!”
VI. Analysis
The interviews reveal a
contradiction. Mr. Smith, Mr. Katine,
and Ms. Goldberg all agree that Lambda’s
decision to hire Jenner and Block, and
Paul Smith in particular, was strategic.
At the same time, Mr. Smith concedes
that the case appeared to be won when
the Court granted cert and that Ms.
Harlow could probably have argued the
case without fear of losing. Ms. Harlow
may have had many reasons for choosing
not to argue Lawrence, but what are the
longer-term impacts of having Mr. Smith
argue the case? Several implications
come to mind.
First, a favorable Supreme Court
ruling in such a high-proﬁle case as
Lawrence solidiﬁes Paul Smith’s excellent
reputation as a member of the Supreme
Court bar and lifts Jenner and Block’s
reputation as a whole. Second, Lawrence
only serves to further convince novice
lawyers, advocacy groups, and clients that
it might be risky to enter the Supreme
Court without specialized counsel. As
Mr. Smith said, “There had been a 25year conscious effort made on the part
of the ‘Supreme Court bar’ to convince
people that they needed special counsel.
Lambda’s decision was particularly
natural because of the importance of
this case.”
Finally, Lawrence, and other cases
like it, may scare novice lawyers29 from
ever arguing in the Supreme Court at all,
especially if they do not work at ﬁrms
that specialize in Supreme Court practice.
“Refusing to allow ﬁrst-time advocates
to argue before the Court,” warns Ms.
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Macey, “would be counterproductive in
the long run; even the most experienced
Supreme Court advocates had a ﬁrst
Supreme Court case.”30
So, is the rise of the Supreme
Court bar good or bad for appellate
advocates? Does it help win cases or does
the hype exceed the value and prevent
the truly passionate from arguing cases?
Is the Supreme Court itself cultivating
the growth of the specialized bar to the
detriment of the advocate?
Ruth Harlow is not Kevin
McGuire’s “typical Supreme Court
lawyer.” Paul Smith, perhaps aside from
his sexuality, is. Mr. Smith’s qualiﬁcations
to argue Lawrence arise from his appellate
work at Jenner and Block. Ms. Harlow’s
qualiﬁcations arise from being the
legal director of an organization with
incredibly extensive appellate work on
the exact issue that was argued in the
Court. So was Paul Smith’s comparatively
narrow skill-set worth the decision to
have him argue the case? If so, how do
advocates like Ms. Harlow ever reach
the Supreme Court? Litigation strategy
certainly must take into consideration
the abilities and experience of the
attorneys involved, but it must also take
into consideration the needs and desires
of the interest group. The Lawrence
team made considerable sacriﬁces to
ensure that the LGBT movement was
best served by the outcome of the case,
and their decisions were informed by
the presence and importance of the elite
Supreme Court bar.
One may extend the analogy
in Lawrence by arguing that Supreme
Court specialists should control impact
litigation from the trial level upward.
Although most appellate lawyers are
not also trial lawyers, a few exceptions
exist. Indeed, two such lawyers recently
brought an action in a Federal District
Court, challenging California’s ban on
same-sex marriage.
VII. Looking forward to
Perry v. Schwarzenegger31
The litigation strategy of the
LGBT movement recently came under
close scrutiny when veteran appellate

lawyers David Boies and Ted Olson
decided to initiate a federal suit against
California’s ban on same-sex marriage in
Perry v. Schwarzenegger.
Litigation strategy involves
calculation and compromise. Mr. Katine,
Ms. Goldberg, Ms. Harlow, and Lambda
Legal all made sacriﬁces by deciding to
ask Mr. Smith to argue Lawrence v. Texas
to the Supreme Court. Mr. Boies and
Mr. Olson, by bringing the case at the
trial level, are effectively preempting
those difﬁcult decisions. Because they
are accomplished appellate lawyers
who have argued multiple cases in the
Supreme Court, they have the luxury of
being able to follow the case through
every step of the appeals process. But
many prominent LGBT groups fear that
Mr. Boies and Mr. Olson do not value
the needs and desires of the LGBT
community as much as the Lawrence team
took such pains to. When Mr. Boies and
Mr. Olson ﬁrst ﬁled the challenge to
“Proposition 8,” these groups protested
the move, worrying that a potential loss
in the Supreme Court would prove more
detrimental to LGBT rights than no
ruling at all.
[N]ot everyone is thrilled with
the decision of Boies and Olson
to pretty much go it alone right
now on a federal suit -- and
that includes the ACLU, the
National Center for Lesbian
Rights and Lambda Legal. The
Boies-Olson team has been
jostling with attorneys of these
and other groups that have
been pursuing LGBT rights
litigation for many years, on a
piecemeal basis in the states.
They wonder how committed
the two are to the victory and
note that Boies and Olson
have next to nothing to lose - except some bragging rights - if they fail. Gays and lesbians,
however, have everything to
lose if the Supreme Court rules
against marriage equality.32
After their initial reluctance, the American
Civil Liberties Union, the National
Center for Lesbian Rights, and Lambda
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Legal all ﬁled to intervene in the case. Mr.
Boies and Mr. Olson refused to let them
intervene, and the judge agreed. Chad
Grifﬁn, the president of the American
Foundation for Equal Rights (“AFER”),33
wrote a letter to the groups detailing
the decision to prevent them from
intervening: “You have unrelentingly
and unequivocally acted to undermine
this case even before it was ﬁled. In light
of this, it is inconceivable that you would
zealously and effectively litigate this case
if you were successful in intervening.
Therefore, we will vigorously oppose
any motion to intervene.”34 This overt
decision to shut-out the participation of
the major LGBT groups was a strong
statement that AFER believes that it can
win the case through the strength of its
lawyers and legal argument, not through
the strength of coalition or movement
building.
Perhaps
AFER’s
decision
was based purely on Mr. Olson’s and
Mr. Boies’ success as members of the
Supreme Court bar. Or perhaps it
was an informed, accurate decision,
calculated to bring the lawyers’ skills
and inﬂuence to a case likely to face
both liberal and conservative judges.
But no matter what the outcome of
the case, AFER’s independent work
may undermine the litigation strategies
that the LGBT groups have spent so
much time cultivating. By reinforcing
the importance of the Supreme Court
bar in impact litigation, Perry could
unnecessarily
deter
inexperienced
lawyers, such as Ruth Harlow, from
risking their inaugural arguments on a
case of such importance.
Perhaps it is not a surprise that
Mr. Boies and Mr. Olson embody Kevin
McGuire’s “typical Supreme Court
lawyer.” As this type of lawyer continues
to be successful in the Supreme Court
in a wide variety of cases, clients will
continue to turn towards the specialized
bar. What does that say to an ever
diversifying pool of upcoming lawyers?
What does it say to the lawyers who are
not that “typical” lawyer? Is it a signal to
give up hope of arguing in front of our
nation’s highest court? What does it say
to advocacy groups? Is it a sign that the
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groups need lawyers like Mr. Boies, Mr.
Olson, and Mr. Smith in order to win?
Or is it a signal that the system needs to
change?
VIII. Conclusion
Creating a successful strategy for
impact litigation requires considerable
sacriﬁce and selﬂess assessment of all
factors. As the relative importance
of the Supreme Court bar grows,
advocacy groups will continue to rely
on outside counsel to argue in front of
the Supreme Court. Lawrence v. Texas
and Perry v. Schwarzenegger represent two
manifestations of this reliance.
In
Lawrence, Lambda made the difﬁcult
decision to ask Paul Smith, someone
invested in the LGBT community as well
as experienced in the Court, to make the
arguments. In Perry, the elite lawyers
have had control of the case from
the beginning.
In our conversation,
Mr. Katine expressed his hope “that
through [the] interview, people who are
in the more inﬂuential positions can
emulate Paul Smith by appreciating the
people on the ground.” In Lawrence,
this appreciation was shown through
including Mr. Katine in all levels of the
litigation and in the decisions to give
Lambda equal booking with Mr. Smith
at the Supreme Court level. By bringing
a case themselves and by preventing the
advocacy groups from signing on, the
lawyers at the American Foundation for
Equal Rights are precluding collaboration
and appreciation.
The outcome Perry and its
subsequent impact on LGBT advocacy
groups remain to be seen. I sincerely
hope that Perry v. Schwarzenegger does not
herald an era in which elite lawyers gain
control of advocacy groups’ litigation
strategies. As always in impact litigation,
a balance must be struck between the
individual clients’ needs, the needs of the
movement, the needs of the advocacy
organizations, and the needs of the
lawyers. I hope that the balance is found
and maintained.
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BOOK REVIEW & ESSAY:
LET’S GET FREE
By: Camille Jones 1
INTRODUCTION
Paul Butler’s recent book, Let’s Get Free: A Hip-Hop
Theory of Justice,2 is a powerful exploration into the conditions
surrounding today’s criminal justice system. Butler, a law
professor, former prosecutor, and black man who has
personally encountered the criminal system, offers a unique
perspective about American crime and punishment. He has
seen the good, the bad, and the ugly of the criminal system,
and he provides valuable insight into its ﬂaws. Let’s Get Free
is inspired by the burgeoning hip hop political movement—a
movement fed by hip hop music’s criminal justice critiques and
reality-driven perspectives on the legal system as a whole. The
book provides a refreshing narrative that critically explores
America’s obsession with extreme punishments for its most
disadvantaged people.
A RUN-IN WITH INJUSTICE
Butler begins by explaining his personal encounter with
the criminal system which resulted from an escalated dispute
with a neighbor. He found himself an accused criminal after
a volatile neighbor, who claimed to have legal ownership over
his parking space, called the police during a heated argument.
This experience demonstrates why Butler is the ideal person to
de-construct the state of the so-called criminal justice system
because he has personally witnessed multiple sides of the
system. He has represented the State when attempting to prove
a person’s guilt and he has also had his own freedom imperiled
by the State. Combining Butler’s explanation of how he carried
himself at trial as a black prosecutor with his description of
how he felt in the police cruiser as another anonymous (alleged)
black criminal, creates a fascinating tension and contributes to
the nuanced tone that is carried throughout the book.
Let’s Get Free is essentially divided into two sections.
The ﬁrst part contains his interpretation of some of the major
issues within the criminal justice system. In the second part,
he offers recommendations on how to ﬁx these problems.
Butler discusses several important issues, including mass
incarceration, harsh criminalization of drug offenders, juror
and prosecutor ethics, controversies surrounding government
informants or “snitches,” and ﬁnally the inﬂuence of hip-hop
on society’s impression of convicts. Butler then explores the
ways in which the criminal system can become more productive
and contribute to a safer country.
One major issue Butler examines is the effect of mass
incarceration on society. America’s “lock em up” mentality
has put 7.3 million Americans on probation, in jail, in prison,
or on parole as of 2008.3 Incarceration is such a pervasive
phenomenon that there is mass overcrowding in prisons, which
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leads to more traumatized, formerly incarcerated people once
they are released.4 The “lock ‘em up” mentality thrusts people
who commit non-violent crimes into prison, leaves them with
fewer options once released, and thus increases the likelihood
of recidivism. This is just one of Butler’s many examples of
how the current system is counter-productive.
Another major issue Butler discusses is the impact of
draconian drug laws on marginalized communities. He argues
that non-violent drug penalties are disproportionate to the
crimes committed and that they do not achieve the goals for
which they were created. This chapter, generally speaking,
debunks myths about the criminalization of certain drugs.
Particularly, he argues for less harsh penalties for non-violent
drug offenses involving personal drug use. Although this
line of argument is familiar to criminal justice advocates, its
importance to a hip-hop theory of justice is indispensible, and
strikes at the heart of the contradictions within our criminal
system.
The book’s ﬁnal chapters examine certain groups’
inﬂuence on America’s justice outlook. Butler looks at a wide
range of actors from government informants, sometimes called
“snitches,” to celebrities. Butler discusses the impact of these
actors on trials, sentencing, and the overall opinion society
forms of people who serve time. Butler’s contribution, perhaps,
is the hip-hop theory of justice, which is a critical legal analysis
of how hip hop’s critiques of the criminal justice system are
instructive for society at-large. Butler delves into how rappers
have supported those currently in jail and challenged the view
that those who have been to jail are “bad” people. This analysis
explores how the justice system could change in the future
based on an evolved perception of criminals and how they
should be treated by society once released to the outside.
The second part of Let’s Get Free offers solutions to the
book’s critiques. Butler discusses how alternative sentencing
would help rehabilitate people within the criminal system and
ultimately, create safer communities. He examines the use of
monitoring technology for certain non-violent convicts to
allow them to return to their homes and communities. Such a
reform would reduce recidivism for certain crimes, especially
non-violent drug crimes. Most signiﬁcantly, however, Butler
proposes seven speciﬁc ways in which justice can better be
served within the United States from cradle to crave: reducing
the amount of lead ingested by poor communities, paying
students to complete high school, ending racial proﬁling,
sending convicts to their communities rather than jail for certain
crimes, imposing punishments that are more proportional to
crimes (especially non-violent crimes), encouraging citizens’
involvement in local justice reform, and reducing the prison
population by half a million people. Butler contends that if
these changes are made in the United States, they will ultimately
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lead to a safer and more productive society.
CONSTITUTIONAL CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE
Jury nulliﬁcation, for which Butler is a long-time
advocate, is one issue that warrants discussion in greater detail.
Jury nulliﬁcation provides citizens with the opportunity to tell
a prosecutor and the federal government that they are opposed
to criminal statute with which the defendant is charged.
Motivations vary from a person’s disapproval of the particular
law at issue to a disagreement with the punishment that will
be handed down to the defendant. Butler argues that jury
nulliﬁcation should be exercised in cases involving non-violent
drug crimes because the punishment does not serve any of
the parties involved. While the State is successful at locking
up more drug users, society does not beneﬁt more people
from going to jail. Incapacitation does not prevent recidivism.
However, if the defendant were acquitted despite the evidence
Butler suggests that it is likely that the experience of being on
trial would be enough to keep them from committing the same
crime again. In this way, jury nullifcation may be an effective
recidivism deterrent. However, for jurors to exercise their right
to jury nulliﬁcation they must be aware of it.
Many people view jury duty as a nuisance that forces
them to be away from work, loved ones, or other things that
they feel are more important. However, many of these people
do not realize the power that they possess when serving on a
jury. Even though lawyers argue to the best of their ability to
prove a person’s guilt or non-guilt, in the end, the power lies in
the hands of the jury. Each juror must examine the evidence
and instructions provided on one hand. On the other, each
juror also reserves the constitutional right to decide acquit
despite the evidence. This is the essence of jury nulliﬁcation.
Jury nulliﬁcation is:
a jury’s knowing and deliberate rejection of
the evidence or refusal to apply the law either
because the jury wants to send a message about
some social issue that is larger than the case itself
or because the result dictated by law to the jury’s
sense of justice, morality, or fairness.5
Butler argues that citizens should exercise this
constitutional right more often. The greatest obstacle to jury
nulliﬁcation is that the public is generally unaware of it. In
some situations, juries exercise this power without being aware
that they have actually done so. Popular television shows
have given this issue visibility with story lines centered on an
underdog who wins a case purely because the jury reached a
decision outside the scope of the legal deﬁnition of the alleged
crime. Though viewers cheer for the underdog, they remain
unaware of the power that they hold to do exactly what they
are seeing—they have to right to choose not to convict despite
the evidence if they disagree with the law.
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Jury nulliﬁcation is rooted in the Sixth Amendment
right for an accused person to be judged by a jury of peers6 and
has a long history in America. It was supported by many of
the Founding Fathers as falling within their democratic vision
of justice, though in recent times it has reached somewhat of
an impasse.7 John Adams stated that “it is not only his (juror’s)
right, but his duty . . . to ﬁnd the verdict according to his own
best understanding, judgment and conscience, though in direct
opposition to the direction of the court.”8 However, this right
is not always communicated to citizens. Although courts have
ruled that jury nulliﬁcation is allowed, judges do not have to
tell juries about it.9
General verdict standards support jury nulliﬁcation,
this is because jurors are not required to explain how a verdict
was reached, and they can decide guilt based on any reason. 10
Jury nulliﬁcation is strongly polarizing, with a small number who
see both its pros and cons.11 Supporters view jury nulliﬁcation
as a safety valve—a way in which citizens may express their
opinion about a law particularly if they feel estranged from
the law-making process.12 Critics see it as a means by which a
jury takes on the role of the judge and legislature.13 Although
Butler promotes increased use of jury nulliﬁcation, his position
best falls into this middle category. Those in this category
see jury nulliﬁcation as a practice that should be used only in
extreme situations and recognize that it can create efﬁciency
and justice problems within a fundamentally fair system if
used too often.14 Butler, therefore, supports jury nulliﬁcation
in very limited circumstances.
Butler supports jury nulliﬁcation in criminal cases that
involve non-violent drug offenses because neither the State nor
defendant beneﬁt from mass incarceration. John Jay, the ﬁrst
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, found great importance in
the public’s right to judge laws. In Georgia v. Brailsford, he wrote,
“juries have the right to take upon themselves to judge both
the law as well as the facts.”15 If society agrees with Butler’s
opinion that non-violent drug crimes do not deserve jail time,
then jury nulliﬁcation would be in direct agreement with both
John Adams and John Jay who are inﬂuential ﬁgures in the
formation of the American legal system.
Jury nulliﬁcation has met court opposition throughout
history. A number of rulings have upheld the jury’s right to
nullify a decision. However, none of these rulings obligate
courts to instruct jurors about nulliﬁcation. In an 1895
Supreme Court case, Sparf v. United States, the Court held that
judges are not required to inform jurors of their de facto right
of juror nulliﬁcation, although jurors’ inherent right to judge
the law remains undisturbed.16 This standard was recently
upheld in United States v. Moylan (1971)17 and United States v.
Dougherty (1972).18 In Moylan, the Court clearly states its belief
that a jury may acquit despite evidence proving guilt:
We recognize, as appellants urge, the undisputed
power of the jury to acquit, even if its verdict
is contrary to the law as given by the judge, and
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CONCLUSION

contrary to the evidence. This is a power that must
exist as long as we adhere to the general verdict
in criminal cases, for the courts cannot search the
minds of the jurors to ﬁnd the basis upon which
they judge. If the jury feels that the law under
which the defendant is accused, is unjust, or that
exigent circumstances justiﬁed the actions of the
accused, or for any reason which appeals to their
logic or passion, the jury has the power to acquit,
and the courts must abide by that decision.19

Today, jury nulliﬁcation is also an issue that polarizes
judges. Some judges have elected to explicitly instruct juries
that they may convict if the evidence supports that decision,
not that they must convict.20 However, in other instances,
judges have refused to include information that informs jurors
about jury nulliﬁcation.21 While the rhetoric seems minimal, it
delivers a very different call to action for jurors. Judges should
at least more clearly inform jurors about their constitutional
right to nullify.

An educated citizenry is an integral part of a successful
democracy and legal system. Defendants need to be aware of
their rights. However, jurors must also be aware of their right
to determine the validity of the law and the manner in which it
is applied. Jury nulliﬁcation is one example of how an educated
citizenry may stand in opposition to the government and send
a message to law-makers that the people do not support the
current laws. By accessing information about jury nulliﬁcation,
individuals put themselves in powerful positions. This is very
important in minority communities because it delivers the
message to law-makers that laws that are unfairly applied to
certain racial or class groups will not be tolerated. In a letter
to Thomas Paine, Thomas Jefferson said, “I consider trial by
jury as the only anchor ever yet imagined by man, by which a
Government can be held to the principles of its constitution.”22
Jury nulliﬁcation is a perfect example of how people can hold
law-makers to the Constitution.
Let’s Get Free is a thought-provoking book that forces
the reader to examine controversial, and sometimes littleknown issues in the criminal system. Jury nulliﬁcation is only
one issue that is examined in Butler’s book but it is among the
more eye opening ones. Let’s Get Free should be read by any
person involved in the criminal system. Regardless of whether
or not the reader agrees with Butler’s positions, Let’s Get Free
will force readers to critically examine the system’s current state.
This book provides vital information for people as informed
citizens, too. To hold the legislature accountable for protecting
the Peoples’ constitutional rights, the People must know what
their rights are in the ﬁrst place.
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“The Elite Factory”
Online Symposium Issue
Call for Papers

The “Elite Factory” is a self-reﬂective political critique of the legal profession’s inability to create genuine access to
the greater public with legal needs. This critique argues that the insular school-to-practice pipeline reinforces elitist
values that rationalize unequal access, and that these values are systemically embedded in legal education and existing
delivery models.
The American Bar Association reports that the average amount borrowed for a private law school education increased
from $83,181 in 2005 to $91,506 in 2008. Some of the Modern American Executive Board members will spend up
to $177,000 for a three-year Juris Doctor degree. This type of debt proves debilitating to most students, and forces
graduates to make tremendously hard personal choices about their professional lives.
Law is a $300 billion per year industry. Although 45 million Americans qualify for civil legal aid, there are only 4,000
lawyers in this ﬁeld. Among the population that qualiﬁes for legal aid, half will have a legal need each year, which goes
largely unmet. An estimated 90% of lawyers serve 10% of the total population. This means that lawyers are available
but because of the profession’s service delivery structure, America’s most well-off are saturated with legal access,
while most of us strain to afford an attorney if we can do so at all.
Why? There are a number of reasons, including wealth inequities that allow a small number of people to ﬁnance legal
education without monstrous debt, an education funnel effect which reserves admissions to America’s best educated,
a homogenous legal community, perverse economic incentives based on a skewed delivery system, and systemic class
and racial inequality that perpetuate self-important rationalizations about why the system is the way it is.
How do we transform the elite factory system? Is this professional model sustainable for a twenty-ﬁrst century
environment that demands transparency, accountability, fairness, and justice? Should we turn away from legal solutions
altogether?
As a follow-up to our successful spring 2010 symposium, TMA is seeking short essays (12 single-spaced pages or
fewer) and legal commentary about the ways in which lawyers are creating access and dismantling barriers to access.
We invite creative and non-traditional pieces from practitioners, scholars, and students who are critically thinking and
addressing this issue.
TMA will accept papers on a rolling-basis with a September 15, 2010. Submissions should be single-spaced in
Garamond font typeface with one-inch margins and endnote citations.
Only e-mail submissions will be accepted at tma@wcl.american.edu.
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CONFLATING HEALTH CARE REFORM WITH TORT REFORM
By: Steven M. Pavsner 1
The recent health care reform act encourages the States to develop
alternatives to the traditional tort system for health claims to control health
costs. Many alternatives have already been tried in the States, but none
have succeeded, except in impairing access to the courts to redress medical
negligence, particularly among disadvantaged groups.

including remittitur, new trial, and appeal, which are commonly
invoked to reduce outsize awards to appropriate levels. It is
therefore not surprising that numerous studies have shown
that neither the incidence of medical negligence suits, nor the
size of plaintiffs’ verdicts, has signiﬁcantly increased during
the “insurance crisis,” much less at the pace with which liability
On March 23, 2010, President Obama signed the premiums have risen.
“Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act” into law.2
Nor have premiums decreased in States that have
Turning aside years of effort to blame rising health care costs adopted “tort reform,” as compared to States that have not.
on “lawsuit abuse” and to impose federal restrictions on state- To the contrary, insurers in States with tort reform have raised
law tort claims as the solution, the Act instead calls on the rates higher and faster than insurers in States without tort
States to seek alternatives to the traditional tort system for reform. The simple reason is that factors other than medical
health care claims. This commentary looks at alternatives the negligence verdicts drive premiums. Numerous studies
States already have tried. It ﬁnds that none these alternatives demonstrate that liability insurance premiums are driven by
have achieved their stated objectives, and all of them have had insurers’ returns on the premium dollars they invest in the
a disparate impact on the most vulnerable among us.
market, not by losses on the premium dollars they pay in
Speciﬁcally, the Act encourages the States to “develop claims. But it’s easier for insurers to blame “litigious plaintiffs”
and test alternatives to the existing civil litigation system as and “greedy lawyers” than their own portfolio managers. And
a way of improving patient safety, reducing medical errors, why not take the easy path? If some members of the public
encouraging the efﬁcient resolution of disputes, increasing believe that their doctors are being driven out of business by
the availability of prompt and fair resolution of disputes, “lawsuit abuse,” they will carry that bias into the jury room
and improving access to liability insurance, while preserving an and return defendants’ verdicts. If some legislators rely on the
individual’s right to seek redress in court….”3 Toward that end, the misinformation and enact limits on medical negligence claims,
Act authorizes the Secretary of the Department of Health and the insurance industry wins again.
Human Services to award “demonstration grants” to States
More than half the States have experimented with
“for the development, implementation, and evaluation of a wide variety of alternatives to the traditional tort system,
alternatives to current tort litigation for resolving disputes over relying on the presumed relationship between health costs and
injuries allegedly caused by health care providers or health care health claims. Existing alternatives include changes to when
organizations.”4
claimants may sue, hoops they must jump through before they
The nexus between health care and tort reform is the may sue, what they may recover when they sue, from whom
alleged relationship between health care costs and a supposed they may recover if they win their suit, and what they pay for
increase in the incidence or size of health claim verdicts. The the chance to sue.
presumed mechanism for health care cost reduction (thus
Restrictions on when health claims may be brought
limiting medical negligence lawsuits) is the lowering medical include shortening limitations in general, limiting the “discovery
liability damage payments. This would
rule,” or requiring minors’ claims to
supposedly allow insurers to lower
The nexus between health care and be brought before they reach majority.
medical liability insurance premiums,
Hurdles to ﬁling in court include
tort reform is the alleged relationwhich would reduce physicians’ costs of
requiring prior notice to the defendant,
ship between heath care costs and a
doing business, and allow them to reduce
submission of the claim to mediation or
supposed increase in the incidence or arbitration before ﬁling, or preparation
their service fees.
size of health claim verdicts.
Unfortunately overlooked is the
of certiﬁcates and reports from doctors
fact that no convincing evidence exists
willing to testify against their peers as a
to support the alleged relationship between health care costs precondition to ﬁling in court.
and health care claims. Studies can be found to support the
Once in court, some States restrict the amount of
relationship, but the better-reasoned and methodologically forensic work expert witnesses may perform, but the most
superior studies are to the contrary. In the “crisis” atmosphere popular alternatives to traditional tort law are limits on the
created by tort reform proponents, it is easier to decry outsize amount or type of damages that the injured party can recover.
verdicts than to review the studies. But anecdotal reports of These include a cap on all damages, or a cap on non-economic
outsize verdicts are irrelevant, in part because they are so rare damages (sometimes indexed to inﬂation or time and sometimes
and in part because they are rarely paid. The traditional tort not), a bar to punitive damages (usually by raising the standard
system has numerous safeguards against outlying verdicts, of proof to “actual malice”), requiring that amounts awarded
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for future damages be paid out over time as the future damages reduced to the cap level. As a result, groups with no earnings,
are incurred, and precluding proof of economic losses paid such as seniors, or historically lower earnings, such as racial and
by a collateral source, such as a health insurance policy. Juries ethnic minorities and women, receive less of their jury awards
generally are not told of these limits, which are imposed in than others. The disparity is only exacerbated by reliance on
post-trial proceedings and can decimate the amount the jury historical race- and gender-based statistics to measure the
intended the victim to receive. States also have experimented loss.
with abolition of the common law concept of joint and several
The nature of the injuries suffered by these same groups
liability, and have instead required juries to apportion damages also contributes to the disproportionate impact of tort reform
according to fault. In such States, when substantial fault is upon them. Injuries resulting from obstetric or gynecologic
assigned to an impecunious or under-insured defendant, the care are common in medical negligence litigation, but the
injured party recovers less than the full jury-awarded damages. resulting verdicts for undiagnosed breast cancer or infertility
Other changes have been made to the traditional tort or other peculiarly “female” damages are often expressed in
system that affect an injured party’s ability to bring a lawsuit larger non-economic than economic awards, and thus are not
in the ﬁrst place, such as the reduction of the contingent fully recovered in “cap” States. The same is true of a child
fee claimants’ counsel may charge for their services or the who has to go through life scarred or maimed or of a senior
requirement that the injured party to pay defense fees if the who is abused in a nursing home. Infertility, disﬁgurement,
suit is lost. Reducing plaintiff ’s counsel’s fees reduces access scarring, blindness, burns, loss of a limb and chronic pain are
to the courts because as the reward for winning decreases, some of the many devastating injuries that cause enormous
willingness to incur the risk of loss also decreases, especially in pain and suffering are properly recognized by an award of
health claims cases, which are particularly expensive and time- non-economic damages, and thus are not fully compensated
consuming to pursue. The abrogation of the “American Rule,” under most tort reform regimes. Indeed, in many such
which does not require losing plaintiffs
cases, the prospect of receiving a lower
to pay defendants’ attorneys’ fees, in
percentage of a reduced award obtained
. . . it’s far better than any of
favor of “offer of judgment” rules,
in a more expensive process has led
the alternatives yet devised.
which impose the winner’s attorneys’
victims and their attorneys to conclude
fees on the loser, deter plaintiffs from
that otherwise meritorious claims are not
ﬁling meritorious claims and raise the stakes much higher for economically viable. Wherever the economic component of
prospective plaintiffs. Insurers are far more able to bear this the loss is relatively small, but the non-economic component
risk than individual plaintiffs, for whom loss of the claim can is great, current tort reform measures heap injustice on top of
mean ﬁnancial ruin.
injury.
Of course, many States employ different combinations
When victims are not fairly compensated, and
of these individual strategies to create their own unique variety vulnerable groups are disproportionately impacted, the whole
of “tort reform,” so there is no shortage of “alternatives to system of justice suffers. A vibrant tort system is a founding
current tort litigation for resolving disputes over injuries principle of our democracy, a deterrent to negligence, and
allegedly caused by health care providers or health care an early warning of recurring problems in our society. The
organizations.” What is lacking, and what the demonstration traditional tort system has its ﬂaws, but, to paraphrase Winston
projects authorized by the Act should focus on ﬁnding, is any Churchill, it’s far better than any of the alternatives yet
alternative to the traditional tort system that reduces liability devised.
insurance premiums while preserving an individual’s access to
the courts and spreading the burden of tort reform equally
among all litigants.
None of the many changes enacted in the States have
Endnotes
reduced liability insurance premiums, except at the cost of
also impairing the individual’s right to seek redress in court. 1 Steven Pavsner is an Adjunct Professor at Washington College of
This is particularly true of children, seniors, racial and ethnic Law, American University, and Shareholder, Joseph, Greenwald &
minorities, the economically underprivileged, and women. Laake, P.A., Greenbelt, MD 20770.
These already disadvantaged groups are disproportionately 2 Sheryl Gay Stolberg and Robert Pear, Obama Signs Health Care
impacted by tort reform for a number of reasons, including Overhaul Bill, With a Flourish, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2010.
3
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, §
their lower earnings and the nature of the injuries they suffer.
6801
(emphasis added).
Lost earnings can be a signiﬁcant component of a 4
Id.
at
§ 10607.
claimant’s economic damages, and under virtually all of the
existing changes they are fully compensated. Victims whose
losses do not include earnings, or include them at a lesser level,
may be equally compensated by juries, but their awards will
have a greater non-economic component, which will then be
FALL 2010
59

LEGISLATIVE UPDATES
By: Cheryl Chado
S. 1102: “Domestic Partnership Beneﬁts and Obligations
Act of 2009”
The Domestic Partnership Beneﬁts and Obligations
Act of 2009 (“DPBO”) provides that federal employees and
their domestic partners will be entitled to the same beneﬁts
and obligations as married federal employees and their
spouses, regardless of the gender of the parties.1 The Act
deﬁnes a domestic partner as “an adult unmarried person
living with another adult unmarried person of the same sex in
a committed, intimate relationship,” and requires employees
to ﬁle a certiﬁcate of eligibility as to their relationship.2
Through this Act, domestic partners will be able to receive
health insurance, retirement and disability beneﬁts and plans,
emergency and medical leave, and any other beneﬁt provided
by the federal government to any employee.3
The DPBO reﬂects the sentiments of many
Americans who support the inclusion of same sex couples
in health insurance coverage beneﬁts.4 This opinion is also
felt by over ﬁfty percent of Fortune 500 companies who also
provide beneﬁts to domestic partners of their employees.5
As Joe Solmonese, president of the Human Rights Campaign,
said, “This legislation would allow the federal government to
keep pace with other top employers.”6 By allowing the same
beneﬁts as private employers, the federal government will be
able to continue to have “access to the top talent on the same
basis as the nation’s leading corporations.”7
However, not everyone is a fan of the Act’s goals.
The Family Research Council points out the increased cost
to taxpayers, estimating nearly a billion dollars required for
funding.8
Further, critics in favor of lesbian and gay equality
point out the Act’s failure to address “Don’t Ask Don’t Tell,”
by excluding military service members from those federal
employees eligible for coverage.9
Senator Joseph Lieberman (I-CT) introduced the
Act in the Senate on May 20, 2009 with twenty-seven cosponsors. The Act was discussed in a hearing of the Senate
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
on October 15, 2009. It was ordered to be reported with
an amendment in the nature of a substitute favorably in
December, 2009. Representative Tammy Baldwin (D-WI)
introduces H.R. 2517 in the House on May 20, 2009 with
one hundred and forty co-sponsors. As of January 29, 2010,
the Act was placed on the Union Calendar, No. 239, in the
House.
H.Res. 194: “Supporting the Goals of International
Women’s Day”
International Women’s Day (“IWD”) is a day of
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global celebration that falls on March 8 of every year. The
ﬁrst Women’s Day was ﬁrst celebrated in 1911 in Austria,
Denmark, Germany, and Switzerland, and was attended by
more than one million people advocating for women’s rights
and an end to employment discrimination.10 IWD has greatly
expanded in prominence over the past century. It is now
recognized as an ofﬁcial holiday in approximately ﬁfteen
countries.11
International Women’s Day has achieved the same
popularity and status as Mother’s Day in a number of
countries,12 but it has not yet reached that level of recognition
in the United States. Representative Janice Schakowsky (DIL) and forty-six co-sponsors have introduced this Resolution
to the House in an effort to support IWD, citing staggering
statistics of gender disparity across the world.13 The
Resolution explains that, although there are now many more
women in powerful leadership positions across the world,
“women still face political and economic obstacles, struggles
for basic rights, face the threat of discrimination, and are
targets of violence all over the world.”14 Other disparities
include the fact that women account for a majority of people
affected by poverty, illiteracy, HIV/AIDS, domestic violence
and abuse.15
This Resolution is a solid effort by the House of
Representatives not only to support and recognize the
goals of International Women’s Day but also to “issue a
proclamation calling upon the people of the United States
to observe International Women’s Day with appropriate
programs and activities.”16
S. 752: “Fair Election Now Act”
The Fair Election Now Act outlines a public funding
system for Senate elections and establishes provisions for
contribution requirements and joint fundraising committees.17
The Act would amend the Federal Election Campaign Act
of 1971 (FECA) by creating a Fair Elections Fund and
a Fair Elections Oversight Board.18 The Act would set
additional requirements for campaign ﬁnancing, including
a public debate requirement, political advertising vouchers,
and the prohibition of joint fundraising committees outside
of the candidate’s ofﬁcial committee.19 Essentially, the Act
would “allow federal candidates to choose to run for ofﬁce
without relying on large contributions, big money bundlers,
or donations from lobbyists.”20 Candidates would then “be
freed from the constant fundraising” and better able to focus
on what their communities want.21
Supporters of the Act have described it as promoting
“a Congress that is more responsive to the voters, less
busy chasing dollars and less reliant on special interests.”22
Commentators have also said that publicly ﬁnanced political

THE MODERN AMERICAN

campaigns “are the answer,” and that they will open doors
for a greater number of candidates and allow for “more
competitive races and … campaigns focusing on the concerns
of individual voters, not special interests.”23
The Fair Election Now Act was introduced by
Senator Richard Durbin (D-IL) on March 31, 2009 and
referred to the Committee on Rules and Administration.24
An act of the same name was introduced in the House by
Representative John Larson (D-CT) on the same day and was
discussed in the House Energy and Commerce Committee in
July 2009.25
“Don’t Ask Don’t Tell”
The National Defense Authorization Act of 1994
contains a section entitled, “Policy concerning homosexuality
in the Armed Forces.”26 The “Don’t Ask Don’t Tell”
policy, as it is more commonly known, has been the widely
discussed subject of debate since its enactment. The Act
begins by stating that there is no constitutional right to serve
in the military, and it is up to the discretion of Congress
to determine who may or may not serve.27 The Act brieﬂy
discusses the requirements for members to achieve success
as a military unit, including “high morale, good order and
discipline, and unit cohesion.”28 The Act further states that,
since the “presence … in the armed forces of persons who
demonstrate a propensity or intent to engage in homosexual
acts would create an unacceptable risk,” those individuals
must be excluded from the military service.29
Since the Act was passed, numerous retired generals
and military personnel have come forward to argue that
“Don’t Ask Don’t Tell” should be repealed.30 Senator Carl
Levin (D-MI), chair of the Armed Services Committee, has
said that this issue is not a priority for many lawmakers.31

The argument has also been made that, with troops ﬁghting
wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, perhaps now is not the time to
reintroduce this highly controversial debate.32 Representative
Ellen Tauscher (D-CA) has supported the repeal for the past
few years and has sponsored legislation in the House, but also
acknowledges that a change of this nature will inevitably take
time.33
Senator Roland Burris (D-IL) has compared “Don’t
Ask Don’t Tell” to racial integration of the military under
President Truman’s administration, saying, “At one time …
members of my race couldn’t even serve in the military. And
we moved to this point where they’re some of the best and
brightest that we’ve had … We must have everyone who is
capable, willing and able to volunteer to defend this country
… regardless [of] their sexual orientation.”34 Echoing Senator
Burris’ statements, Representative Tauscher has described
“Don’t Ask Don’t Tell” as “the last big piece of civil rights
legislation left.”35
In February, 2010, Defense Secretary Robert Gates
announced that the Pentagon would be undertaking a yearlong study to assess the attitudes of military service members
and potential consequences of repealing “Don’t Ask Don’t
Tell.”36 Anticipated factors of analysis include the effects on
unit cohesion and service member bonding, as well as other
issues such as military communities and family housing.37
Gates said, “We will enter this examination with no
preconceived views but a recognition that this will represent a
fundamental change in personnel policy…”38
Indeed, a repeal of “Don’t Ask Don’t Tell” would
represent a fundamental change. While progress has not
been made as swiftly as some may have hoped, there is a large
contingent of supportive lawmakers and military personnel
who hope to resolve this issue soon.
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